Policy and Oversight Report

Intelligence Operations Directorate

Evaluation Report on Training of Foreign Military Personnel - Phase I

Report Number PO 97-007 February 21, 1997

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Acronyms

ASD(C^3I)	Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence)
ATSD(IO)	Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Intelligence Oversight)
DEPSECDEF	Deputy Secretary of Defense
SECDEF	Secretary of Defense
SOA	School of the Americas
USSOUTHCOM	U.S. Southern Command

INSPECTOR GENERAL
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February 21, 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS, AND INTELLIGENCE)
ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT)

SUBJECT: Evaluation Report on Training of Foreign Military Personnel - Phase I (Report No. PO 97-007)

We are providing this evaluation report for information and use. We conducted the evaluation in response to a Deputy Secretary of Defense request. This report is one in a series of evaluation reports to be issued. We considered management comments on a draft of this report in preparing the final report.

Comments on the draft of this report conformed to the requirements of DoD Directive 7650.3 and left no unresolved issues. Therefore, no additional comments are required.

We appreciate the courtesies extended to the evaluation staff. Questions on the evaluation should be directed to (b) (6), Program Director, at (b) (6) (DSN (b) (6)) or (b) (6), Project Manager, at (b) (6) (DSN (b) (6)). See Appendix D for the report distribution. The team members are listed inside the back cover.

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Assistant Inspector General
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Office of the Inspector General, DoD

Report No. PO 97-007 **February 21, 1997**
(Project No. 7OI-9009)

Training of Foreign Military Personnel - Phase I

Executive Summary

Introduction. On August 9, 1991, the Secretary of Defense directed the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Intelligence Oversight) to investigate the use of Spanish language intelligence training manuals in the U.S. Southern Command area of responsibility. The manuals contained materials considered inconsistent with U.S. and Department of Defense policies. In its March 10, 1992, report, "Improper Material in Spanish-Language Intelligence Training Manuals," the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Intelligence Oversight) told the Secretary of Defense that Army personnel involved in the preparation of the manuals and the presentation of associated intelligence courses did not recognize that the materials contravened DoD policies and that no evidence was found of a deliberate and orchestrated attempt to violate those policies.

Objectives. On September 30, 1996, the Deputy Secretary of Defense asked the Inspector General, Department of Defense, to review the March 10, 1992, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Intelligence Oversight) report and supporting material to determine whether it is adequate to assess individual responsibility. If the report and supporting materials were judged inadequate for this purpose, the Inspector General was requested to take additional steps as may be practical and necessary to determine individual responsibility. As a follow-on to this overarching objective, the Inspector General, Department of Defense, was asked to determine whether corrective actions resulting from the March 1992 report were satisfactorily implemented.

On October 7, 1996, the original tasking was expanded to examine how training conducted at the School of the Americas is reviewed and approved and examine intelligence training for foreign personnel throughout the Department of Defense. These latter two tasks will be addressed in future reports.

Results. The investigation performed by the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Intelligence Oversight) was adequate for concluding no deliberate and orchestrated attempt was made to violate Department of Defense or U.S. Army policies. The intent of the investigation was to determine how objectionable materials in the manuals were introduced into the Army educational system and to make certain that similar activity did not recur. From 1982 through early 1991, many mistakes were made and repeated by numerous and continually changing personnel in several organizations from Panama to Georgia to Washington, D.C. Lack of attention to Department of Defense and U.S. Army policies and procedures by those personnel and organizations perpetuated the assumption that the materials in the Spanish language intelligence training manuals were proper and doctrinally correct. We conclude that:

o absent the discovery of evidence that the lengthy episode was a deliberate attempt to violate Department of Defense policies, the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Intelligence Oversight) decision not to pursue the issue of individual responsibility was justified and

o further investigation to assess individual responsibility is not required because we found no evidence to support that action.

In compliance with the recommendations for corrective action in the March 1992 Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Intelligence Oversight) report, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence) issued a policy memorandum on intelligence and counterintelligence training of non-United States persons. The memorandum specified that such training could be provided when it supports national security objectives and that it should reflect current Department of Defense policies and procedures. The memorandum directed that training material must be approved by the appropriate doctrinal authority to ensure consistency with policy and that the material must be cleared for foreign release. In cases where the training is provided overseas, policy approval must be obtained through the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence). We conclude that even though the policy memorandum was well intentioned, it had little impact. The Army and the Defense Intelligence Agency were the only DoD Components that published documents in support of the memorandum while others had no record of receipt or considered no action was needed. Had the memorandum been issued as a DoD Directive, it would have compelled action addressees to report actions to comply with its provisions.

Summary of Recommendations. We recommend that the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence) reissue its August 1992 policy memorandum as a DoD Directive on the provision of intelligence training to non-U.S. persons that includes requirements for the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence Oversight) to ensure that intelligence oversight inspections scrutinize intelligence training for foreign students.

Management Comments. We received comments on a draft of this report from the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence) and the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Intelligence Oversight). The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence) concurred with the recommendation to reissue its August 1992 policy memorandum as a DoD Directive. The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Intelligence Oversight) had no comment. See Part III for the discussion of management comments and Part V for the complete text of those comments.

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Background

On March 28, 1991, the U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) requested approval for a counterintelligence Mobile Training Team to conduct an intelligence course for Colombian military personnel in Bogota, Colombia. The Joint Staff did not endorse the proposal and requested clarification on the details of the course of instruction. Upon review of the proposed instructional documentation, the Joint Staff and the Defense Intelligence Agency discovered that several passages contained inappropriate material that violated U.S. laws and DoD policies. Immediate corrective action was initiated and the Mobile Training Team counterintelligence course for Colombia was never conducted.

On August 9, 1991, the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) directed the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Intelligence Oversight) (ATSD[IO]) to conduct a full investigation of the matter and to report to the SECDEF any recommendations deemed appropriate. The ATSD(IO) issued its report, "Improper Material in Spanish-Language Intelligence Training Manuals," March 10, 1992. The report recommended that:

o the Joint Staff establish a policy to ensure that intelligence and counterintelligence training for foreign personnel is consistent with U.S. and DoD policy;

o DoD intelligence agencies and military Service schools conducting intelligence training for foreign personnel should ensure that training materials have been approved for consistency with U.S. and DoD policy;

o the Army conduct a damage assessment of the classified information disclosed through use of the manuals; and

o the General Counsel, DoD, retain one copy of the manuals and that all other copies of the manuals and associated materials should be destroyed.

The SECDEF approved the report and its four recommendations on March 27, 1992, and directed the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence) (ASD[C^3I]) to issue instructions to implement the corrective actions. ASD(C^3I) policy memorandum, "DoD Policy on Intelligence and Counterintelligence Training of Non-United States Persons," August 27, 1992, implemented the recommendations approved by the SECDEF.

On September 30, 1996, the Deputy Secretary of Defense (DEPSECDEF) asked the Inspector General, DoD, to review the 1992 ATSD(IO) report and supporting material to determine whether it is adequate to assess individual responsibility. See Appendix C for the chronology of events related to the evolution of inappropriate materials.

Objectives

As requested by the DEPSECDEF, our primary objective was to assess the adequacy of the ATSD(IO) report and supporting materials to determine individual responsibility. If the report and supporting materials were inconclusive or otherwise insufficient to determine whether a deliberate attempt was made to provide instructional materials not in accordance with Departmental human rights policies, we were to take additional steps to determine individual responsibility and accountability.

Based on an October 7, 1996, meeting of the DEPSECDEF and the Inspector General, DoD, and the expressed interest of the Under Secretary of the Army for immediate attention to the School of the Americas (SOA) as it relates to the use of inappropriate materials, three objectives were added:

o determine whether corrective actions resulting from the 1992 ATSD(IO) report were satisfactorily implemented,

o determine how training conducted at the SOA is reviewed and approved for doctrinal consistency and currency by appropriate DoD and Army functional proponents, and

o examine intelligence training for foreign personnel throughout the DoD.

See Appendix A for a discussion of the evaluation process. See Appendix B for a summary of prior reports and reviews related to the evaluation.

Structure of Report

The details of our report are presented in two parts. In Part II, we discuss the March 1992 ATSD(IO) report and assess the adequacy of the report to determine individual responsibility. In Part III, we address the ASD(C^3I) August 1992 policy memorandum that implemented the recommendations in the ATSD(IO) report and examine the corrective actions taken as a result of that memorandum.

Part II - The March 1992 Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Intelligence Oversight) Report

Assessment of Individual Responsibility

Our review of documentation and interviews with the former ATSD(IO) and former and current ATSD(IO) staff members who assisted him showed that the initial intent of their investigation was to determine how the objectionable materials in the manuals were introduced into the Army's educational system and to make certain that such an occurrence did not recur. The former ATSD(IO) and his staff interviewed numerous officials, including those in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Department of the Army, the Joint Staff, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the USSOUTHCOM, the U.S. Army South, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command, the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School, the SOA, and the 470th Military Intelligence Brigade. During the ATSD(IO) interview and investigative process, individual actions related to the manuals were continuously addressed. The former ATSD(IO) said that his investigative team found no unlawful activity by any individual or organization. Had it discovered such activity, the former ATSD(IO) said he would have pursued the individuals involved and would have made recommendations to address personal wrongdoing.

The ATSD(IO) received neither instructions nor guidance on how to proceed, and no limitations were placed on its investigation. The ATSD(IO) was aware that the USSOUTHCOM had commenced an internal investigation and, therefore, to avoid duplication of effort, waited until that investigation was completed before commencing its inquiry. USSOUTHCOM found objectionable language in the manuals but could not determine whether that language was expunged prior to use at the SOA in 1982. USSOUTHCOM directed retrieval of the manuals, a complete review of intelligence and counterintelligence training to ensure its compliance with policy, a review of the adequacy of the USSOUTHCOM intelligence oversight program and instructions to U.S. Military Groups to advise their counterparts in the USSOUTHCOM area of responsibility that the manuals did not represent U.S. policy.

The ATSD(IO) gave the President's Intelligence Oversight Board periodic status reports on the investigation and the General Counsel, DoD, was kept apprised of its progress. Further, periodic meetings were conducted among the ATSD(IO); the General Counsel, DoD; and the President's Intelligence Oversight Board.

ATSD(IO) Report Findings. On August 9, 1991, the SECDEF directed the ATSD(IO) to investigate the use of manuals containing objectionable material in the training of Latin American military students in the USSOUTHCOM area of responsibility. The ATSD(IO) initiated its inquiry August 16, 1991, and submitted its classified report March 10, 1992. The ATSD(IO) reported the results of the investigation and the planned actions resulting from the recommendations to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Secretary of the Army, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the President's Intelligence Oversight Board.

The ATSD(IO) report found that:

o the Spanish language manuals had evolved from lesson plans used in an intelligence course at the SOA and were based, in part, on old material from Project X (see Appendix C for a discussion of Project X);

o neither the Army element at the USSOUTHCOM nor the faculty at the SOA followed Army policy for doctrinal approval of the manuals;

o no English language version of the manuals was ever prepared;

o USSOUTHCOM Mobile Training Teams distributed copies of the manuals to military personnel and intelligence schools in Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Peru, and as many as 1,000 copies of the manuals may have been distributed in the USSOUTHCOM area of responsibility from 1987 through 1989 to students from Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela at the SOA from 1989 through early 1991;

o five of the seven manuals contained language and statements in violation of legal, regulatory, or policy prohibitions, such as motivation by fear, payment of bounties for enemy dead, false imprisonment, and the use of truth serum*; and

o Army personnel involved in the preparation and presentation of the intelligence courses did not recognize that the training materials contravened DoD policies and the report found no evidence that a deliberate and orchestrated attempt was made to violate DoD or U.S. Army policies.

The report noted that DoD representatives in Latin America had been instructed to advise their counterparts that the manuals were outdated and did not represent U.S. Government policy. Further, while efforts continued to recover all manuals in circulation, total retrieval was considered doubtful.

Conclusion

The former ATSD(IO) said, when interviewed as part of our evaluation, that a series of events over a long period resulted in the use of questionable materials

*Tab H to the March 10, 1992, ATSD(IO) report cites 1949 Geneva Convention, Articles 3 and 18; Title 18, United States Code, Sections 872 and 875; Title 22, United States Code, Sections 2304(a)(3), 2347b, and 2349aa-1; Executive Order 12333, paragraph 2.11; DoD Directive 5240.1-R, procedures 2,3, and 4; and numerous federal and state laws prohibiting assault and battery (not further specified).

for foreign student instruction. We agree with that assessment. Formulation of a 382-hour Spanish language course of instruction on military intelligence for foreign students at the SOA in 1982 was the genesis of a nearly 10-year problem. Throughout the period, numerous and continually changing personnel in several organizations from Panama to Georgia to Washington, D.C., made and repeated many mistakes. Lack of attention to DoD and U.S. Army policies and procedures by those same personnel and organizations perpetuated the assumption that the material was proper and doctrinally correct. We agree with the ATSD(IO) report that "It is incredible that the use of the lesson plans since 1982, and the manuals since 1987, evaded the established system of doctrinal controls." The ATSD(IO) report focused on systemic difficulties and recommended corrective actions to prevent recurrence of the appearance of inappropriate materials in intelligence training manuals provided to foreign students. While numerous individuals and organizations made many unintentional mistakes and false assumptions, the ATSD(IO) report found no evidence that a deliberate attempt was made to contravene DoD or U.S. Army policies. We agree with that conclusion.

Based on our review of the March 1992 ATSD(IO) report and associated materials, we conclude that further investigation to assess individual responsibility is not required.

Part III - The August 1992 Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence) Policy Memorandum

Corrective Actions Taken to Implement the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Intelligence Oversight) Report Recommendations

ATSD(IO) Recommendations. The March 10, 1992, ATSD(IO) report recommended that:

o the Joint Staff establish a policy to ensure that intelligence and counterintelligence training for foreign military personnel by combatant unified commands is consistent with U.S. and DoD policy and that instructional material used in that training has been approved by the appropriate Service Component;

o DoD intelligence agencies and military Service schools conducting intelligence training of foreign personnel should ensure that training materials have been approved by the appropriate proponent school or doctrinal authority for consistency with U.S. and DoD policy, that information and documents have been cleared for release to foreign governments, and that a master copy of the lesson plans and instructional material is available in the English language;

o the Army conduct a damage assessment of the classified information disclosed through the use of the manuals; and

o for record purposes, the General Counsel, DoD, should retain one copy of each of the seven manuals and that all other copies of the manuals and associated instructional materials, including computer disks, lesson plans, and Project X documents should be destroyed.

If the SECDEF approved, the report indicated that the ASD(C^3I) would issue instructions to implement the measures. The SECDEF approved the report and its recommendations on March 27, 1992.

Action Taken

Damage Assessment. On July 23, 1992, the ASD(C^3I) asked the Army to conduct a damage assessment of any classified information that may have been compromised as a result of being in the training manuals. On November 16, 1992, the Army reported that the damage assessment was complete and that "potential damage to the security, integrity, or goals of the U.S. Government, USSOUTHCOM, or the U.S. Army falls between minimal and non-existent."

Destruction of Manuals and Associated Material. On April 29, 1992, the ATSD(IO) informed the President's Intelligence Oversight Board that the

SECDEF had approved the ATSD(IO) report and that, as part of the follow-on actions, the ASD(C^3I) would notify the congressional intelligence committees on the results of the inquiry.

On July 23, 1992, the ASD(C^3I) notified the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence that the Army and the USSOUTHCOM were being instructed to destroy all copies of the manuals to include lesson plans and related documentation. A record of the manuals would be on file with the General Counsel, DoD. In addition, the committees were told that DoD representatives in Latin American countries were advising their counterparts that the manuals did not represent U.S. Government policy.

Policy Guidance. The ASD(C^3I) letters to the congressional intelligence committees stated that, to prevent recurrence of the problem, guidance would be issued reiterating that training for foreign military personnel must be consistent with U.S. Government policy and approved by the respective Service Component.

On August 27, 1992, ASD(C^3I) issued a policy memorandum, "DoD Policy on Intelligence and Counterintelligence Training of Non-United States Persons," to the:

- Secretaries of the Military Departments;
- Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff;
- Director, Defense Intelligence Agency; and
- Director, National Security Agency.

The memorandum indicates that:

- intelligence and counterintelligence training may be provided when it supports national security objectives;

- such training shall conform with current statutes, executive orders, directives, instructions, and regulations and shall reflect current policies and procedures;

- training material must have been approved by the appropriate doctrinal authority to ensure its consistency with policy and must have been cleared for foreign release;

- where training is provided overseas, Office of the Secretary of Defense policy approval must be obtained through ASD(C^3I); and

- a master copy of all lesson plans and instructional material must be available in English.

Procedural guidance is an attachment to the memorandum.

The memorandum was coordinated with the ATSD(IO). The General Counsel, DoD, and the Joint Staff were provided information copies prior to publication

and had no objections. Once the memorandum was signed by the ASD(C^3I), the author said he personally hand-carried a copy to each action addressee.

Receipt of the Memorandum and Actions Taken

We contacted the action addressees to determine whether they had received the ASD(C^3I) policy memorandum and then ascertained what actions, if any, were taken to comply with the DoD policy guidance.

o Army - The memorandum was received. Using the memorandum as guidance, the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence forwarded the Department of the Army policy on the matter in a memorandum to the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca on November 18, 1992. Information copies were provided to the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command and the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command.

o Navy - The memorandum was received; however, it was forwarded to four separate offices within the Navy Staff for information only. The office of the Commandant of the Marine Corps received a copy for information only.

o Air Force - No record that the memorandum was received.

o Joint Staff - No record that the memorandum was received.

o Defense Intelligence Agency - The memorandum was received. Using the memorandum as guidance, Defense Intelligence Agency published Defense Intelligence Agency Regulation No. 24-12, "Training of Foreign Students," February 10, 1995. The regulation applies to all Defense Intelligence Agency elements and activities. Additionally, it furnishes guidance that DoD activities and other agencies involved in intelligence training of foreign students can use.

o National Security Agency - No record that the memorandum was received.

The "Joint Security Assistance Training Regulation," dated March 27, 1990, incorporates Army Regulation 12-15, Secretary of the Navy Instruction 4950.4, and Air Force Regulation 50-29. It prescribes policies, responsibilities, procedures, and administration for the education and training of international military students as authorized by U.S. security assistance legislation. It deals specifically with training under the International Military Education and Training program and the Foreign Military Sales program. Several additional documents address training of foreign students, including:

o Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Title 22, United States Code as amended;

o Arms Export Control Act of 1976, Title 22, United States Code as amended;

o DoD Directive 5230.11, "Disclosure of Classified Information to Foreign Governments and International Organizations," June 16, 1992; and

o DoD Manual 5105.38M, "Security Assistance Management Manual," October 1, 1988.

The Navy said that it uses Defense Intelligence Agency Regulation 24-12 as its guidance document; the National Security Agency said that its training for foreign personnel is accomplished on a case-by-case basis; and the Air Force has a series of local operating instructions such as the 315th Training Squadron Operating Instruction 16-2, "Use of Unclassified Materials in Support of Course Lecture," September 1, 1995. The Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, memorandum and the Defense Intelligence Agency Regulation were the only evidence we found to suggest that action addressees complied with the provisions of the August 27, 1992, ASD(C^3I) policy memorandum.

Memorandum Impact

Interviews of former ASD(C^3I) officials involved in the formulation of the policy memorandum disclosed that, while the memorandum was envisioned as an outgrowth of the ATSD(IO) report recommendations, no specific instructions were given regarding its contents. The intent of the memorandum, according to its author and confirmed by the former ATSD(IO), was to remind addressees of their responsibilities pertaining to intelligence training of non-U.S. persons. The author said that the memorandum was crafted to ensure that Office of the Secretary of Defense policy approval is properly coordinated and obtained from ASD(C^3I) when intelligence training for foreign personnel is conducted overseas. Concern was focused on mobile training teams providing intelligence training overseas to foreign personnel and the need to prevent training materials from being used without approval from appropriate organizations. The SOA was not at issue in the memorandum.

In hindsight, the author of the policy memorandum stated that the memorandum may have had more impact had it been published as a DoD Directive. We agree with that view. However, a directive usually takes approximately 1 year to formulate, staff, and gain approval. In this case, in the interest of timeliness, a policy memorandum was issued to demonstrate that the DoD was serious about this systemic problem. The memorandum was issued with the expectation that the guidance would be followed, but the lack of an established ASD(C^3I) mechanism to monitor compliance with the policy memorandum was a drawback.

We found no evidence that action addressees followed the guidance by requesting Office of the Secretary of Defense policy approval through ASD(C^3I) for intelligence training conducted overseas for foreign students. We were told that the Army and the Navy pursued obtaining policy approval on several occasions within months of the publication of the ASD(C^3I) policy

memorandum. Current ASD(C^3I) staff members said that they have only seen a few requests in recent years, mainly from U.S. Army Pacific, that cite the ASD(C^3I) policy memorandum. The extent of intelligence and counterintelligence training conducted for foreign military overseas will be addressed in our Phase III report.

Conclusion

We conclude that even though the ASD(C^3I) August 1992 policy memorandum was well intentioned, several missing ingredients prevented its success. While the memorandum was issued 5 months after the recommendation appeared in the ATSD(IO) report, it had little impact on action addressees. The Army and the Defense Intelligence Agency were the only DoD Components that published documents in support of the memorandum; other action addressees had no record of receipt or considered no action was needed. The ASD(C^3I) had no mechanism in place to monitor compliance with its memorandum. As a result, the issue of DoD policy on intelligence and counterintelligence training of non-U.S. persons evaporated and current ASD(C^3I) staff members have little or no recollection of the 1992 memorandum. Had the policy memorandum been issued as a DoD Directive, the action addressees would have been compelled to report actions to comply with its provisions within a prescribed period. Finally, had a DoD Directive been issued, the ATSD(IO) and the action addressees' inspectors general would have been better positioned to include training for foreign students in their intelligence oversight inspections.

Recommendations and Management Comments

We recommend that the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence) reissue its August 1992 policy memorandum as a DoD Directive to ensure:

1. Action addressees fulfill their continuing responsibilities related to the provision of intelligence training for non-U.S. persons.

2. The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Intelligence Oversight) and other intelligence oversight activities scrutinize intelligence training for foreign students.

Management Comments. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence) concurred with the recommendation. The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Intelligence Oversight) had no comment on the recommendation.

Part IV - Additional Information

Appendix A. Evaluation Process

Scope

Because of the breadth of this task, we will issue reports in three phases.

o This effort constitutes Phase I. It addresses the March 1992 ATSD(IO) report and supporting materials and the August 1992 ASD(C^3I) policy memorandum.

o Phase II, to be issued later, will address the present policies and procedures for review and approval of training given to foreign personnel at the SOA.

o Phase III, to be issued after the Phase II report, will address intelligence training for foreign personnel throughout the DoD.

To achieve the first two objectives, we reviewed the March 1992 ATSD(IO) report and approximately 2,500 pages of supporting and associated materials from the ATSD(IO). We also reviewed approximately 1,000 pages of data related to the issue dating from April 1991 through October 1996 obtained from the Inspector General, Department of the Army, and all documentation received to formulate the Inspector General and General Counsel, DoD, October 1995 joint report, "GUATEMALA REVIEW," to the President's Intelligence Oversight Board. That report included a section on inappropriate training materials used at the SOA and throughout the USSOUTHCOM area of responsibility.

We also interviewed more than 20 current and former U.S. Government employees, including:

o the former ATSD(IO) and the three members of his staff who assisted him in the 1991/1992 SECDEF-directed investigation;

o the former ASD(C^3I) staff member who was the principal author of the August 1992 policy memorandum that implemented the ATSD(IO) report recommendations, one other former ASD(C^3I) staff member who participated in drafting the memorandum, and one current ASD(C^3I) staff member who participated in coordinating the memorandum through the DoD;

o representatives from the Military Departments, the ASD(C^3I), the Joint Staff, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Agency who deal with issues related to intelligence training of foreign personnel; and

o members of the Inspector General staff, Department of the Army.

Methodology

Using the data collected from the ATSD(IO), the Army, and the interviews, we constructed a chronology of events that began with the development of the first lesson plans for an intelligence course at the SOA in 1982 and culminated with discovering the use of inappropriate training materials in the USSOUTHCOM area of operations in 1991.

We analyzed the events and interviewed the ATSD(IO) members who conducted the investigation at the direction of the SECDEF to determine whether the ATSD(IO) report and supporting materials adequately assessed individual responsibility. We then reviewed the ASD(C^3I) policy memorandum that implemented the ATSD(IO) recommendations and interviewed its principal author. Finally, to assess the sufficiency of corrective measures, we contacted the policy memorandum action addressees to first determine whether they had received the memorandum and then to learn what, if any, action they had taken in response to the memorandum.

Computer-Processed Data and Sampling. We did not use computer-processed data or statistical sampling procedures for this evaluation.

Evaluation Period. We performed this evaluation from October through December 1996.

Contacts During the Evaluation. We visited or contacted individuals and organizations within the DoD. Further details are available on request.

Appendix B. Summary of Prior Reports and Reviews

During the past 5 years, the General Accounting Office; the General Counsel and Inspector General, DoD; the SOA Board of Visitors; U.S. Army Infantry Center Task Force; and Professional Software Engineering, Inc. issued reports discussing SOA issues.

General Accounting Office

General Accounting Office Report No. NSIAD-96-178 (OSD Case No. 1171), "School of the Americas - U.S. Military Training for Latin American Countries," August 22, 1996, states that the SOA training is intended to provide a long-term investment in a positive relationship with Latin America. Training at the SOA makes up a small percentage of the entire training the Army provides to foreign students. The courses offered at the SOA are based on U.S. military doctrine and are similar to courses at other Army training locations. The SOA courses emphasize the protection of human rights.

The report refers to a recent study contracted by the Army (Professional Software Engineering, Inc., White Paper, August 4, 1995; discussed below) that concludes that the School should remain open but recommended changes. The report states that the DoD agrees with the white paper recommendations and is considering how to implement them. Finally, the report indicates that to strengthen civilian institutions in Latin America, the DoD is considering establishing a separate institution to focus on civil-military relations and the development of greater civilian expertise in the region's Defense establishments.

General Counsel and Inspector General, DoD

The DoD Guatemala Review Panel, chaired by the General Counsel and Inspector General, issued Report Serial Number SI-433514-95, "Guatemala Review - Report to the President's Intelligence Oversight Board," on October 31, 1995. The report, which focused on a Government-wide review of allegations surrounding the death, disappearance, and kidnapping of U.S. citizens and others in Guatemala, included a description of the use of inappropriate training materials in the USSOUTHCOM area of responsibility from 1982 through 1991. The report states that Guatemala was among the nations that received intelligence training from USSOUTHCOM Mobile Training Teams using the inappropriate manuals and Guatemala military personnel were students at the SOA when the manuals were in use.

Board of Visitors, U.S. Army School of the Americas

The "Initial Report of the Board of Visitors," July 8, 1996, states that the SOA mission is being pursued in an exemplary manner by the Commandant and his staff. The SOA fulfills a need in providing doctrinal training as well as instruction on civilian control, democratic values, and human rights. The Board of Visitors made several recommendations, including that:

o the current mission of SOA remain unchanged;

o the SOA become more relevant to Latin American country needs by modifying doctrine, curriculum, and course materials;

o the SOA remain under the command of Training and Doctrine Command;

o Spanish remain the principal language for SOA courses; and

o the SOA curriculum be monitored to ensure that current inclusion of human rights instruction is maintained and strengthened.

U.S. Army Infantry Center Task Force

The U.S. Army Infantry Center Task Force, "Report on the School of the Americas," March 15, 1994, states that the SOA has been and remains a valuable strategic instrument. The SOA accomplishes its assigned mission and complies with applicable regulations. The nomination and selection process of SOA cadre and students is sound. The SOA courses are comprehensive, doctrinally sound, and cost-effective. Less than 1 percent of all SOA graduates are alleged to have committed crimes or human rights violations. No evidence indicates that the SOA courses influenced the alleged criminal behavior. The report concludes that the SOA human rights training is an active, comprehensive, and integrated program that effectively promotes human rights. The report recommends that the human rights program be further legitimized by assigning an Army Judge Advocate as the proponent for human rights training and that the SOA should be provided adequate resources to continue to execute its mission.

Professional Software Engineering, Inc.

The Professional Software Engineering, Inc., a consulting firm under contract with the U.S. Army, "White Paper on U.S. Army School of the Americas," August 4, 1995, states that the SOA is strategically important to the United States and that the SOA mission supports U.S. foreign policy. The publicity received by the SOA has given the U.S. Army an opportunity to examine the school's operations closely and resulted in added emphasis on human rights in

the course materials. The white paper stresses that human rights violations by Latin American military personnel cannot be linked to SOA instruction or training.

The white paper recommends that:

o the Army reaffirm Spanish as the language of instruction at the SOA,

o the SOA be subordinated to USSOUTHCOM,

o the Training and Doctrine Command seek a clear statement of policy regarding the SOA,

o the Training and Doctrine Command ask the DoD to review the interpretation of the Expanded International Military Education and Training criteria, and

o the Training and Doctrine Command investigate the affiliation between the SOA and the Inter-American Defense College.

Appendix C. Evolution of Inappropriate Materials

Chronology of Events

The following chronology shows the events regarding the use of inappropriate materials in training foreign students at the SOA and throughout the USSOUTHCOM area of responsibility.

The SOA was established in 1946 at Fort Amador, Canal Zone, and transferred to Fort Gulick, Panama, in 1949. The school suspended operations in September 1984 to comply with the terms of the Panama Canal Treaty and reopened at Fort Benning, Georgia, in late 1984. The SOA is a military educational institution that has trained more than 55,000 officers, cadets, and noncommissioned officers from 22 Latin American countries. All instruction is conducted in the Spanish language. The school is charged by Public Law (Title 10, United States Code, Section 4415) and its mission statement to develop and conduct for the armed forces of Latin America the most doctrinally sound, relevant, and cost-effective training programs; promote military professionalism; foster cooperation among multinational military forces; and expand the Latin American armed forces' knowledge of U.S. customs and traditions.

The Department of Nonresident Instruction at the U.S. Army Intelligence School, Fort Holabird, Maryland, developed the Joint Foreign Intelligence Assistance Program (Project X) in 1965-1966. The purpose of Project X was to provide intelligence training to friendly foreign countries. The U.S. Intelligence School on Okinawa first used it to train Vietnamese and other friendly foreign nation personnel. While we found no records regarding the release of Project X materials to foreign nationals, all Project X materials were presumably authorized for release to those foreign nations receiving that intelligence training.

In the mid-1970s, after moving to Fort Huachuca, Arizona, the U.S Army Intelligence Center and School began providing, on request, Project X materials to U.S. Security Assistance Organizations, U.S. Defense Attache Offices, and other U.S. military organizations participating in the U.S. advisory training effort in friendly foreign countries. In addition, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School instructors used Project X materials as reference guides in preparing lesson plans for its Foreign Officer Course. Again, we found no records related to the release of Project X materials to foreign nationals. We assume that the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School believed that all such materials were unclassified and, therefore, authorized for release. By 1981, the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School abolished its Department of Nonresident Instruction; however, it maintained a master file of Project X materials.

Appendix C. Evolution of Inappropriate Materials

In 1982, the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School at Fort Huachuca was tasked by the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, to develop a 382-hour Spanish language course of instruction on military intelligence for use by the SOA. In constructing the course, materials were selected from existing lesson plans at the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School as well as from the Project X materials, which were still stored there. Project X materials were chosen for use because presumably they had previously been cleared for foreign disclosure.

During course development, the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School was concerned that while Project X materials were previously presumably authorized for release to friendly foreign countries, some of the material appeared to be a word-for-word extract of U.S. Army Field Manual 30-18, "Intelligence Collection Operations," a classified manual. The U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School requested the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence to provide a declassification review of the proposed Project X materials that would be incorporated into the course. The Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence told the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School during the summer of 1982 that the materials could be incorporated into the course so long as it reviewed the materials for currency. The materials were reviewed and course construction was then completed.

The first course using the Project X materials was conducted at the SOA in September 1982. It was taught by the U.S. Army officer who was initially tasked to put the course together. During the fall of 1982, the SOA raised concern over some course material and ordered that references to "sodium pentathol" and "termination," among others, be eliminated. Thereafter, the course, presumably absent any reference to objectionable language, was taught regularly by temporary duty personnel from Fort Huachuca and, from 1986 through 1989, by the author of the course, who had transferred from Fort Huachuca to the SOA in 1986.

In 1987, the USSOUTHCOM directed the 470th Military Intelligence Brigade, the intelligence component of U.S. Army South, to form a Regional Training Detachment to teach intelligence to foreign military personnel in the USSOUTHCOM area of responsibility. During course development, 470th Military Intelligence Brigade personnel visited the SOA for information and documentation that might be useful for their purpose. They were given free access to SOA intelligence instructional materials. SOA personnel were not aware of what instructional materials were taken by 470th Military Intelligence Brigade personnel, but whatever was taken, presumably contained Project X material that had been incorporated into the initial 382-hour military intelligence course developed in 1982. Whether material that was taken was pre- or post-course review is unknown. The textual materials eventually chosen from the SOA intelligence training documents were directly turned into seven Spanish language manuals:

- Analysis I
- Revolutionary War and Communist Ideology
- Terrorism and Urban Guerrilla

- o Counterintelligence
- o Interrogation
- o Source Handling
- o Combat Intelligence

From 1987 until the Regional Training Detachment was disestablished in 1989, the Regional Training Detachment-developed manuals were issued to students and military intelligence schools in Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, El Salvador, and Guatemala.

In 1989, a former member of the 470th Military Intelligence Brigade assumed instructor duties at the SOA. He knew that the Regional Training Detachment had used several intelligence manuals to instruct foreign students and, on his own initiative, obtained four of the manuals (Analysis I, Source Handling, Interrogation, and Counterintelligence) from the 470th Military Intelligence Brigade. The former member of the 470th Military Intelligence Brigade assumed that since the manuals he obtained had been approved earlier, no further disclosure or currency of information review was required. He copied the four manuals and used them as student handouts for the military intelligence courses he taught at the SOA. From 1989 through early 1991, the manuals were issued to students from 10 countries at the SOA: Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela.

While all Project X and U.S. Army doctrinal material used to develop the intelligence courses for the SOA, the Regional Training Detachment, and the manuals were in the English language, the lesson plans from which the manuals derived and the manuals themselves were in the Spanish language.

In March 1991, USSOUTHCOM requested approval for a counterintelligence Mobile Training Team to conduct a course of instruction for Colombian military personnel in Bogota, Colombia. The Joint Staff did not endorse the proposal and requested clarification of the instructional details. The Joint Staff and the Defense Intelligence Agency reviewed the documentation proposed for use during the Mobile Training Team training and discovered that several passages contained inappropriate material that violated U.S. laws and DoD policies. The materials in question were mostly derived from the Source Handling manual that was developed from the original 1982 intelligence course constructed for the SOA, then converted to a manual by the 470th Military Intelligence Brigade in 1987, and finally reintroduced into the SOA as a student handout in 1989. The Mobile Training Team training was never conducted. Corrective action was immediately initiated and, in August 1991, the SECDEF asked the ATSD(IO) to conduct a full investigation and to submit a report with any recommendations deemed appropriate.

Source of Inappropriate Materials

We were unable to determine with certainty the circumstances surrounding the entry of improper material into the Spanish language intelligence training manuals that were provided to foreign students in the USSOUTHCOM area of responsibility, including the SOA. Apparently, only Project X and U.S. Army doctrinally approved materials were used to formulate the intelligence course for the SOA in 1982. While no documentary record verifies whether the course materials were subjected to review by the then Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (now called the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence), Department of the Army approval was presumably given to use them following the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School review for currency. Objectionable material was allegedly removed from the initial course of instruction by the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School and the SOA, and the course was taught periodically using the same, presumably approved materials, through early 1991.

When the 470th Military Intelligence Brigade sent personnel to the SOA in 1987 to obtain materials for use by the Regional Training Detachment, materials were gathered from the SOA intelligence course files. Because the gathered materials were not altered in any way and were immediately converted into seven manuals by the 470th Military Intelligence Brigade, we presume that the materials were taken from the 1982 intelligence course developed by the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School for the SOA. The converted materials likely contained objectionable (Project X) language included in early drafts of the intelligence course constructed in 1982, not the corrected version subsequently used in SOA lesson plans from 1982 through early 1991. In 1989, the former member of the 470th Military Intelligence Brigade reintroduced the Regional Training Detachment manuals into the SOA as student handouts. He was not aware that the manuals originated from materials obtained from SOA files. From 1982 through early 1991, all concerned personnel assumed that the materials in question were current, doctrinally correct, and authorized for instruction to foreign students in the USSOUTHCOM area of responsibility and the SOA. That assumption was incorrect.

Appendix D. Report Distribution

Office of the Secretary of Defense

Deputy Secretary of Defense
Under Secretary of Defense (Policy)
Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)
  Deputy Chief Financial Officer
Deputy Comptroller (Program/Budget)
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence)
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)
General Counsel of the Department of Defense
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Intelligence Oversight)
Director, Defense Logistics Studies Information Exchange

Joint Staff

Director, Joint Staff
Inspector General, Joint Staff

Department of the Army

Secretary of the Army
Under Secretary of the Army
Commander, Training and Doctrine Command
Inspector General, Department of the Army
Auditor General, Department of the Army
Commander, United States Army Infantry Center
Commandant, School of the Americas

Department of the Navy

Secretary of the Navy
Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Financial Management and Comptroller)
Inspector General, Department of the Navy
Auditor General, Department of the Navy
Inspector General, United States Marine Corps

Department of the Air Force

Secretary of the Air Force
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Financial Management and Comptroller)
Inspector General, Department of the Air Force
Auditor General, Department of the Air Force

Unified Commands

Commander in Chief, United States Atlantic Command
  Inspector General, United States Atlantic Command
Commander in Chief, United States Central Command
  Inspector General, United States Central Command
Commander in Chief, United States European Command
  Inspector General, United States European Command
Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Command
  Inspector General, United States Pacific Command
Commander in Chief, United States Special Operations Command
  Inspector General, United States Special Operations Command
Commander in Chief, United States Southern Command
  Inspector General, United States Southern Command

Defense Organizations

Director, Defense Logistics Agency
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
  Inspector General, Defense Intelligence Agency
Director, National Imagery and Mapping Agency
  Inspector General, National Imagery and Mapping Agency
Director, National Security Agency
  Inspector General, National Security Agency
Director, Defense Security Assistance Agency

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Office of Management and Budget
Technical Information Center, National Security and International Affairs Division, General Accounting Office
Chairman and ranking minority member of each of the following congressional committees and subcommittees:
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  Senate Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations
  Senate Committee on Armed Services
  Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
  Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs
  House Committee on Appropriations
  House Subcommittee on National Security, Committee on Appropriations
  House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight
  House Subcommittee on National Security, International Affairs, and Criminal Justice, Committee on Government Reform and Oversight
  House Committee on National Security
  House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence

Part V - Management Comments

Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence) Comments

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
6000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-6000

February 5, 1997

COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS, AND INTELLIGENCE

MEMORANDUM FOR INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Evaluation Report on Training of Foreign Military Personnel--Phase I (Project No. 7OI-9009)

We have reviewed the draft report and concur as written. We will reissue the August 1992 ASD(C3I) policy memorandum as a DoD Directive. The Directive will establish a process whereby the Intelligence Training Councils of the separate intelligence disciplines will be required to monitor training provided to foreign nationals. The directive will also include requirements for the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight to assure that intelligence oversight inspections scrutinize intelligence training for foreign students.

The Intelligence Infrastructure Directorate in the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence and Security) is the action office preparing the DoD Directive. Questions should be directed to (b) (6), (b) (6).

Emmett Paige, Jr.

Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Intelligence Oversight) Comments

ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

[redacted]
4035 Ridgetop Road, Suite 210
Fairfax, Virginia 22030

January 24, 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT INSPECTOR GENERAL (POLICY AND OVERSIGHT)

SUBJECT: DoD IG Evaluation Report on Training of Foreign Military Personnel - Phase I (Project No. FOI-9009)

No comment.

Walter Lajko

Team Members

This report was prepared by the Intelligence Operations Directorate, Office of the Assistant Inspector General for Policy and Oversight, DoD.

(b) (6)
(b) (6)

P y and

O rsight Report

Intelligence Operations Directorate

Evaluation Report on Training of Foreign Military Personnel - Phase II: School of the Americas

Report Number PO 98-601 **November 14, 1997**

Office of the Inspector General
Department of Defense

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To suggest topics for or to request future evaluations, contact the Planning and Coordination Branch of the Analysis, Planning, and Technical Support Directorate at (703) 604-8939 / (DSN 664-8939) or FAX (703) 604-8932. Ideas and requests can also be mailed to:

Inspector General, Department of Defense
OAIG-AUD (ATTN: APTS Evaluation Suggestions)
400 Army Navy Drive (Room 801)
Arlington, Virginia 22202-2884

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Acronyms

DEPSECDEF	Deputy Secretary of Defense
FM	Field Manual
INLEA	International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Activities
IMET	International Military Education and Training
MOA	Memorandum of Agreement
POI	Program of Instruction
SECDEF	Secretary of Defense
SOA	School of the Americas
SME	Subject Matter Expert
TRADOC	U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
USAIC	U.S. Army Infantry Center
USSOUTHCOM	U.S. Southern Command

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INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
400 ARMY NAVY DRIVE
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202-2884

November 14, 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS)
DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
(INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS)
COMMANDER, U.S. ARMY TRAINING AND DOCTRINE
COMMAND
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE,
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
COMMANDANT, U.S. ARMY INFANTRY CENTER
COMMANDANT, SCHOOL OF THE AMERICAS

SUBJECT: Evaluation Report on Training of Foreign Military Personnel, Phase II: School of the Americas (Report No. PO 98-601)

We are providing this evaluation report for information and use. We conducted the evaluation in response to a Deputy Secretary of Defense request. This report is the second of three evaluation reports to be issued. We considered management comments on a draft of this report in preparing the final report.

Comments on the draft of this report conformed to the requirements of DoD Directive 7650.3 and left no unresolved issues. Therefore, no additional comments are required.

We appreciate the courtesies extended to the evaluation staff. Questions on the evaluation should be directed to Mr. Robert A. Vignola, Program Director, at (703) 604-8896 (DSN 664-8896) or Mr. Norman Idleberg, Project Manager, at (703) 604-8821 (DSN 664-8821). See Appendix C for the report distribution. The team members are listed inside the back cover.

Russell A. Rau
Assistant Inspector General
Policy and Oversight

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Office of the Inspector General, DoD

Report No. PO 98-601 (Project No. 7OI-9009.01)

November 14, 1997

Training of Foreign Military Personnel, Phase II: School of the Americas

Executive Summary

Introduction. This report is the second in a series of three produced in response to a request by the Deputy Secretary of Defense for an evaluation of the training of foreign military personnel.

Objective. Our objective was to evaluate whether the current policies and procedures, concerning instruction at the School of the Americas, are adequate to prevent the use of improper training materials and to determine whether the School's lesson plans and related instructional materials are reviewed and approved for doctrinal consistency and currency.

Evaluation Results. The School of the Americas has initiated several commendable measures designed to focus attention on human rights. The measures have included the creation of a Board of Visitors as well as an enhanced human rights training program for students and instructors. Despite these improvements, there are weaknesses that could prevent the School from necessarily avoiding the use of improper training materials.

o Most, if not all, of those bodies responsible for external oversight of the School do not conduct hands-on content review of the School's lesson plans and instructional materials. Those bodies rely instead on the School to perform its own oversight in those areas.

o The 1990 U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command Special Relationship Memorandum of Agreement has not been revised to reflect that the U.S. Army Infantry Center is responsible for oversight of the School. Additionally, the Memorandum has no provision for evaluation of the School's Spanish language lesson plans by Spanish proficient U.S. personnel. The U.S. Training and Doctrine Command has initiated action to satisfy that requirement.

o The U.S. Training and Doctrine Command authorized the School to use a non-standard lesson plan format rather than the format prescribed in TRADOC regulations.

o Forty of 124 Army Field Manuals included in the 1997 School's Catalog of Publications are categorized by the Army as obsolete. We reviewed the obsolete Field Manuals and found no questionable human rights language. Also, the School's statement of required distribution is incomplete.

o The 1992 Army policy memorandum on intelligence and counterintelligence training of non-United States persons has not been effective. The School did not receive implementing instructions and thus, did not translate intelligence training materials into

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English for review by appropriate authorities. For purposes of our review, 20 lesson plans were independently translated for our examination. We found no language in the translations contrary to applicable U.S. or DoD policy in any of those plans.

o Some countries have been prohibited from sending students to DoD schools under International Military Education and Training funding because of human rights abuses. However, there is no prohibition on students and instructors from those countries being admitted to the School if other funding, such as from the International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs program, is used. While legally permitted, this practice, absent rigorous external oversight, raises concern about the quality of instruction by such persons at the School.

Summary of Recommendations. We recommend that:

o The U.S. Training and Doctrine Command revise the 1990 Special Relationship Memorandum of Agreement and specify and strengthen the role of the U.S. Army Infantry Center in conducting meaningful external oversight of the School; assign personnel proficient in Spanish to the U.S. Army Infantry Center to evaluate the School's training materials; and task the School to translate all intelligence instructional materials into English within 180 days of the publication of this report.

o The School adopt the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command Regulation 350-70 standard lesson plan format; review the currency of all materials listed in its Catalog of Publications; revalidate its statement of required distribution; staff the leadership of the School's Evaluation Branch with a U.S. citizen; and maintain rigorous oversight of the quality of instruction provided by foreign instructors from countries under sanction, should they be assigned to the School.

o The Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, revise the 1992 Army policy on intelligence and counterintelligence training of non-United States persons, following publication of the new DoD Directive on the subject.

o The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs), in conjunction with the Department of the Army, seek DoD coordination whenever consideration is given to assigning foreign personnel to the School from countries under sanction.

Management Comments. We received comments on a draft of this report from the Department of the Army; the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence); and the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs). All organizations concurred with our recommendations, however, the Department of the Army and the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) offered suggestions to clarify the report. See Part VIII for the complete text of those comments.

Evaluation Response. Management comments were responsive. Where appropriate, we modified the report as suggested by the Department of the Army and the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs).

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Part I - Introduction

Background

In March 1991, the U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) requested approval for a Mobile Training Team to conduct counterintelligence training for Colombian military personnel in Bogota, Colombia. The Joint Staff did not endorse the proposal and requested clarification on the details of the course of instruction. Upon review of the proposed instructional materials, the Joint Staff and the Defense Intelligence Agency discovered that several passages contained inappropriate material that were inconsistent with U.S. laws and DoD policies. The materials, in the form of Spanish language manuals, were being used in the USSOUTHCOM area of responsibility and at the School of the Americas (SOA) in Fort Benning, Georgia. Immediate corrective action was initiated and the training for military personnel in Colombia was never conducted.

In August 1991, the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) directed the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Intelligence Oversight) to conduct a full investigation of the matter. The report, "Improper Material in Spanish-Language Intelligence Training Manuals," dated March 10, 1992, recommended that:

o the Joint Staff establish a policy to ensure that intelligence and counterintelligence training for foreign personnel is consistent with U.S. and DoD policy;

o DoD intelligence agencies and military Service schools conducting intelligence training for foreign personnel should ensure that training materials have been approved for consistency with U.S. and DoD policy;

o the Army conduct a damage assessment of the classified information disclosed through the use of the manuals; and

o the General Counsel, DoD, retain one copy of the manuals, and that all other copies of the manuals and associated materials should be destroyed.

The SECDEF approved the report and directed the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence) to issue instructions to implement the corrective actions. An August 27, 1992, memorandum, "DoD Policy on Intelligence and Counterintelligence Training of Non-United States Persons," issued policy to implement the recommendations approved by the SECDEF.

The issue was addressed again during a 1995-1996 Government-wide review of U.S. activities in Guatemala and was discussed in the June 1996 report by the President's Intelligence Oversight Board.

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In September 1996, the Deputy Secretary of Defense (DEPSECDEF) asked the Inspector General, DoD, to review the 1992 Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Intelligence Oversight) report and supporting material to determine whether they were adequate to assess individual responsibility and to determine whether corrective actions were satisfactorily implemented.

Our report No. PO 97-007, "Evaluation Report on Training of Foreign Military Personnel-Phase I," issued on February 21, 1997, satisfied the initial DEPSECDEF task. The original tasking was subsequently expanded to examine how training conducted at the SOA is reviewed and approved for doctrinal consistency and currency by appropriate DoD and Army functional proponents and to review intelligence training for foreign personnel throughout the DoD.

Objective

Our objective was to evaluate whether the current policies and procedures concerning the development and conduct of instruction at the SOA are adequate to prevent the use of inappropriate training materials and to determine whether the SOA lesson plans and related instructional materials are reviewed and approved for doctrinal consistency, currency and conformity to all legal requirements. See Appendix A for a summary of prior reports and reviews related to the evaluation.

Scope and Methodology

Because of the breadth of this task, we will issue reports in three phases.

o Phase I: Our February 21, 1997, report on the Training of Foreign Military Personnel, (PO 97-007), which addressed the March 1992 Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Intelligence Oversight) report and supporting materials; and the August 1992 Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence) policy memorandum.

o This report comprises Phase II and addresses the present policies and procedures for review and approval of training at the SOA.

o The Phase III report, to be issued later, will examine intelligence training for foreign personnel throughout the DoD.

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Introduction

To achieve our objective, we reviewed the March 1992 Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Intelligence Oversight) report and more than 2,500 pages of supporting and associated materials from that office. We also reviewed approximately 1,000 pages dating from April 1991 through October 1996, of data related to the issue, obtained from the Inspector General, Department of the Army, and all documentation received to formulate the October 1995 Inspector General and General Counsel, DoD, report, "GUATEMALA REVIEW," to the President's Intelligence Oversight Board. Additionally, we reviewed the 1996 General Accounting Office review of the SOA; the 1994 U.S. Army Infantry Center Task Force Report on the SOA; the September 1995 U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Regulation 350-70, "Training Development Management, Processes, and Products"; the May 1992 TRADOC memorandum, "U.S. Army School of the Americas (USARSA) Special Relationship Memorandum of Agreement (MOA); the October 1, 1996, Department of the Army Pamphlet 25-30, "Consolidated Index of Army Publications and Blank Forms"; and other documentation to understand the policies and procedures associated with Army training and the mission of the SOA.

We also met with and interviewed more than 30 U.S. Government civilian and military personnel, including:

- o representatives from the International Programs Office and the Security Assistance Office in the Department of the Army Secretariat;
- o representatives from the Operations and Intelligence organizations of the Army Staff;
- o representatives from the TRADOC Headquarters and the U.S. Army Infantry Center;
- o the Commandant, SOA, and members of his staff and faculty; and
- o members of the SOA Board of Visitors.

We developed a comprehensive questionnaire designed to identify incorrect and obsolete instruction at the SOA. We asked instructors at the SOA to explain what information was covered in their lessons, what source materials were used, whether nonstandard or course materials provided by foreign governments were included, and whether supervisors had reviewed the lessons plans. We coordinated the questionnaire with the TRADOC and the SOA.

With the assistance of the TRADOC and the SOA, we identified 136 of the lesson plans used at the SOA that have intelligence or intelligence-related topics. We selected and reviewed a representative sampling of 20 of those lesson plans for translation from Spanish to English for the purpose of determining whether they were current, doctrinally correct, and in accordance with U.S. and DoD policy.

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We coordinated the effort with the TRADOC, the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca, and the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School. In the case of the 136 intelligence or intelligence-related lesson plans, we asked the SOA instructors to certify that all references were current and to identify those that were obsolete. We also asked them to identify U.S. officials at the SOA who reviewed the lesson plans to note whether any plans were derived from lesson plans taught elsewhere in the Army school system and to identify any foreign instructor teaching a particular lesson.

Finally, using the data collected from our sources of information, the interviews, the questionnaires, and the translated lesson plans, we:

o examined the degree to which there is effective external oversight of the SOA;

o assessed the course development process at the SOA to determine whether it conforms to U.S. and DoD policy and is current and doctrinally correct;

o analyzed the currency of reference materials used by the SOA;

o examined the Army's implementation of the 1992 DoD guidance related to intelligence and counterintelligence training of non-United States persons, and its impact on the SOA;

o researched the process for screening foreign officials scheduled to attend the SOA; and

o determined the language requirements for U.S. personnel at the SOA.

Structure of the Report

The details of our report are presented in six parts. Part II, outlines the history of the SOA and relates its uniqueness among TRADOC schools. Part III, discusses external oversight directed at the SOA. Part IV, covers the course development process at the SOA, focusing on lesson plans. Part V, addresses administrative issues that impact SOA instruction. Lastly, Part VI, discusses three related issues: the Army implementation of the 1992 DoD policy memorandum on intelligence and counterintelligence training for non-United States persons; the approval process for foreign instructors and students at the SOA; and the language proficiency of U.S. personnel at the SOA.

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Part II - Uniqueness of the School of the Americas

The School of the Americas

History. The SOA was established in 1946 at Fort Amador, Panama Canal Zone, as the Latin American Center-Ground Division. In 1949, the SOA relocated to Fort Gulick, Panama Canal Zone, adopted Spanish as the language of instruction, and was renamed the U.S. Army Caribbean School. In 1963, the school was redesignated the U.S. Army School of the Americas. The SOA suspended operations in September 1984 to comply with the terms of the Panama Canal Treaty and reopened at Fort Benning, Georgia, in late 1984, where it became an official Army school under the TRADOC. In 1990, the name of the school was changed to the School of the Americas. The SOA is authorized under Title 10, United States Code, Section 4415, to operate for the purpose of providing military education and training to military personnel of Central and South American countries and Caribbean countries. The SOA mission is to provide doctrinally sound, relevant military education and training to the nations of Latin America; to promote democratic values and respect for human rights; and to foster cooperation among multinational military forces.

Current Status. As a TRADOC school, the SOA is responsible for developing its curriculum in accordance with TRADOC Regulation 350-70, "Training Development Management, Processes and Products," September 24, 1995. The regulation requires that all TRADOC Schools follow the systems approach to the training process, which is designed to determine whether training is needed; what material is covered in the training; who gets the training; how, and how well, and where the training is presented; and the training support required. Several factors make the SOA unique among Army schools.

Special Relationship. A special relationship exists to ensure that the SOA continues to serve the regional security assistance requirement of the U.S. Government as identified by the USSOUTHCOM and the U.S. Atlantic Command in conjunction with regional Security Assistance Offices. This relationship is documented in the U.S. Army School of the Americas Special Relationship Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), May 22, 1990. The document recognizes that requirements for SOA support and that instruction may come from other than traditional Army channels, such as a request from USSOUTHCOM, and specifies procedures to process and address those requests.

Spanish Instruction. All instruction at the SOA is conducted in the Spanish language. Furthermore, all associated instructional materials, including lesson plans, student texts, and training aids, are in Spanish. All U.S. instructors and most of the U.S. faculty and staff must be proficient in Spanish before they are considered for assignment to the SOA.

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Foreign Instructors. The SOA depends on foreign officers to meet some of its instructional requirements. In 1996, the SOA had 23 foreign military instructors, 48 U.S. military instructors, and one U.S. civilian educational specialist authorized in its Table of Distribution and Allowances.

Foreign Students. While a small number of foreign students may attend courses at other U.S. Army schools, the SOA student body is comprised mainly of Spanish-speaking personnel from countries in the Western Hemisphere. A small number of U.S. Army officers attend Command and General Staff College training at the SOA. In 1996, 905 of the 931 students were foreign personnel.

Material Sales. Certain SOA Spanish language instructional material (not including lesson plans) is offered for sale to foreign governments through the DoD security assistance apparatus. The SOA materials are listed in its publications catalog. For example, the 1997 SOA Catalog of Publications offers a translated copy of Field Manual (FM) 90-10, "Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain," for $38.00. The SOA also makes its materials available, on a reimbursable basis, to security assistance teams scheduled to provide training in Central and Latin America.

Human Rights Training. Every student at the SOA is required to receive at least 4 hours of human rights training, including: definition of concepts; the historical development of conventions and declarations; civilian control of the Armed Forces; the role of those forces in a democracy; and the military advantage for complying with human rights and the Law of Armed Conflict. As part of its internal evaluation process, the SOA requires all students to discuss the effects of human rights instruction in their course critiques. Students are required to describe how SOA instruction in human rights, democratization, civil control of the military, and military justice affected them and how the instruction may have changed any previously held views. In addition, all prospective SOA instructors, both U.S. and foreign, receive 16 hours of human rights instruction.

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Part III - External Oversight

External Oversight

Department of Defense. Since the SOA courses are offered almost exclusively to foreign military personnel, the U.S. Army Security Assistance Training Field Activity lists them in the Military Articles and Services Listing. Foreign governments, through the U.S. Security Assistance Office in each foreign country, may request quotas from the Security Assistance Training Field Activity for courses offered by the SOA from the Military Articles and Services Listing. The DoD security assistance process is managed by the Defense Security Assistance Agency, which works under the direction and supervision of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. Except for Expanded International Military Education and Training courses, the Defense Security Assistance Agency does not review course instructor lesson plans of any DoD school, including the SOA, because this is the responsibility of the Military Departments that sponsor the courses.

Department of the Army. On the Army Staff, the Training Directorate, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, develops general policy related to Army training and ensures that there is proper funding and support to meet the Army's training requirements. While the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans considers the SOA an Army school, the vast majority of SOA students are foreign personnel. Within the Army Secretariat, the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of the Army for International Affairs oversees security assistance programs, which include the policy for foreign student administration. The Deputy Under Secretary of the Army for International Affairs endorses new Army training proposals to the Defense Security Assistance Agency and the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. However, neither the Deputy Under Secretary of the Army for International Affairs nor the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans review the content of the lesson plans of the SOA or any other Army school.

Training and Doctrine Command. The TRADOC is the Army Major Command responsible for all Army schools and ensures that the SOA is properly staffed and funded to perform its training mission. The TRADOC is also responsible for managing the training of foreign military personnel in the United States and for approving the Programs of Instruction (POI) of all Army schools to ensure that they are in compliance with policy. However, the TRADOC POI review is not a policy content review. The SOA and other Army schools submitting POIs for TRADOC review are responsible for ensuring that the references are complete and current.

U.S. Army Infantry Center. TRADOC Memorandum, "U.S. Army School of the Americas (USARSA) Special Relationship Memorandum of Agreement

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(MOA)," May 22, 1990, specifies that the TRADOC Deputy Commanding General (Combined Arms Center) "will ensure that courses are tailored to meet established regional objectives and that U.S. doctrine, tactics and techniques have been incorporated to the maximum extent possible while allowing for country-specific requirements." On May 2, 1994, the Commandant, U.S. Army Infantry Center (USAIC), Fort Benning, Georgia, assumed management oversight for the SOA and became responsible for developing and resourcing doctrinally sound, relevant training programs for Latin American armies, in accordance with U.S. Government policy. That oversight role had previously been held by the Commander, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. We were told that manpower restrictions had limited what the Combined Arms Center could do in terms of oversight of the SOA. While the SOA would forward its training documentation, including POIs, through the Combined Arms Center to the TRADOC for review, the Combined Arms Center did not conduct policy content reviews. The USAIC oversight of the SOA is quite similar to the oversight previously administered by the Combined Arms Center. Geographical separation is no longer a problem, but the USAIC oversight function consists mainly of POI reviews and resourcing decisions. The USAIC Commandant told us that he views the SOA in a manner similar to that of other major USAIC departments. The USAIC reviews what the SOA and other USAIC departments do in an annual POI review. However, similar to the role exercised by the TRADOC, the USAIC does not conduct policy content reviews of POIs. The USAIC ensures adequate resourcing to address the instructional standards and that all courses meet the Terminal Learning Objective and the Enabling Learning Objectives. When changes are required, the USAIC is the approving authority. The USAIC Commandant said that determining the doctrinal consistency of the SOA instruction is more complicated than for other USAIC departments because the SOA materials are in Spanish.

Board of Visitors. The SOA Board of Visitors was established in 1996 to provide the Commander, TRADOC, with independent advice and program assessment from distinguished individuals in fields, such as education, Latin American affairs, human rights, and international law. Two former USSOUTHCOM Commanders in Chief, one former TRADOC Commander, two former U.S. Ambassadors, three academicians, and one attorney comprise the current Board of Visitors. The Board of Visitors meets twice a year and may provide advice and recommendations on matters related to the SOA policies, curriculum, educational philosophy, effectiveness, and learning resources. The Board has limited ability to conduct independent oversight of the SOA operations and relies, to a great degree on information presented by management.

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External Oversight Deficiencies

Revision of the TRADOC 1990 Special Relationship MOA should assist in resolving the issue of oversight of the SOA. Currently, the biggest deficiency is that most of, if not all the external oversight bodies do not conduct hands-on content review of SOA lesson plans and instructional materials. Those bodies rely instead on the SOA to perform its own oversight in those areas.

Special Relationship Memorandum of Agreement. The 1990 MOA has not been revised to reflect that the Commandant, USAIC, is responsible for management oversight of the SOA. Two areas of concern related to the MOA and external oversight of the SOA involve curriculum approval and the need for Spanish language proficient officers at the USAIC to objectively review instruction.

Curriculum Approval. While the curriculum at all other Army schools has been developed in support of U.S. Army training and educational requirements, the SOA curriculum is designed to support U.S. policy and to meet the needs of the unified commands. The 1990 Special Relationship MOA contains provisions for the USSOUTHCOM and the U.S. Atlantic Command to provide annual formal comments concerning the appropriateness of the SOA curriculum and to recommend changes. Formal comments by the unified commands on the SOA curriculum ensures that the courses offered are those needed to satisfy regional objectives. We reviewed the USSOUTHCOM report on the 1996 Annual Security Assistance Conference and found no indication that the SOA curriculum had been approved at that forum. We learned that the SOA provides an informal briefing on its curriculum at each Annual Security Assistance Conference. However, a SOA representative, who has attended every conference since 1987, said that while the SOA briefs its curriculum at each conference, requests for a curriculum change have never been received at a conference. The same SOA representative said that curriculum change requests are received throughout the year and are accommodated, refined, or rejected in coordination with the requester. Because curriculum change requests are addressed throughout the year, the SOA curriculum briefing is viewed as an information exchange by conference attendees.

Spanish Language Proficiency. The external management oversight of the SOA exercised by the USAIC has not extended to the review of Spanish language lesson plans. There are no Spanish language proficient officers at the USAIC specifically assigned for those reviews. In late 1996, the USAIC tasked the SOA to conduct a "word for word reading" of its lesson plans and related instructional materials to determine whether they were in consonance with DoD policy. The review was accomplished solely by U.S. personnel assigned to the SOA; the USAIC did not participate in the review, nor did it independently verify the accuracy of the results. Meaningful external oversight of the SOA could be

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achieved if personnel proficient in the Spanish language were assigned to the USAIC to perform objective and independent reviews of the SOA Spanish language materials. Without that presence, the USAIC is forced to rely on the SOA to oversee itself in this area. To alleviate that shortcoming, the TRADOC told us that despite manpower decrements, efforts continue to establish several positions at the USAIC coded in Spanish for the purpose of evaluating SOA training materials.

Recommendations

A. We recommend that the Commander, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, revise the May 1990 U.S. Army School of the Americas Special Relationship Memorandum of Agreement. At a minimum, the revision should:

1. Specify and strengthen the role of the Commandant, U.S. Army Infantry Center, in conducting meaningful external oversight of the School of the Americas, to include its responsibility for ensuring the doctrinal consistency and training relevance of the courses.

2. Request that the U.S. Southern Command provide formal concurrence with or recommend changes to the School of the Americas curriculum.

B. We recommend that the Commander, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, assign U.S. personnel proficient in the Spanish language to the U.S. Army Infantry Center for the purpose of evaluating School of the Americas lesson plans and associated instructional materials.

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Part IV - Course Development

Lesson Plan Approval Process

Courses of instruction developed at the SOA follow the Army process and procedures specified in TRADOC Regulation 350-70, "Training Development Management, Processes and Products," September 24, 1995.

Program of Instruction. After a requirement to present a course of instruction has been validated as a task, the SOA assembles a POI in the English language. The POI includes the general makeup of the course, the resources required, the duration of the course, and other administrative data. The SOA then staffs the POI with the TRADOC and others who have an interest in the course for their approval. The TRADOC reviews all new POIs and major POI revisions to determine whether the SOA has the personnel and resources to provide the required instruction. The TRADOC review is not a policy content review and although there is a general listing in the POI of the references used to develop the course, the TRADOC does not verify that the references are complete and current. The responsibility for policy content and accuracy of references rests with the school submitting a POI. Once the POI is approved, development of the course continues. Each time a course is revised, the POI is changed. For example, the POI for the Military Intelligence Officer Course was last revised on January 29, 1996, replacing a POI that was 8 months old.

Lesson Plan Development. After POI approval, course development continues. This development includes the preparation of detailed lesson plans, teaching aids, such as slides and video tapes, study guides and worksheets, special instructional texts, practical exercises, and tests designed to confirm whether the course objectives have been met. The lesson is the basic building block of all training. An instructor-presented lesson is documented as a lesson plan and represents the detailed blueprint for presenting the instruction. The lesson plan is of such detail that a new instructor can teach the lesson with little preparation. All course development is in the Spanish language for lesson plans developed by the SOA. In some cases, such as the SOA Command and General Staff course, the SOA acquires lesson plans that are in use at other Army schools and translates them verbatim into Spanish. Once a lesson plan is prepared at the SOA, there is no requirement for another Army school to review it. The responsibility for lesson plan review rests with the SOA Commandant.

Lesson Plan Format. The TRADOC Regulation 350-70, is an over-arching regulation, superseding 13 TRADOC regulations, 4 TRADOC pamphlets, and other TRADOC regulatory guidance. The regulation requires standardization of lesson plan formats at all the TRADOC schools and in training conducted within the Army Reserve Component structure. The lesson plan formats must include:

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o a full listing of the references used, to include numbers, titles, and dates;

o identification of those personnel, other than the instructor, who approved the lesson plan; and

o approvals obtained to release controlled unclassified information to foreign students.

We found that the SOA did not implement the TRADOC Regulation 350-70 provision related to lesson plan standardization. In 1995, the SOA conferred with the TRADOC to determine whether the SOA needed to adopt the standard lesson plan format. The SOA was informed that, because of its uniqueness with respect to Spanish language instruction, the TRADOC would not enforce a standard format for lesson plans designed only for internal SOA use. Based on the TRADOC guidance, the SOA developed a simplified lesson plan format that does not require a complete reference cite, does not record when lesson plans are reviewed, and does not address the releasability of information to foreign personnel.

While we agree that the SOA lesson plans have little or no utility for other schools within the TRADOC system, the TRADOC decision to authorize the SOA to use a nonstandard lesson plan format is inappropriate. Regardless of whether the instruction is in English or Spanish, the standardized TRADOC lesson plan format ensures that essential data are present in every lesson plan. The SOA format does not include the following:

o The SOA lesson plan format does not document whether personnel have reviewed the contents of a lesson. Given the SOA reliance on foreign guest instructors, it is important to document which U.S. personnel have reviewed the lessons and to record the dates of the review.

o Although the SOA lesson plan format requires instructors to list all references used to construct the lesson, the citing is brief and outdated doctrinal references may be perceived as valid.

o We found that 28 FMs that were translated into Spanish for use at the SOA, and subsequently offered for sale to foreign governments through the U.S. security assistance mechanism, contained a restricted dissemination caveat. The caveat advises users that coordination is required with the office of proponency, normally another TRADOC school, before the FMs can be made available to foreign governments. The TRADOC subsequently determined that the dissemination caveat was unnecessary in 18 of the 28 FMs and that 2 additional FMs were obsolete. Given the SOA focus on instruction to foreign personnel, lesson plan formats should identify all approvals that are required for release of FMs to foreign governments.

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Lesson Plan Review. The last step of an 11-step lesson plan development process, outlined in TRADOC Regulation 350-70, directs developers to "obtain appropriate command authority approval." The data elements required for lesson plan approval include the name, rank, and position of personnel reviewing the lesson, as well as the date of the review. The regulation does not require any TRADOC school, including the SOA, to coordinate its lesson plans with any other Army school. Officials at the SOA told us that all lesson plans are developed by instructors and are reviewed for content and doctrinal compliance by Subject Matter Experts (SMEs). The TRADOC Regulation 350-70 indicates that an SME must have thorough knowledge of his or her duties and tasks. U.S. instructors at the SOA are usually qualified SMEs. In most cases, the SME is also the instructor or course director. For example, the SME for intelligence at the SOA is also the primary instructor and the course director for the Military Intelligence Officer Course. In some cases, other personnel can assist an SME in the review process. The SOA Battalion Commander is a Psychological Operations qualified officer. Because of his expertise, he can assist those responsible for the Psychological Operations Course. The SOA Commandant, also has a role in the review process. Five weeks prior to the start of each course, he chairs a Course Mission Training Plan review, at which time proposed revisions to a course are discussed and receive final approval. While foreign instructors at the SOA may possess functional expertise and experience, they are not considered SMEs. Without exception, U.S. instructors at the SOA review the lesson plans used by foreign instructors.

Regardless of the lesson plan review process at the SOA, it is difficult to determine when and by whom lesson plans are reviewed. The SOA lesson plan format has no place for those reviewing the contents to record the date and the results of the review. In some cases, we found that lesson plans were not reviewed by any individuals other than the SME. For example, the 45 lesson plans comprising the Military Intelligence Officer course showed that the SME had reviewed each one, yet only 6 plans showed an additional level of review.

Coordination With Other Army Schools. Within the Army system, schools are identified as the proponent for certain topics. TRADOC Regulation 350-70 identifies a Proponent School as "The TRADOC school designated by the Commanding General, TRADOC or appropriate Major Command as training proponent to exercise supervisory management of all combat/training development aspects of a material system, functional area or task. It analyzes, designs and develops training/training products for the proponency area." For example, the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca is designated as the proponent for intelligence and counterintelligence.

The Army Staff told us that the SOA has no proponency requirement and thus does not develop any doctrinal concept for the Army. The SOA is a unique school that provides instruction in Spanish on topics and issues developed by other Army schools. In some cases, such as the SOA Command and General Staff course, the

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instruction is designed to mirror the Army course provided in English at the proponent school in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. In other cases, such as the Intelligence Officer Course and the Civil Affairs Course, while SOA instructors developed the lesson plans, the lesson plan building blocks were taken from the doctrinal references and related materials developed by other proponent schools.

The SOA attempts to have every SME visit the proponent TRADOC school at least once a year. One purpose of the visit is to identify pertinent and new doctrinal material for inclusion in SOA courses. Another purpose is to allow proponent schools to review SOA POIs. New material collected during visits and identified for adoption by the SOA is earmarked for translation into Spanish by the SOA Language Services Division. Once translated, the SME reviews the material for doctrinal correctness prior to publication.

Recommendations

C. We recommend that the Commandant, School of the Americas, with the concurrence of the Commandant, U.S. Army Infantry Center:

1. Adopt the standard lesson plan format in U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command Regulation 350-70, "Training Development Management, Processes and Products," September 24, 1995, to ensure that, at a minimum, the following information is displayed on each lesson plan:

a. A thorough listing of the references used, to include numbers, titles, and dates.

b. The identity of those personnel, other than the instructor, who approve the lesson plan.

c. The approvals obtained from other Training and Doctrine Command schools on lesson plans that are reviewed at schools other than the School of the Americas.

d. The approvals obtained to release any controlled, unclassified information to foreign students.

2. Establish a process to identify lesson plans requiring updates as a result of changes in DoD and Army policy and doctrine.

3. Institute a comprehensive lesson plan review policy that, at a minimum, identifies the individuals responsible for reviews and the dates the reviews occurred.

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4. Ensure a legal review of lesson plans for compliance with law, policy, and regulation, as appropriate.

5. Coordinate with appropriate proponent schools to obtain comments and suggestions on lesson plans under their proponency.

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Part V - Administrative Issues

Obsolete Reference Materials

Some SOA courses and lesson plans use outdated instructional materials without acknowledging that more recent revisions and changes exist. Additionally, no records exist that indicate that proponent schools have approved the release of controlled materials under their cognizance to foreign personnel. As a result, controlled instructional materials could be provided to students without the knowledge and approval of proponents and students might incorrectly assume the materials are current.

Awareness of Outdated Materials. A number of the Army doctrinal references that have been translated into Spanish for use at the SOA are not current, and foreign persons receiving outdated reference material are not advised of this fact. The U.S. instructors at the SOA with whom we met were uncertain as to the aids that are available to determine the currency of doctrinal references. Officials in the TRADOC told us that it is not uncommon to find outdated manuals being used for instruction at training schools throughout the Army. Reference materials, such as FMs developed by the TRADOC for Army-wide use, are reviewed to ensure that they do not contain any information that contravenes U.S. or DoD policy. This review applies not only to current materials, but also to outdated reference materials. The TRADOC officials opined that as long as instructors are aware that references are outdated, and know what is contained in an updated change, the isolated use of outdated references did not necessarily indicate improper instruction.

Monitoring Revisions. Department of the Army Pamphlet 25-30, "Consolidated Index of Army Publications and Blank Forms," dated October 1, 1996, assists Army personnel in determining whether publications are current or obsolete. The pamphlet provides a comprehensive list that cites the number, title, and date of the Army's current and obsolete FMs. None of the U.S. instructors at the SOA indicated that they had ever used the pamphlet to determine whether the references they used were current.

Outdated Instructional Materials. We compared the listing of 124 FMs in SOA Pamphlet 109, "Catalogue of Publications-1997," with the list in Department of the Army Pamphlet 25-30. Forty FMs were listed in the SOA catalog under titles that had been revised or rescinded. The Army pamphlet identified the 40 FMs as obsolete. Four of the obsolete manuals pertained to intelligence. We reviewed the outdated version of each FM to determine whether the contents reflected older doctrine or whether they contained questionable human rights language. We found that the contents of the outdated FMs merely reflect older doctrine and contain no questionable human rights language. Other doctrinal publications listed in the SOA catalog may have been revised with no change in either title or FM number.

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Because the SOA catalog does not list document publication dates, we could not compare them with the listing in Army Pamphlet 25-30. Officials at the SOA said that, on occasion, an obsolete FM might be used in a course because the students' countries have not yet received or may never receive state-of-the-art equipment that is described in an FM. Therefore, SOA officials advised that what is considered obsolete by U.S. standards may be current and appropriate for other armies in the Western Hemisphere. Nevertheless, we believe that SOA instructors should be aware that materials are outdated and of the revisions in current versions.

Recommendations

D. We recommend that the Commandant, School of the Americas:

1. Review the currency of all materials listed in the School of the Americas Catalog of Publications and amend the listing to include the date of each reference and a notation identifying the references that have been rescinded or revised.

2. Insert a notification in each obsolete reference used at the School of the Americas, or otherwise made available to foreign personnel through sale, that indicates that the reference is obsolete, cites the latest revision, and summarizes the changes contained in the revision.

3. Confirm, at least annually, the currency and compliance with Army doctrine of all non-Army instructional materials used at the School of the Americas.

Required Distribution

The SOA is not receiving all the new doctrinal materials that are available to support its instructional requirement because the SOA statement of required distribution is incomplete. As a result, the SOA may be unaware of new instructional materials that rescind others in use at the SOA, and its ability to revise lesson plans and other training materials could be inhibited.

Automatic Distribution System. Distribution of required publications is a "push" system whereby each Army activity submits its required publications listing to the U.S. Army Publications and Printing Command. Publications available through

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this Army-wide distribution system include doctrinal materials, normally in the form of FMs originating within the TRADOC organization. Once an activity states a requirement for a given publication, the activity automatically receives changes and revisions. When a new publication supersedes one or more existing publications, and is published with a different title or FM number, the requesting activity automatically receives the new document. The listing the SOA submitted to the Army to register its need for official publications is not complete. Therefore, the SOA does not receive updates for some of the materials it uses. For example, the SOA has not listed FM 34-52, "Intelligence Interrogation," as a required publication, although the subject is included in its Military Intelligence Officer Course.

Obsolete Materials. Because the SOA does not maintain a current and complete statement of required distribution, some updates to doctrinal publications are not forwarded to the school. For example, the SOA is still using FM 30-15, "Intelligence Interrogation," which is dated September 29, 1978. That FM was superseded on May 8, 1987, by a manual with the same title, but renumbered FM 34-52. The FM was last revised on September 28, 1992. We reviewed the obsolete and the current FMs and determined that they contained no objectionable human rights language. Had the SOA listed FM 30-15 in its statement of required distribution, it would have received all revisions automatically. We compared 124 FMs listed in SOA Pamphlet 109, "Catalogue of Publications - 1997," with the November 1996 U.S. Army Printing and Publishing Command printout of the SOA publications distribution. The comparison showed that the SOA was not on distribution for updates to 34 FMs it uses for instruction or sells to foreign governments.

Recommendation

E. We recommend that the Commandant, School of the Americas, revalidate on a regular basis the school's statement of required distribution with the U.S. Army Printing and Publishing Command. The revalidation should ensure that the School of the Americas receives automatic updates to all Field Manuals and related Army doctrinal references it uses to develop courses and lessons or provides to students in the conduct of its instruction.

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SOA Evaluation Program

Evaluation Branch. TRADOC Regulation 350-70 requires that schools within the TRADOC system implement an evaluation and quality assurance program, using the staff evaluation organization as the program's vehicle. Assessing conformity with doctrine and currency of training materials is an essential ingredient of the program. However, the Directorate of Evaluation and Standardization has been eliminated throughout the TRADOC system because of mandated personnel cuts. Recognizing the need to maintain a separate evaluation mechanism, a two-person Evaluation Branch consisting of one foreign officer and one U.S. Army Non-Commissioned Officer, continues to operate as an element under the Staff and Faculty Development Division at the SOA. The branch is responsible for assessing both the quality of instruction and the expertise of the instructors.

The foreign officer focuses primarily on instruction inside the SOA classrooms while the U.S. Army Non-Commissioned Officer assesses field instruction. The branch concentrates on how well the instructor complies with the lesson plans, the instructor's techniques to enhance learning, and how the instruction aligns to the learning objective; but it does not address conformity with doctrine and currency of training materials. Doctrinal conformity and currency of training materials is an SME responsibility.

Although the SOA has retained the evaluation mechanism in the face of directed personnel cuts, the scope of the evaluations is limited. Given that the SOA relies so much on foreign instructors (in 1996, 23 of 72 instructors were foreign officials) and that a major portion of the instruction is imparted in the absence of either U.S. instructors or students, we believe that the Evaluation Branch should be strengthened and headed by a U.S. citizen.

Recommendation

F. We recommend that the Commandant, School of the Americas, strengthen the internal evaluation function and ensure that the Evaluation Branch staff is headed by a U.S. citizen.

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Part VI - Related Issues

The August 1992 DoD Policy Memorandum

Following the 1991 discovery that improper intelligence training materials in the Spanish language were being used at the SOA and elsewhere in the USSOUTHCOM area of responsibility, corrective measures were initiated, but were not effectively implemented within the DoD or the Army. The measures were designed to ensure that greater attention is given to intelligence and counterintelligence training provided to foreign students.

DoD Policy. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence) issued policy memorandum, "DoD Policy on Intelligence and Counterintelligence Training of Non-United States Persons," August 27, 1992 (see Appendix B). We determined in our earlier report, PO 97-007, "Evaluation Report on Training of Foreign Military Personnel - Phase I," February 21, 1997, that the DoD corrective measures were not effectively implemented. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence) agreed to formalize the 1992 policy memorandum and to reissue the document as a DoD Directive.

Army Policy. The Army implemented the August 1992 DoD policy memorandum when the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence issued policy memorandum, "DA Policy on Intelligence and Counterintelligence Training of Non-United States Persons," November 18, 1992. The memorandum was sent to the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca, and copies were provided to the TRADOC and the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command, but not to the SOA. The memorandum confirmed that the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, was "responsible for the content of all intelligence and counterintelligence training offered to and by the U.S. Army, and that the Commander, U.S. Army Intelligence Center-Fort Huachuca, exercises day to day responsibility for those training functions." The Army memorandum tailored the provisions of the DoD memorandum to address its consumers. The provisions included:

- a requirement that all intelligence and counterintelligence training material used or provided be cleared by the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence for release to foreigners;

- a requirement to obtain the approval of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence) if the intelligence or counterintelligence training is to be provided overseas;

- a requirement that a master copy of all intelligence and counterintelligence lesson plans and instructional material must be available in the English language; and

- a requirement that the English language translations would be held at the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca.

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Officials at the Department of the Army, the TRADOC and the SOA told us that the vast majority of Army personnel were not aware of the November 1992 Army policy memorandum that implemented the August 1992 DoD guidance. Furthermore, the TRADOC officials claimed that despite the fact that the TRADOC was on the distribution list for the Army policy memorandum, the requirement was never communicated to the command, and no action was taken.

SOA Situation. We learned that 669 lesson plans make up the courses that comprise the SOA curriculum. All the lesson plans are in the Spanish language, and no English translations exist. Officials at the SOA said that the school was not aware of the 1992 Army policy memorandum that required English translations of lesson plans and associated material related to intelligence and counterintelligence training. For purposes of this review, we selected a sample of 20 of the 136 SOA lesson plans associated with intelligence or intelligence-related topics that were, at our request, independently translated into English for our examination. We considered these 20 lesson plans to be those that most likely relate to human rights issues. Based on our review of those lesson plans, we concluded that they are current, doctrinally correct, and in accordance with U.S. and DoD policy with respect to the protection of human rights.

Recommendations

G. We recommend that the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army:

1. Ensure that Army components comply with the provisions of the Department of the Army November 18, 1992, policy memorandum on intelligence and counterintelligence training of non-United States persons; and revise and republish the Army policy as necessary, following publication of the new DoD Directive on the subject.

2. Stress the applicability of the November 18, 1992, Department of the Army policy memorandum to instruction at the School of the Americas.

H. We recommend that the Commander, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, task the School of the Americas to:

1. Translate all intelligence and counterintelligence lesson plans and related instructional materials in the curriculum into English, and ensure that the materials are cleared through appropriate foreign disclosure entities in the Department of the Army. The translations should be completed within 180 days from the publication date of this report.

2. Provide a copy of the translated materials to the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca for retention.

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Screening Foreign Instructors and Students

Each potential assignment of a foreign official to the SOA as an instructor or student is first considered by the U.S. Embassy in the country in which that person is a citizen. On occasion, countries are prohibited from using certain funding sources to send students to the SOA because of sanctions imposed by the U.S. Government. Those sanctions can be based on events ranging from human rights violations (Chile, El Salvador, Guatemala) to the shootdown of a U.S. plane (Peru). The embassy screening process is designed to ensure that all factors associated with an assignment to the SOA are fully coordinated and that the resultant decision is consistent with U.S. policy. While foreign personnel assignments to the SOA are fully coordinated in the foreign country, appropriate DoD organizations should be advised whenever assignments of personnel from countries under sanction are being considered. It is recognized that many sanctions are caused by failure to repay U.S. Government loans on time. Sanctions of this nature need not require coordination of assignments to the SOA.

Embassy Responsibilities. The U.S. Embassy in a foreign country, providing instructors and students to the SOA, is responsible for screening them as part of the nomination process. A Department of State cable, "Screening the Human Rights Records of Nominees for U.S.-Sponsored Training," Date Time Group 111930Z JAN 94, reminded all Chiefs of Mission (Ambassadors):

> ...that all candidates for U.S. training or travel grants - military or civilian - should be carefully checked for any record of criminal activity, human rights abuses or corruption that would make them ineligible or inappropriate for U.S. programs. This applies to nominees for, inter alia, International Military Education and Training (IMET), DoD educational institutions, police training, counter-terrorism and counter-narcotics training and USIS [U. S. Information Service] international visitor programs. Screening the records of prospective nominees for human rights abuses, corruption and criminal actions is in keeping with the administration's emphasis on human rights, and greater congressional and public scrutiny of recipients of U.S. training and travel grants.

The screening process starts after a foreign country requests personnel quotas and provides the names and other identifying data of those they wish to nominate to the U.S. Embassy in that country. Once prospective instructors and students are approved, the U.S. Security Assistance Office in the embassy publishes invitational travel orders for them to proceed to the SOA.

International Military Education and Training Restrictions. On occasion, countries are prohibited from sending their students to the United States under International Military Education and Training (IMET) funding to receive training. In some instances, the prohibition is of short duration, such as the period immediately following a coup. In other instances, the prohibition may be long term, such as with Guatemala, when IMET was suspended in March 1995 because of concerns about the lack of progress in resolving human rights abuse cases. The

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Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Acts of 1996 and 1997 state that no IMET funds may be made available for Guatemala. The 1996 and 1997 acts provided that IMET funding may be provided to Guatemala if the President certifies that the Guatemalan military is cooperating with efforts to resolve human rights abuses by the military.

International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Program Funding. Even though a country may be under an IMET suspension, instructors and students from that country could be assigned to the SOA during the suspension period. When we visited the SOA in 1996, we noted the presence of Guatemalan students, and we asked about the source of their funding. We were told that the Guatemalans were funded through the International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INLEA) program. The Department of State Congressional Presentation for Foreign Operations for FY 1997 states that one objective of the INLEA is to "improve the ability and cooperation of host nation police and military forces to attack narcotics production and trafficking centers." That same document indicates that INLEA funding of $2.1 million for FYs 1995 and 1996 had been authorized for Guatemala, because narcotics trafficking through that country was on the rise. The funding dropped to $2 million for FY 1997. In FY 1996, approximately 35 percent (326) of the 931 foreign students enrolled in the SOA were INLEA funded. (The SOA expects the INLEA to fund 15 percent [180] of its estimated 1,200 students in FY 1997.) Students funded by INLEA can be members of either the armed forces or the national police and are sent to receive training in courses that will benefit a country's war on drugs.

The Prohibition Issue. We learned that a Guatemalan military officer was assigned to the SOA as a guest instructor while Guatemala was under IMET sanction due to human rights abuses. That sanction commenced in March 1995 and continues to date. The instructor's assignment was approved by the U.S. Embassy in Guatemala City. A March 31, 1995, memorandum from the Commander of the U.S. Military Group in Guatemala to the SOA Commander, advised him that the Guatemalan officer had been "vetted with other U.S. Embassy offices to insure there was no derogatory information on him. These included DEA, Political, DAO and Consulate." The memorandum further stated that the vetting was "standard operating procedure on any officer traveling to the U.S." We also learned that even though Guatemala could not send students to the SOA because of the IMET restriction, the SOA was not precluded from using its own funding to enable its guest instructor to gain admittance to the SOA. Foreign governments fund all salaries and other associated costs for instructors they provide to the SOA.

The assignment of a guest instructor at the SOA from a country that is under IMET, Expanded-IMET, or Foreign Military Sales sanction, in particular, because of human rights abuses, can raise serious concerns regarding the quality and propriety of the instruction. At a minimum, an in-depth, preselection review should be conducted and coordination should be effected with the DoD whenever students or guest instructors from countries under IMET, Expanded-IMET, or

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Foreign Military Sales sanction are under consideration for assignment to the SOA or any DoD school. In cases in which officials from countries still under sanction are eventually given U.S. Government authorization to instruct at the SOA, the SOA should maintain vigorous oversight of the nature and quality of the instruction provided by those officials.

Recommendations

I. We recommend that the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs), in conjunction with the Department of the Army, ensure that Department of Defense coordination is obtained whenever a U.S. Embassy in a country under International Military Education and Training, Expanded International Military Education and Training, or Foreign Military Sales training sanction, considers the assignment of students or guest instructors to the School of the Americas.

J. We recommend that the Commandant, School of the Americas, maintain vigorous oversight over the nature and depth of instruction provided by guest instructors from countries under International Military Education and Training, Expanded International Military Education and Training, or Foreign Military Sales training sanction, should they be assigned to the School of the Americas.

Spanish Language Requirement

Because instruction at the SOA is in the Spanish language and because the ability to converse with and understand foreign students and instructors is an important factor in the review and oversight of SOA instruction, most U.S. staff and faculty personnel assigned to the SOA must be proficient in Spanish. We found nothing to support a recent claim that U.S. personnel assigned to the SOA lacked sufficient Spanish linguistic capability to satisfy mission requirements.

Proficiency of U.S. Personnel. The November 1, 1996, SOA Table of Distribution and Allowances, indicates that proficiency in the Spanish language is a requirement for U.S. instructors. Similar language requirements are listed for key members of the SOA command group and staff who are not instructors such as the Commandant, the Chief of Staff, the Director of Training Development and the Battalion Commander. Because all instruction at the SOA is in Spanish, and because U.S. instructors and selected staff personnel must converse with foreign personnel on a regular basis, requisitions submitted by the SOA through the Army

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replacement and assignment system seek replacement personnel already proficient in Spanish.

Language Testing. Once assigned to the SOA, personnel who are expected to be proficient in Spanish are required to pass the Modern Language Proficiency examination. Prospective instructors who fail to achieve a satisfactory grade are not permitted to instruct at the SOA until they pass the exam. If they cannot pass the exam, they are reassigned within the SOA to support duties or they might be reassigned elsewhere at Fort Benning. To maintain language proficiency, personnel must pass the Modern Language Proficiency examination annually.

SOA Commandants. Recent criticism of the SOA alleged that previous SOA Commandants lacked the required proficiency in Spanish to perform their duties. The criticism is unfounded. We checked the records of every SOA Commandant from 1982 to the present. Their Spanish language proficiency, listed below, ranges from limited working (2+) to functionally native (5). Foreign language skill levels range from 0 to 5.

Language Proficiency of SOA Commandants

Period of Assignment	Listening	Reading
Jun. 1982 - Jun. 1984	4	4
Jun. 1984 - Oct. 1985	3	3
Oct. 1985 - Jan. 1989	4	5
Jan. 1989 - May 1991	2+	3
May 1991 - Mar. 1993	3	3
Mar. 1993 - Jan. 1995	3	2+
Jan. 1995 - Present	3	3

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Part VII - Additional Information

Appendix A. Summary of Prior Reports and Reviews

During the last 5 years, the General Accounting Office; the Inspector General, DoD; the General Counsel and Inspector General, DoD; the SOA Board of Visitors; the U.S. Army Infantry Center Task Force; and the Professional Software Engineering, Inc., issued reports discussing SOA issues.

General Accounting Office

Report No. NSIAD-96-178 (OSD Case No. 1171), "School of the Americas - U.S. Military Training for Latin American Countries," August 22, 1996, states that the SOA training is intended to provide a long-term investment in a positive relationship with Latin America. Training at the SOA makes up a small percentage of the entire training the Army provides to foreign students. The courses offered at the SOA are based on U.S. military doctrine and are similar to courses at other Army training locations. The SOA courses emphasize the protection of human rights. The report did not address problems or weaknesses at the SOA and offered no recommendations for corrective action.

Inspector General, DoD

Report No. PO 97-007, February 21, 1997, "Evaluation Report on Training of Foreign Military Personnel - Phase I," provides the results of a review of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Intelligence Oversight) report of March 1992 on the use of Spanish language intelligence training manuals in the U.S. Southern Command area of responsibility and at the School of the Americas. The evaluation was undertaken at the request of the Deputy Secretary of Defense to determine whether the 1992 report was adequate to assess individual responsibility and to determine whether corrective actions recommended in the report were satisfactorily implemented. The Inspector General, DoD, evaluation determined that the 1992 report was adequate for concluding that no deliberate or orchestrated attempt was made to violate DoD or Army policies and that no further investigation was required. In August 1992, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence) issued a policy memorandum on intelligence and counterintelligence training of non-U.S. persons. The memorandum directed that the appropriate authority must approve the

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training materials to ensure consistency with policy and that the materials must be cleared for foreign release. The Inspector General, DoD, evaluation concluded that the memorandum had little impact and that only the Army and the Defense Intelligence Agency published implementing instructions. The evaluation report recommended that the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence) reissue the memorandum as a DoD directive.

General Counsel and Inspector General, DoD

The DoD Guatemala Review Panel, chaired by the DoD General Counsel and Inspector General, issued Report Serial Number SI-433514-95, "Guatemala Review-Report to the President's Intelligence Oversight Board," October 31, 1995. The report, which focused on a Government-wide review of allegations surrounding the death, disappearance, and kidnapping of U.S. citizens and others in Guatemala, described the use of inappropriate training materials in the USSOUTHCOM area of responsibility from 1982 through 1991. The report states that Guatemala was among the nations that received intelligence training from USSOUTHCOM Mobile Training Teams using the inappropriate manuals and that Guatemalan military personnel were students at the SOA when the manuals were in use.

Board of Visitors

The "Initial Report of the Board of Visitors," July 8, 1996, states that the SOA mission is being pursued in an exemplary manner by the Commandant and his staff. The report indicates that the SOA fulfills a need in providing doctrinal training as well as instruction on civilian control, democratic values, and human rights. The report made several recommendations, including that:

- the current mission of the SOA remain unchanged;
- the SOA become more relevant to Latin American country needs by modifying its doctrine, curriculum, and course materials;
- the SOA remain under the TRADOC;
- Spanish remain the principal language for SOA courses; and

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o the SOA curriculum be monitored to ensure that current inclusion of human rights instruction is maintained and strengthened.

U.S. Army Infantry Center Task Force

At the direction of the TRADOC Commander, a task force was created in 1994 to review all aspects of the operations of the SOA in response to a request received from the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee for a full report on SOA. The U.S. Army Infantry Center Task Force, "Report on the School of the Americas," March 15, 1994, states that the SOA has been and remains a valuable strategic instrument. The SOA accomplishes its assigned mission and complies with applicable regulations. The nomination and selection process of SOA cadre and students is sound. The SOA courses are comprehensive, doctrinally sound, and cost-effective. Less than 1 percent of all SOA graduates are alleged to have committed crimes or human rights violations. There is no evidence that indicates that the SOA courses influenced alleged criminal behavior. The report concludes that the SOA program for human rights training is the most comprehensive and well-developed program in the U.S. Army. The report recommends that the SOA be provided adequate resources to continue to execute its mission and that an active duty lawyer be assigned to the SOA faculty to enhance its human rights awareness training.

Professional Software Engineering, Inc.

The Professional Software Engineering, Inc., a private sector company, was contracted by the TRADOC to conduct a study of the SOA. In its "White Paper on U.S. Army School of the Americas," August 4, 1995, the company points out that the SOA is strategically important to the United States and that the SOA mission supports U.S. foreign policy. The report states that the publicity received by the SOA has given the U.S. Army an opportunity to examine the SOA operations closely and resulted in added emphasis on human rights in the course materials. The white paper stresses that human rights violations by Latin American military personnel cannot be linked to SOA instruction or training.

The white paper recommends that:

o the Army reaffirm Spanish as the language of instruction at the SOA;

o the SOA be subordinated to USSOUTHCOM;

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o the TRADOC seek a clear statement of policy regarding the SOA;

o the TRADOC ask the DoD to review the interpretation of the Expanded IMET criteria; and

o the TRADOC investigate the affiliation between the SOA and the Inter-American Defense College.

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Appendix B. DoD Policy Memorandum

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-3040

August 27, 1992

COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY

SUBJECT: DoD Policy on Intelligence and Counterintelligence Training of Non-United States Persons

It is the policy of the Department of Defense (DoD) that the Military Departments, unified and specified combatant commands, and DoD intelligence agencies may provide intelligence and counterintelligence training to non-United States persons when such training supports essential national security objectives. All such training shall conform with current statutes, executive orders, Director of Central Intelligence directives, and DoD directives, instructions, regulations, and shall reflect current departmental policies and procedures. Further, training material used or provided must have been approved by the appropriate DoD doctrinal authority to ensure that it is consistent with U.S. and DoD policy and must have been cleared for foreign release. In cases where this training is provided overseas, OSD policy approval must be obtained through ASD(C3I). A master copy of all lesson plans and instructional material must be available in the English language.

The ASD(C3I) is responsible for overall DoD policy and oversight of the training of non-U.S. persons in intelligence and counterintelligence subjects. ASD(C3I) will provide OSD policy review and coordination as required. Procedural guidance is contained in the attachment to this memorandum.

The Secretaries of the Military Departments and Directors of the DoD intelligence agencies continue to be responsible for review and approval of the intelligence and counterintelligence training provided by their departments/agencies and shall ensure that all associated Programs of Instruction (POI) are consistent with the policy stated above. Proposals for training to be provided overseas should be coordinated with ASD(C3I).

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should review and approve intelligence and counterintelligence training proposed by the unified and specified combatant commanders. Proposals for training to be provided overseas should be coordinated with ASD(C3I).

Duane P. Andrews

Attachment

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Procedural Guidance for Intelligence and Counterintelligence Training of non-U.S. Personnel

Existing Military Department, DIA, NSA, and JCS procedural guidance for training with CONUS remain in effect.

Existing responsibilities for technical review of training proposals remains in effect.

In the case of intelligence and counterintelligence training provided overseas, formal programs of instruction (POI) must be developed prior to the initiation of training. These POI must contain lesson plans and copies of all instructional materials, including handouts, to be used in the training.

Lesson plans and materials will be standardized to the maximum extent practicable and will be generated by the appropriate Military Department major command responsible for training doctrine. In cases where appropriate lesson plans have not been prepared by the Service major command and cannot be prepared in time to meet objectives critical to the combatant commanders, draft lesson plans and material may be proposed by the U&S command involved, but must be endorsed as doctrinally correct by the appropriate Service major command. Services will assure that adequate English language translations exist of all material.

All POIs shall be reviewed doctrinally by the Services which is proponent for the subjects being taught, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the National Security Agency (for SIGINT subjects), and the Joint Staff. DIA will be responsible for certifying that the information has been cleared for release to the foreign government specified before endorsing the POI. Prior to any deployment of training personnel, the training proposal shall be reviewed by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence) (ASD(C3I)). The ASD(C3I) will accomplish staffing within OSD and with the intelligence community as necessary. Requests for ASD(C3I) review should not be forwarded until the concurrence of the appropriate Military Services, DIA, and all appropriate Joint Staff offices has been obtained. These concurrences and any pertinent comments should be shown in the request for ASD(C3I) review.

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Appendix C. Report Distribution

Office of the Secretary of Defense

Deputy Secretary of Defense
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)
  Deputy Chief Financial Officer
  Deputy Comptroller (Program/Budget)
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence)
Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)
General Counsel of the Department of Defense
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Intelligence Oversight)
Director, Defense Logistics Studies Information Exchange

Joint Staff

Director, Joint Staff
Inspector General, Joint Staff

Department of the Army

Secretary of the Army
Under Secretary of the Army
Deputy Under Secretary of the Army for International Affairs
Commander, Training and Doctrine Command
Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Inspector General, Department of the Army
Auditor General, Department of the Army
Commandant, United States Army Infantry Center
Commandant, School of the Americas
Inspector General, United States Army Infantry Center

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Department of the Navy

Secretary of the Navy
Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Financial Management and Comptroller)
Inspector General, Department of the Navy
Inspector General, United States Marine Corps

Department of the Air Force

Secretary of the Air Force
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Financial Management and Comptroller)
Inspector General, Department of the Air Force

Unified Commands

Commander in Chief, U.S. European Command
  Inspector General, U.S. European Command
Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command
  Inspector General, U.S. Pacific Command
Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command
  Inspector General, U.S. Atlantic Command
Commander in Chief, U.S. Southern Command
  Inspector General, U.S. Southern Command
Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command
  Inspector General, U.S. Central Command
Commander in Chief, U.S. Special Operations Command
  Inspector General, U.S. Special Operations Command

Defense Organizations

Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
  Inspector General, Defense Intelligence Agency
Director, Defense Logistics Agency
Director, National Imagery and Mapping Agency
  Inspector General, National Imagery and Mapping Agency
Director, National Security Agency
  Inspector General, National Security Agency
Director, Defense Security Assistance Agency

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Non-Defense Federal Organizations and Individuals

Office of Management and Budget
Technical Information Center, National Security and International Affairs Division, General Accounting Office

Chairman and ranking minority member of each of the following congressional committees and subcommittees:

Senate Committee on Appropriations
Senate Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations
Senate Committee on Armed Services
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs
House Committee on Appropriations
House Subcommittee on National Security, Committee on Appropriations
House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight
House Subcommittee on Government Management, Information and Technology, Committee on Government Reform and Oversight
House Subcommittee on National Security, International Affairs, and Criminal Justice, Committee on Government Reform and Oversight
House Committee on National Security
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence

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Part VIII - Management Comments

Department of the Army Comments

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
102 ARMY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20310-0102

22 October 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSPECTOR GENERAL

SUBJECT: Evaluation of the U.S. Army School of the Americas – INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

The Department of the Army reviewed the September 3, 1997 draft evaluation report, "Training of Foreign Military Personnel, Phase II: School of the Americas" and, as requested, provides management comments.

While the report found no evidence of lesson plans or publications at the School of the Americas that are inconsistent with U.S. or Department of Defense (DoD) policies, it noted some administrative deficiencies and recommended corrective actions. Enclosed are the comments of the Commander, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command indicating the Army's concurrence with, and proposed actions on, most of the recommendations. The Army's Inspector General will review our progress in correcting the noted administrative deficiencies and addressing your recommended changes.

The Army will continue to fulfill its mission of operating the School in accordance with U.S. and DoD policies.

Claude M. Kicklighter
Lieutenant General,
United States Army Retired
Deputy Under Secretary of the Army
(International Affairs)

Enclosure

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

ATTG-I

18 September 1997

MEMORANDUM THRU Deputy Under Secretary of the Army (International Affairs), 102 Army Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20310-0102

FOR Secretary of the Army, 101 Army Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20310-0101

SUBJECT: Management Comments on Evaluation Report on Training of Foreign Military Personnel, Phase II: School of the Americas

1. DOD IG memorandum, dated 3 Sep 97, subject: Evaluation report on Training of Foreign Military Personnel, Phase II: School of the Americas (Project No. 7OI-9099.01), requested management comments prior to release of the final report.

2. Comments on the Executive Summary are as follows:

a. The Executive Summary should contain a brief statement of the evaluators' overall assessment of School of the Americas (SOA). Did they find a well-run school teaching U.S. Army doctrine and emphasizing human rights? We believe the inspectors are well-qualified to make such a brief, general assessment, and that it is well within the spirit of their charter.

b. We have concerns regarding the report's handling of "external oversight." The use of phrases such as "hands on content review" appears to equate external oversight with detailed curriculum review.

(1) While SOA has not had a detailed curriculum review by an outside agency, it has been the beneficiary of aggressive external oversight in recent years. (One indication is the number of prior reports and reviews cited in Appendix A.) The SOA Board of Visitors is one source of valuable external oversight. The members pursue their duties aggressively and provide candid criticism.

(2) Passages in the report could be construed to mean that OSD, the Army Secretariat, or the Army staff should be providing external oversight of SOA. The Commander, U.S. Army Infantry Center, can provide the most effective external oversight of SOA and that is the appropriate level.

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Department of the Army Comments

ATTG-IT
SUBJECT: Management Comments on Evaluation Report on Training of Foreign Military Personnel, Phase II: School of the Americas

c. We will work with the other signatories to update the Special Relationship Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) to reflect changes that have already taken place. We will augment the staff of the Infantry Center with qualified Spanish speakers to facilitate oversight of SOA. We question, however, whether the assignment of Spanish speakers to the Infantry Center is an appropriate topic for the MOA. The 1990 version does not cover management oversight within TRADOC, and this has never been an issue with the other signatories.

d. TRADOC is the proponent for policy on lesson plan formats; there is no U.S. Army policy. While we have the authority to grant exceptions to our own policy on a case-by-case basis, we will review our decision with regard to SOA.

revised Exec Sum

e. There are many reasons why an "obsolete" manual may be appropriate for use at SOA based on the type of equipment, force structure, or doctrine used by the Latin American armies. U.S. Army doctrine is dynamic; field manuals are continually being revised. The index to publications can be very misleading in this regard. We will, however, ensure that SOA has the most recent index, update the "statement of required distribution", and revise our procedures regarding reference materials IAW the DODIG recommendations.

f. With regard to the 1992 Army policy memorandum published by HQDA DCSINT on intelligence and counterintelligence training of non-United States persons: we searched files at HQ TRADOC, Fort Benning, Fort Leavenworth, and Fort Huachuca, and could not locate a copy. There is no evidence the memo was ever received at TRADOC. We are taking action to comply with the memo and concur with recommendation that we translate intelligence and intelligence-related lesson plans in 180 days.

g. Prior to assignment of guest instructors from countries under sanction, TRADOC will coordinate with the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of the Army (International Affairs) (DUSA-IA). DUSA-IA will staff further as appropriate; however, we question the utility of OSD involvement.

h. Once a guest instructor has been through the screening/vetting process and approved for assignment to SOA, SOA exercises the same degree of supervision as for any other guest instructor. It is inappropriate to single out certain countries/individuals for more "rigorous oversight."

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ATTG-IT
SUBJECT: Management Comments on Evaluation Report on Training of Foreign Military Personnel, Phase II: School of the Americas

3. Comments on the draft evaluation report are as follows (items covered in paragraph 3 above are not repeated):

a. Recommendation A1: Concur. Revised MOA will include the role of the Commander, U.S. Army Infantry Center.

b. Recommendation A2: Per 8 Sep 97 discussion with DODIG representatives, the phrase "[TRADOC should] ensure that U.S. Southern Command provides formal concurrence with . . . the School of the Americas curriculum" should be changed to "[TRADOC should] request that U.S. Southern Command . . . " revised page 15

c. Recommendation B: Also IAW 8 Sep 97 discussion, " . . . assign U.S. officers proficient in the Spanish language . . . " should be changed to " . . . assign U.S. personnel . . . " revised page 15

d. Recommendations C2, C3, and C5: Concur, but suggest that these recommendations be combined into one recommendation addressing lesson plan review. We will formalize our review procedures to facilitate identification of lesson plans requiring updates.

e. Recommendation C4: A legal review of every lesson plan is impractical and should not be necessary. We will have a JAG officer review any lesson plan where there is a legal issue. revised page 22

f. Recommendation F: TRADOC will strengthen SOA's Evaluation Branch and ensure that it is headed by a U.S. citizen. Personnel constraints prevent us from staffing this office entirely with U.S. personnel, and we value contributions and perspective of foreign officers. They can give us insight into subtleties of different cultures and the appropriateness of the instruction. revised page 27

4. We appreciate the DODIG's candid and thorough evaluation.

William W. Hartzog
WILLIAM W. HARTZOG
General, U.S. Army
Commanding

CF:
Chief of Staff, USA, 200 Army Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20310-0200

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Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence) Comments

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
6000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-6000

September 15, 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY ASSISTANT INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR INTELLIGENCE REVIEW

SUBJECT: Evaluation Report on Training of Foreign Military Personnel, Phase II: School of the Americas

We appreciate the opportunity to review the Draft Evaluation Report. We are in concurrence with the Report's findings and recommendations. Although not a specific recommendation of the Phase II Report, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (ASD(C3I)) continues to develop a DoD Directive on intelligence and counter-intelligence training for non-U.S. persons as recommended in the Phase I Report. The Directive development and coordination process is normally 8-12 months in length, suggesting an approximate completion date of April-May 1998.

If we can be of further assistance, please contact Capt Troy Thomas, USAF, at (703) 695-3617 (DSN 225-3617) or Dr. Carolyn Crooks at (703) 614-1400 (DSN 224-1400).

Cheryl J. Roby
Acting
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Intelligence and Security)

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Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) Comments

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-2400

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY ASSISTANT INSPECTOR GENERAL (INTELLIGENCE REVIEW)

FROM Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs 23 SEP 1997
(Prepared by: R. Novak, IA, 697-9301, 16 Sep 97)

SUBJECT: Evaluation report on Training of Foreign Military Personnel, Phase II: School of the Americas (Project No. 701-9009.01)

We have reviewed the draft report. Recommendation 1, under "Screening Foreign Instructors and Students" in Part VI - Related Issues, is directed at this office. We concur with the recommendation, with the following caveat: Many sanctions are caused by failure to repay U.S. Government loans on time. Sanctions of this nature need not require coordination of student or instructor assignments to the SoA.

revised page 32

Most of the other recommendations made by the evaluators are technical in nature, requiring expertise in the areas addressed and outside the realm of this office. However, we believe recommendation F, in Part V, Administrative Issues, goes too far and would rob the School of the valuable insights a foreign instructor could provide. The desire to keep responsibility for conformity with doctrine and currency of training materials under U.S. control is commendable. However, a Latin perspective is important in ensuring that the desired points are, in fact, the ones made in the classroom. Someone with the proper cultural perspective and not just language capability is necessary to carry out this responsibility. Perhaps a U.S. Army officer could be assigned as OIC and a foreign instructor be retained in the evaluation branch.

revised page 27

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Team Members

This report was prepared by the Intelligence Operations Directorate, Office of the Assistant Inspector General for Policy and Oversight, DoD.

John V. Lewin
Norman Idleberg

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UNCLASSIFIED

Trip Report - USARSA HR Instruction Week

PURPOSE
To inform on the visit of J5-HR representatives to USARSA, Fort Benning

BACKGROUND
- SCJ5-HR reps traveled to Fort Benning Feb 8-11 to observe and evaluate USARSA's HR Instruction Week and to attend a HR Committee meeting as well

HR INSTRUCTION WEEK
- USARSA has instituted a full week of HR and International Humanitarian Law (IHL) instruction as a main component of its longest course, the 49 week Command and General Staff Course (CGSC)
  - This year the course has 60 students, primarily 0-4's
    - ⇒ 35 Latin American officers
    - ⇒ 25 U.S. officers
- HR Instruction Week forms the first week of subject matter instruction for this course, creating a background of knowledge in HR and IHL which students will apply to other topics studied later in the course and hopefully throughout their military careers as well
- HR instruction follows a comprehensive approach, integrating the following elements:
  - Ethical/moral
  - Legal
  - Operational
- An overview of the instructions is as follows:
  - Military Ethics and the Ethical Use of Force presented by Chaplain and USARSA Commandant
  - International Human Rights-Universal Declaration of Human Rights presented by USARSA IAG/HR Officer
  - International Humanitarian Law, also called International Law of Armed Conflict, presented by guest lecturer, ICRC Regional Delegate, Mr. Francois Senechaud
    - ⇒ IHL instruction consisted of lectures, videos and practical exercises worked in small groups
  - Lecture on developments in legal enforcement of internationally recognized human rights by guest speaker, International HR attorney, *Mr.* Steven Schneebaum
  - Visit to Andersonville, a concentration camp from the Civil War (SCJ5-HR reps had departed for Miami prior to this event on the last day of the HR Instruction Week
- Other course observers included two representatives from Center for International Policy, Capt. Lawrence Rockwood and Dr. Amelia Simpson, and from Habitat for Humanity International, Sister Betsy Van Dousen

OBSERVATIONS
- Structure of the course was comprehensive and effective, with a good mix of lecture, question and answers periods, and practical exercises
- High level of enthusiastic participation from the students, particularly the Latin American officers
  - Many demonstrated previous knowledge of the subject matter
- Commandant effectively removed risk of U.S. being perceived as "preaching" by beginning instruction with discussion of the My Lai case
- Other course observers expressed their positive impression of the HR instruction
- SCJ5-HR recommendations to further improve HR Instruction Week:
  - Expand HR instruction to include the Inter-American Human Rights System-OAS, American Declaration of the Human Rights and Duties of Man, the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights, and the Inter-American Human Rights Court in San Jose, Costa Rica
  - Focus instruction and discussions more tightly on internationally recognized human rights such as extrajudicial killing, torture, forced disappearance, genocide, etc.
    - ⇒ These are the issues which will present most important challenge to students as professional military officers
  - Invite more representatives of NGOs, PVOs and IOs to observe instruction
  - Include time for observers to interact with the students in small groups or roundtable discussions

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USARSA HR COMMITTEE MEETING

Background

- The USARSA HR Committee meeting was held Thursday, 11 Feb 99. This committee meets quarterly to coordinate and evaluate USARSA HR program
- SCJ5-HR first attended USARSA HR Committee in Sep 97, and now has a permanent seat on the Committee
- COL Weidner, presided over the meeting

Attendees

- COL Weidner, USARSA Commandant
- Col Parker, Sub-Commandant (El Salvador)
- LTC Barreto, Chief of Staff
- LTC Harkins, Director of the Department for Joined Combined Operations (DJCO)
- LTC Sheppard, Chief, Civil-Military Operations Division
- MAJ Raimondo, JAG/HR Officer
- Maj Colon, Chaplain
- Maj Fiemayer, Public Affairs Office
- Dr. Ramsey, Resident Academician
- Mr. Joe Leuer, Department of Training and Doctrine
- MAJ Stewart, SCWFO
- Ms. Eva Wiegold, DoS-ARA, HR Officer
- Mr. Schneebeam, International HR attorney
- Mrs. Bresnahan, J5-HR Coordinator
- Mrs. Borden, J5-HR Specialist

DISCUSSION

HR Instruction Program

- USARSA HR curriculum expanded
  - ➢ Comprehensive focus to include ethical/moral, legal and operational aspects
    - ⇒ Use of case studies (i.e., My Lai)
  - ➢ DoS rep suggested the use of case studies from AOR, such as El Mozote
    - ⇒ Commandant and Sub-Commandant (ES) expressed concern that this would create a defensive atmosphere in the classroom
    - ⇒ Will continue to evaluate the best method of instruction and consider this option
- Continue to increase dialogue with IOs, and invite NGOs to USARSA as observers
  - ➢ Such as OAS, IACHR, IIHR
  - ➢ HR NGOs such as AIUSA, WOLA
  - ➢ Commandant open to increasing dialogue between observers and students, by inviting them to speak and/or participate in small group discussions
    - ⇒ Care must be exercised to offer this opportunity to individuals who are objective, i.e. without a political agenda to close USARSA
- Initiative of inviting VIPs (regional/military experts, dignitaries, etc) to visit USARSA as guest speakers on HR, IHL, democracy, and civil-military relations
  - ⇒ Few funds available
- HR instruction in course curriculum
  - ➢ CGSC: 1 week of formal instruction
    - ⇒ HR is integrated into many aspects of instruction, which is difficult to quantify
    - ⇒ Instructors will attempt to quantify for reporting purposes
    - ⇒ Commandant open to the idea of having observers monitor other portions of the course (such as PKO, OOTW, CN) to assess integration of HR into overall course instruction
  - ➢ Remaining courses have 8 hours of instruction,
    - ⇒ Only exception is the Chilean Cadet Course, which has two weeks of duration and 4 hours of HR instruction
  - ➢ Advanced Course, which is 6 months in length, will accommodate a week-long HR Instruction Course
  - ➢ USARSA will provide schedule of HR instruction for each course to facilitate invited NGO observers throughout the year

Host Nation and Country Team Support for USARSA

- Incorporation of Guatemalan students into CGSC, Democratic Sustainment (E-IMET qualification), and Civil Military Operations courses
- GOG proposal to include a Guatemalan civilian observer in the CGSC was not considered feasible at this time
- USARSA accepts HR instructors from any country in LA, as long as they complete HR certification and instructor training at USARSA

Deputy Commandant Position

- Position normally rotates from country to country in alphabetical order

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- In a normal rotation, Guatemala would be the next country to fill the position (current Dep Commandant is from El Salvador)
- Because of political sensitivities, decision has been made not to invite Guatemala to send a Deputy Commandant at this time
- Will probably ask an Ecuadorian to fill the position: Ecuador did not provide a Deputy Commandant in the normal rotation before El Salvador

Distance Learning Initiative (DLI)

- Initiative to post HR instruction material on the Internet
- Will be used to offer instruction to USARSA students at Ft. Rucker
- May also be used for HR training within host countries
  - ➢ This would require training personnel in the MILGPGs to teach

USARSA HR Training Opportunities

- USARSA can provide HR instruction
  - ➢ As part of courses at USARSA
  - ➢ DLI (see above)
  - ➢ MTTs
    - ⇒ USARSA is glad to participate in such projects
    - ⇒ However, USARSA instructors have tight schedules and therefore will not often be available for travel
- HR Train the Trainer course
  - ➢ Excellent 2-week course which trains HR instructors
    - ⇒ Would help answer the need expressed by AOR militaries to increase HR instruction
  - ➢ Scheduled for April 98, but will have to cancel if no more students enroll
  - ➢ Currently one Argentine student projected

ICRC in HR Instruction

- ICRC currently participates actively in training USARSA students who attend the CGSC and PKO courses
  - ➢ Commandant wishes to expand ICRC participation in more HR training courses
  - ➢ ICRC wants to maintain a low profile

Amnesty International

- COL Weidner welcomes AI and other NGOs to visit USARSA and to act as observers in HR training sessions
  - ➢ To evaluate the content of the instruction and give feedback

Department of State position at USARSA

- Eva Weigold reported that the DoS slot at USARSA to head up the Civil-Military Relations Division has been approved
- The position will go up for bidding in the summer of 1999
- Will likely be filled in 2000

Board Of Visitors (BOV)

- COL Weidner reported that the new BOV is currently being formed
- It will consist of diplomatic, academic and military members
- Seven of nine members have agreed to serve, including Amb. Luigi Einaudi, Gen. (Ret.) Gorman, and Jeanne Mandelcorn Forman
- He hopes to add a representative of the religious community as well as eventually an NGO rep
- The next BOV meeting is schedule for 10-12 May
- COL Weidner hopes that SC will be represented by either the CINC or the DCINC
- SCIS-HR informed that the DCINC had issued an invitation to ICRC Director, Mr. Reto Meister, to attend as an observer
  - ➢ Mr. Meister accepted the invitation

Next HR Committee meeting

- Will be scheduled for May to coincide with the BOV

SCIS-HR ACTION

- Work with SAOs to get students for the next HR Train the Trainers course
- Increase effort to get NGO and IO reps to USARSA to observe HR instruction

Date Prepared: 18 Feb 99
Mrs. Borden/Mrs. Brennahan J5-HR
437-1573/437-1560
AS OF 18 Feb 99

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TRIP REPORT – BOARD OF VISITORS OUTBRIEF– U.S. ARMY SCHOOL OF THE AMERICAS

BACKGROUND
Capt Wetzel, Deputy Director Pol-Mil and HR and Ms. Levy, SCJ5-HR attended the U.S. Army School of the Americas (USARSA) Board of Visitors (BOV) Outbrief on 16-17 July. Also attended the USARSA Change of Command Ceremony on 17 July.

- The 16-17 July meeting was to serve as a transition meeting between old and new BOV members. Army Regulation 15-1 requires the oversight committee to appoint new members every two years.

- Current BOV members present were:
  - Gen. (Ret) Paul Gorman
  - Gen. (Ret) Fred Woerner
  - Gen (Ret) Bill Richardson
  - Ambassador Edwin Corr (Chairman)
  - Dr. Johanna Mendelson-Forman (USAID)
  - Mr. Steven Schneebaum (HR Attorney)
  - Col Trumble (Former USARSA Commandant)
  - Col Weidner (USARSA Commandant)
- Ambassador David Passage, a prospective new member of the USARSA BOV was present on 17 July.
- Gen. Hartzog (TRADOC Commander) and Gen. Ernst (Post Commander) were also present on 17 July.
- Nominations for new BOV members are currently being compiled.

SUMMARY
The following were the items of interest covered during the course of the meeting:

- <u>Distributed Learning Initiative</u>
  - Initiative to use internet (AmNet) as the tool to launch a long-distance, interactive web-based training program for countries throughout the AOR- (Phase I- Asynchronous Learning)
  - Proposal also includes Phase II- Synchronous Learning which would include one or two way video and sound transmission with countries down range
  - Phase II is much more costly than Phase I and would only be implemented if Phase I is successful
  - Booz Allen & Hamilton drafted a proposal with the technical specifics of implementing the pilot program (SEE TAB B)
    - Proposal indicates a $475,000 cost to set up the program. Would be operable in 6 months
  - USARSA was in contact with various MILGROUPs to identify which ones had an interest in synchronous training
  - Determined Chile and Argentina would be good candidates for trying out the Phase I aspect of the Distributive Learning Pilot Program
  - USARSA chose three courses to include in the Phase I pilot program
    - Introduction to Military Operations Other Than War
    - Leadership Counseling
    - Division Combat Support
  - These courses belong to the CGSC curriculum of instruction
  - BOV recommended SOUTHCOM TCA Funding for the initial (Phase I) implementation of the pilot program
  - Capt Wetzel highlighted CINCSO's support for using AmNet as a training tool

- <u>Re-Focusing SOUTHCOM AOR Needs</u>
  - USARSA is an essential vehicle for SOUTHCOM's Theater Engagement Plan
  - SOUTHCOM's AOR has changed in the last year to include English speaking nations of the Caribbean
  - USARSA should support this change by conducting certain English language courses to respond to needs of this region
  - USARSA and BOV were supportive of this idea

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- Commandant Rating Scheme Issue
  - Currently the USARSA Commandant senior rater is the Commander of the Combined Arms Center in Ft. Leavenworth, KS
  - The commandant is not rated by anyone in SOUTHCOM or TRADOC
  - BOV moved to have the rating scheme re-structured, as the Commandant's responsibilities relate directly to both the TRADOC and SOUTCHOM missions

- Mission Focus Shift to Counter Drug (CD)
  - 43% of all courses are INL funded or CD-related
  - USARSA courses tailored to mesh with US foreign policy in LATAM(anti-communism rhetoric out...CD in)
  - Mr. Schneebaum expressed concern that CD courses include only the basic 4-hour core of human rights instruction
  - CD missions have HR implications that are not covered in the 4-hour block of instruction (i.e. treatment of detainees, etc.)
  - As School's focus shifts to more CD, the HR curriculum should be tailored to CD-missions

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Ensure proper coordination and information sharing between the MILGROUPs/USARSA and HQ USSOUTHCOM on all School-related matters

- Conduct a by-country assessment of technical capabilities and level of interest with regard to the Distributive Learning Initiative

- Support the Phase I portion of the Distributive Learning Initiative. Explore method of funding this initiative.

- Conduct an assessment of which courses would be most beneficial for English-speaking countries in the AOR

- Research all aspects related to the integration of English language courses into the USARSA curriculum

As of 17 July 98
Ms. Levy
SCJ5-HR
21 July 98

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Trip Report – USARSA Human Rights Committee Meeting – 20 August

BACKGROUND

- The U.S. Army School of the Americas (USARSA) Human Rights (HR) Committee met on 20 August. The USARSA HR Committee meets quarterly to discuss internal USARSA issues.
- In Sep 97, SCJ5-HR first attended USARSA HR Committee.
- SCJ5-HR now has a permanent seat on the committee.
- DoS-ARA representative, Ms. Eva Wiegold, attended the 20 Aug meeting. This was the first time a DoS representative attended.
- Col Weidner, the new USARSA Commandant, presided over the meeting.

ATTENDEES

- Col Weidner, USARSA Commandant
- Col Parker, Sub-commandant (El Salvador)
- CPT Garvin, JAG/HR Officer
- Maj. Colon, Chaplain
- Dr. Ramsey, resident academician
- LTC Nunez-Ross, Chief of Staff
- LTC Harkins , Director of the Department for Joined Combined Operations (DJCO) – NOTE: This is the department under which the HR program falls
- Mr. Joe Lenz, Department of Training and Doctrine
- Ms. Eva Wiegold, DoS-ARA, HR Officer
- Maj. Rivera, Battalion Executive Officer
- Ms. Levy, SCJ5-HR representative

EXPANDING COMMITTEE MEMBERSHIP

- COL Weidner proposed expanding the HR Committee membership to include the sub-commandant, Col Parker, from El Salvador
  - ➢ Col Parker has extensive training in International Humanitarian Law
  - ➢ Has assisted in conducting various HR classes

HOST NATION AND COUNTRY TEAM SUPPORT FOR USARSA

- Recent decision not to fill Guatemala's FY 99 student slots concerns COL Weidner
- DoS representative was not aware of the situation, but indicated she would look into it
  - ➢ During COL Weidner's visit to SC week of 31 Aug, POLAD indicated he will also investigate decision
  - ➢ GOG and Guatemalan Army want to continue sending students re: talcon with MLGRP GT on 1 Sep

DISTANCE LEARNING INITIATIVE

- Proposal was made to modify the core block of Human Rights Instruction for distance learning.
  - ➢ NOTE: SOUTHCOM has been involved in helping USARSA develop distance learning capabilities to export training material to countries down range
- Committee voted and agreed that the HR program was ideal due to its length.
- SOUTHCOM representative updated the committee on Command's position
  - ➢ CINCSO very supportive of the program
  - ➢ SOUTHCOM funds not available to support Phase I
  - ➢ SOUTHCOM prepared to assist USA find alternative funding source
  - ➢ Col Weidner stated that an important consideration would be the review and approval process –i.e. – who has access to take the course (vetting considerations etc.), and course content (ensuring it complies with policy and doctrine)
- Committee decided to wait until the program is closer to implementation to make these decisions

COLOMBIA HR INSTRUCTOR

- DoS and SOUTHCOM representatives raised concerns over School's idea to have a Colombian Officer become one of the School's HR instructors
- USARSA HR Officer explained invitation had already been extended to Colombian Officer

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- Commandant explained that the individual in question had extensive HR experience
- He also emphasized that his real-world experience in the field would give him additional credibility in the classroom
- Commandant also pointed out that
  - CO officer would be one in a team of instructors
  - US officer has oversight of what is taught.
  - The CO instructor had undergone vetting, and should have no HR problems on his record
  - Lesson plans used are Army-approved
  - Committee discussed pros/cons and decided to take the chance and deal with negative PR/criticism that might result

ICRC INVOLVEMENT IN HR TRAINING

- ICRC currently participates in training USARSA students attending the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) and Peace Operations Courses
- ICRC has asked USARSA to keep their involvement "low key" (i.e.- no hype-low visibility)
- ICRC scheduled to visit School in August/September time frame to discuss future of the relationship
- USARSA HR Officer stated they would iron out how "public" to make the relationship.

AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL

- SCJ5-HR representative provided Committee with approved Course of Action (COA) to deal with Amnesty International (AIUSA's) decision to adopt a resolution calling for the closure of the School (SEE TAB A)
  - Text of CINC letter inviting AIUSA leadership to visit USARSA is currently in draft form and is being coordinated with SCJA and SCPA.
- Commandant's position is that the School welcomes AIUSA or any other NGO.
- DoS representative proposed Using Board of Visitor (BOV) members with influence in the HR Community.
  - USARSA HR Officer will contact two BOV members (Mr. Schneebaum-International HR Lawyer and Dr. Mendelson - USAID) to get their feedback/support in this matter

HR TRAINING

- Committee decided to expand the core block of HR instruction, which all students in all courses receive, from four to eight hours

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Proceed with approved Course of Action to engage AIUSA leadership and other NGOs
  - Coordinate with DoS-ARA to send out an endorsement for USARSA from DoS leadership
- SCJ5-HR coordinates with DoS to target HR NGOs to visit the School
  - Forward feedback, as appropriate, to AI International Secretariat
- SCJ5-HR coordinates with J3-Information Operations "Guru" (Mr. Meyers) to develop a strategy to improve School's image in down range countries. (i.e. Guatemala, Colombia)

As of 26 August 1998
Ms. Levy/Mrs. Brennahan
SCJ5-HR
9 September 98

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CLASSIFICATION:UNCLASSIFIED

TRIP REPORT – HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUCTION AT USARSA

- Lt Col Frontaura attended the Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law (IHL) block of instruction for the (year-long) Command and General Staff Course (CGSC) at the US Army School of the Americas, 9-11 Mar 1998.
  - The USARSA JAG, CPT Garcia, covered the subject of human rights (HR)
  - The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) taught, for the first time, the IHL block of instruction.
- Overall, instruction was very good and covered all the aspects of HR and IHL that are important and necessary for the CGSC students to know and learn.

HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUCTION

- Facts:
  - Based on the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights
  - Final objective: to identify the correct course of action given various circumstances when in a conflict.
  - One day of instruction
  - Approximately 25% of students indicated they had previously received HR education.
- Observations: As expected, subject aroused strong emotions and opinions.
  - Much discussion around "who can be charged with committing a HR violation?"
    - Ans.: by definition, only agents of the state. Though guerrillas also violate HR they are charged based on the laws they break, not HR.
  - Other student comments:
    - Worse stigma attached to HR violators than to terrorists—press/media influence.
    - HR NGOs are anti-military/police
    - Subversives use accusations of HR violations to undermine the armed forces.
  - Not enough time to cover all the material, some important aspects were not covered:
    - Treatment of civilians.
    - Legal vs. illegal orders.
    - Military advantage to respecting HR.
    - Rules of Engagement.
- Recommendations: (already given to USARSA JAG)
  - Take more time to cover the subject.
  - Be up-front as to why USARSA teaches HR
    - ⇒ History of abuses in the AOR
    - ⇒ USARSA under Congressional scrutiny
    - ⇒ Have to do it but also good to do it regardless of the cause
      - Respect for HR is a force multiplier
      - It is expected of professionals
      - Improves the quality of training—treatment of recruits
    - ⇒ HR has become more relevant given new roles for armed forces such as CD and PKO.
  - Include also the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man of the OAS.
  - Address USSOUTHCOM's initiatives:
    - HR Conferences (1996-1997)
    - HR Seminars (1997-1998)
  - Other possible teaching tools:
    - Present case studies for small group discussions.
    - Debate with actual members of HR community (if too risky could be role-played by SCIS-HR personnel.)

INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW INSTRUCTION

- Facts:
  - Based on the Geneva Conventions I-IV, Geneva Protocols I-II, and Hague Protocol.
  - Presented the role of the ICRC in times of conflict—international and internal.
  - Two days of instruction.
  - Background of instructors included experiences in Bosnia and Somalia as well as Latin America.
- Observations:
  - Instruction was thorough but became somewhat repetitive on the second day.
  - Excellent use of videos from other countries.
  - Distributed various printed materials.
  - Good mix of examples, not only Latin America.
  - Spent too much time on the role of the ICRC.

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- IHL covers essential aspects of respect for human rights.
- Also included basic principles of war: military necessity, proportionality, limits and humanity.

- Recommendations:
  - Continue to include the ICRC as instructors
  - Give less time to instruction and incorporate a training exercise (which the ICRC is prepared to do already.)
  - Consider teaching IHL first—logical to cover with armed forces—and use it as a stepping stone to introduce HR.

- Overall recommendations:
  - Continue to work with USARSA JAG on human rights instruction.
    - ⇨ Review material being taught.
    - ⇨ Discuss how to implement new approaches.
  - Request IIR instructional material from HR NGOs being used with armed forces (e.g., IIDH's in Guatemala.)
    - ⇨ Forward to USARSA JAG for incorporation into various courses.
  - Get students feedback—learn, adjust, and implement.
  - Send an SCJ5-HR person to attend the ICRC two week "Train the trainer" course to prepare instructors in IHL.
    - ⇨ Adds credibility to the division.
    - ⇨ Makes us better prepared to do assessments and recommendations for HR programs in the AOR.

13 March 1998
Lt Col Rafael Frontaura
SCJ5-HR
11 March 1998

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RESOURCES/DOD

Question. How do you think the extent of foreign military training has affected readiness?

Answer. The regional CINCs consistently place training among their highest priorities to execute their regional engagement strategies. They often rely on foreign military training to ensure the highest possible level of military readiness.

Regional CINCs rely on Special Operations Forces (SOF) to provide unconventional military options for a wide variety of in-theater missions. In turn, the CINCs use foreign military training—whether Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET), humanitarian demining training and counterdrug training—to sharpen critical SOF Mission Essential Task List skills, both at the unit and Joint levels. U.S. forces involved in these programs enhance their foreign language and instruction skills, expand their knowledge of foreign environments and cultures, hone their combat and combat support skills, and improve U.S. access to key foreign military personnel and support facilities. Foreign military training programs contribute directly to a CINC's strategic goals of shaping the regional security environment and building a capacity to respond effectively should there be a threat to American interests in this area of responsibility.

Question. What is the rational for DoD funding of this vast foreign training?

Answer. The DoD budget funded only a small portion of the total training costs borne by the United States that are included in the Military Training Report. Of the over 52,000 activities listed in the Report, less than threa percent fell under DoD authorities, including activities executed under drawdown authorities which are funded by DoD. The remaining 97 percent fell under security assistance mechanisms (e.g., IMET, FMS). Of the $809 million in total training, IMET grants accounted for about six percent and DoD authorities for about seven percent, or $57 million. The balance, and by far the vast majority, was provided through the Foreign Military Sales system, with financing from various sources including host nation funds, Foreign Military Financing (FMF) grants, FMF loans, and International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) funds.

DoD-funded training provides the United States a high return on its investment. In FY 1998, about $12.4 million funded Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) activities conducted by Special Operations Forces (SOF) under 10 U.S.C. 2011 authorities. The JCET program produces superbly trained and highly qualified SOF who can implement critical aspects of the CINCs' theater engagement strategies and promote U.S. national security interests. The DoD-funded counterdrug program develops host nation forces' capabilities to engage actively in the counterdrug campaign. The humanitarian demining program develops host nation capabilities to manage national demining centers, to locate and destroy landmines, and to develop public information programs that promote mine awareness.

SCHOOL OF THE AMERICAS

Question. In the aftermath of the discovery of manuals used at the School of the Americas, the DoD committed to improve the oversight of the curriculum by issuing a directive on training programs meeting human rights standards. Has that directive been issued? Provide a copy of the directive for the record.

Answer. DoD took immediate corrective action when we discovered in 1991 that six instructional manuals the School of the Americas was using contained 24 inappropriate statements. All of the manuals were destroyed, with the exception of one set, which was set to the DoD General Counsel's Office.

The School's Commandant has made promoting human rights awareness a critical foundation of the School's mission. The School's formal mission statement reads: "Provide doctrinally sound, relevant military education and training to the nations of Latin America, promote democratic values and respect for human rights and foster cooperation among multinational military forces." Eight hours of human rights training is mandatory for each student attending the School.

Numerous internal and external reviews and inspections of the School of the Americas have consistently noted a measurable improvement in the School's awareness of and instruction in human rights. Several organizations have provided oversight of the School's training materials including the United States Army Infantry Center, the General Accounting Office, the DoD Inspector General, the Department of the Army Inspector General, the United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, and U.S. Southern Command.

In light of the measures taken, no formal DoD directive on training programs meeting human rights standards was required or issued, but DoD did issue a policy memorandum requiring that all intelligence and counterintelligence instruction of

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foreign nationals be consistent with that given to U.S. military service members. This policy has been fully implemented at the School.

Furthermore, the Secretary of Defense annually certifies that instruction and training provided by the School of the Americas is fully consistent with the training and doctrine imparted by DoD institutions whose primary purpose is to train U.S. military personnel. This pertains, in particular, to the observance of human rights.

Question. What steps have been taken to ensure that all curriculum developers and instructors are aware of the directive and are complying with it?

Answer. The School of the Americas is actively committed to continued improvement in its human rights instruction. The School's Commandant has made promoting human rights awareness a critical foundation of the School's mission. The School's formal mission statement reads: "Provide doctrinally sound, relevant military education and training to the nations of Latin America, promote democratic values and respect for human rights and foster cooperation among multinational military forces."

All courses taught at the School must include a human rights awareness component. Each course description that appears in the School's catalog highlights human rights issues. Every instructor receives a mandatory sixteen-hour block of human rights instruction as part of the Instructor Training Course mandated by the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. The latest annual training guidance, issued by the School's Commandant in June 1998, explicitly states one of the School's six goals is to "Continue development of our Human Rights Training Program and be recognized as the premier Human Rights training institution in DoD."

Question. Which IMET courses beyond expanded IMET contain a human rights and/or civil military relations component?

Answer. Per se, there is no such thing as an IMET course. IMET is a source of funding used to support the costs of training international students in a wide variety of DoD-sponsored courses. With few exceptions, almost all courses available to U.S. military students and over 100 courses under expanded IMET (E–IMET) are available through IMET funding. These courses of instruction fall into three broad categories:

1. *Professional Military Education* includes command an staff colleges, postgraduate education and other instruction directed toward senior officers and mangers. Almost all of these courses include education in human rights and or civil-military relations.

2. *English language training* is designed to ensure students achieve prescribed levels of English proficiency needed to complete their follow-up courses successfully. Topics of human rights and civil-military relations are used throughout the English language curricula.

3. *Traditional military training* encompasses technical or general skills, but does not include specific training in human rights or civil-military relations. (Note: this category of training composes only about 25% of IMET-funded programs.) These students are exposed to U.S. values in human rights and civil-military relations through the Informational Program.

The Informational Program (IP), a key component of the international student's experience in the United States, encompasses a variety of activities designed to enhance awareness and functional understanding of human rights and the American democratic way of life. This program is available to all international students and can be financed through IMET, FMF, or country national funds.

The IP is designed to ensure that international students return to their homelands with an understanding of the responsibilities governments, militaries and citizens have to protect, preserve, and respect the rights of every individual. IP activities can be powerful tools for presenting U.S. institutional values to international students. DSCA continues to work with the security assistance training community to update and focus IP activities.

International Military Student Officers (IMSOs) must arrange activities and events for international students that clearly support at least one of the following areas of concentration. (1) internationally recognized human rights, as outlined in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights; (2) the democratic ideals of an elected government and effective civil-military relations; (3) the roles and interrelationships of a culturally, ethnically, economically, and socially diverse population in a democratic society; and (4) the role of the U.S. free enterprise system in a democratic society.

IMSOs arrange events that involve contact with a diversity of groups that contribute to a vibrant civil society. These include various groups such as civil rights, environmental preservation, citizen tax review, anti-war and other organizations. Visits to and briefings by these and other non-governmental organizations emphasize how accountability in a democracy serves to preserve the human rights and

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other freedoms of each citizen. IMSOs are required to complete assessment reports for all IP events and to ensure that all students complete evaluation forms. These forms are maintained on file.

Question. Provide an assessment of the performance of School of Americas graduates during 1997 and 1998.

Answer. The U.S. Army School of the Americas graduated 946 foreign and U.S. military students in 1997 and 778 students in 1998. These graduates represented the following countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, the United States, and Venezuela. Course offerings in 1997 and 1998 included the following Expanded IMET courses: command and general staff officer course, civil-military operations, and resource management. Other course offerings included peace operations, counterdrug operations, medical assistance, countermine operations, cadet leadership development engineer, cadet leadership development logistics, battle staff operations, joint operations, and NCO development.

The U.S. does not "track" foreign personnel after completing their U.S. training. Formal tracking of graduates would be logistically complex and costly—and perhaps impossible. The U.S., in all our training activities could graduate over 30,000 foreign students in any given year. Moreover, it is doubtful we could obtain the information necessary for career-long tracking from foreign citizens who have no continuing formal association with the U.S. government. Even if it were feasible to collect this type of information, we do not believe it would be worth the huge administrative burden, which would fall most heavily on already stretched embassy staffs.

We do have some information about certain "alumni" who have established and maintained informal relationships with U.S. personnel. Graduates who have done well, often rising to very high positions in their governments, frequently credit U.S. training as a key element in their career development. Examples from Latin America include the Minister of Defense of Venezuela; the Minister of National Defense of Ecuador; and the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of Honduras.

There are sometimes reports of foreign officers charged with gross violations of human rights or other misconduct who have attended U.S. training at some point in their careers. We correctly condemn these individuals, but their misconduct must not cast doubt on all recipients who have received or may receive similar U.S. training.

Question. Were any graduates implicated in human rights abuses during that time (1997 and 1998)? Provide the details of the violations or alleged violations for the record.

Answer. The Department of Defense is not aware of any 1997 and 1998 graduate from the U.S. Army School of the Americas who has been implicated in human rights abuses.

Question. Describe how many students were enrolled in the Human Rights Train the Trainer course in 1998, and plans to offer it in 1999.

Answer. In fiscal year 1998, the U.S. Army School of the Americas did not have any students who took the Human Rights Train the Trainer Qualification course. This same course has been made available to Latin American countries for fiscal year 1999, but there are currently no students scheduled for enrollment at this time.

Question. What kind of ongoing, external oversight of the SOA curriculum is exercised beyond that done by the Board of Visitors? Provide for the record any recent relevant report by the Board of Visitors, and reports from any other external oversight body.

Answer. Department of Defense and Department of the Army Inspectors General have recently conducted detailed inspections of the School. The DoD Inspector General conducted two inspections in 1997, while the Army Inspector General conducted a follow-up inspection in 1998. Results of these inspections point to a consistent improvement in human rights training and instructional oversight. Additionally, the United States Southern Command's (USSOUTHCOM) Human Rights Office has made numerous visits to the School of the Americas to evaluate whether its human rights training meets required standards, as well as to suggest improvements and enhancements to the training. Also, representatives for the Human Rights Office attend the School's quarterly Human Rights Committee meetings to offer insight on curriculum content and focus. A curriculum review team for USSOUTHCOM will again visit the School in mid-April for a top-to-bottom review of the curriculum. A copy of the DoD Inspector General's Report and inspection reports for the USSOUTHCOM Human Rights Office are attached for the record; the interim Army Inspector General's report will soon be available for final release.

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TUESDAY, MARCH 23, 1999.

MILITARY TRAINING REPORT

WITNESSES

WALTER B. SLOCOMBE, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY
ERIC D. NEWSOM, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR POLITICAL-MILITARY AFFAIRS

CHAIRMAN CALLAHAN'S OPENING STATEMENT

Mr. CALLAHAN. Thank you. This afternoon we are holding a hearing on foreign military training. The focus of the hearing will be the four-volume report issued to the committee on March the 5th, by the administration, pursuant to Section 581 of our 1999 Foreign Operations Act. The report also included a classified annex.

The report includes training that was conducted by the Department of Defense during fiscal year 1998 and training proposed for fiscal year 1999. It specifies 51,000 unclassified training activities and 555 classified activities. The total dollar value of this training approaches $1 billion, but most of the training described in the report is provided as part of foreign military sales or FMS purchased by foreign Governments.

These Governments use their own funds, in many cases, to purchase goods and services from American companies. The U.S. Government acts as their agent for these military sales and associated training activities. Less than $50 million consists of funds appropriated for the IMET program. The remaining 3 percent of the $1 billion consists of training appropriated through the Defense Subcommittee. The military training under the jurisdiction of our subcommittee is authorized in the Foreign Assistance Act and the Arms Export Control Act.

Similarly, it is my understanding that military training performed by DOD, using funds appropriated by the Defense Subcommittee, is authorized, in part, by Title X of the United States Code. Specifically, training by special operation forces, the so-called JCETs program, is authorized by Section 2011 of Title X.

As recently as October 17, 1998, the authority for such training was modified by the Congress through the Armed Services Committee. This law also requires an annual report on training by special forces. I am interested in ensuring proper oversight over the foreign military training funded through this subcommittee, and that is why I agreed to include Mrs. Pelosi's amendment on training in the 1999 Appropriation Bill.

However, military training funded through the Defense Subcommittee and authorized by the Armed Services Committee, is the responsibility of those committees. Our subcommittee is the proper venue for reviewing the programs and activities under our jurisdic-

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tion, but I believe we have plenty to do without trying to manage programs over which we have no funding control.

Today, we are pleased to have Walt Slocombe, under secretary of Defense for Policy, and Eric Newsom, assistant secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs, and we welcome both of you. I urge you to summarize your statements so members may have the opportunity to ask questions.

We will now see if Mrs. Pelosi has an opening statement.

MS. PELOSI'S OPENING STATEMENT

Ms. PELOSI. I do, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much. I want to begin by thanking you, Mr. Callahan, for agreeing to hold this hearing on military training. We have invited our colleagues from the Defense Subcommittee to the hearing, and I do not know if they are coming. I talked to Chairman Lewis earlier. He might be here, and I do not know about Mr. Murtha. But I know Mr. Lewis has Intelligence Committee business right now, as do I.

It is my hope that we can focus our discussion today on the process by which Congress, and particularly this subcommittee, is informed of decisions involving military training, which have clear foreign policy implications.

I want to join you in welcoming our witnesses, Mr. Chairman, Secretary Slocombe, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, and Secretary Newsom, the Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs. Welcome, gentlemen.

The issue of military training was discussed at some length recently at our security assistance hearing. Because our witnesses today are different witnesses, I want to make some of the points I made then and take the discussion into further detail.

There is no doubt that the Defense Department has the authority to conduct foreign military training with their own funds. The theoretical justification for these authorities is that the training activity benefits U.S. military readiness. Mr. Slocombe's prepared statement also recognizes that, "Engaging foreign military establishments through a variety of training programs strongly supports U.S. national security and foreign policy interests."

The reality is that the growth in the breadth and scope of these activities has made military training a foreign policy tool. Congress does have input and has acted in the past in the instance of, for example, the School of the Americas, to prohibit or restrict foreign military training. It is the other forms of training into which Congress has little or no input about which I am concerned.

The report, recently submitted, indicates that $800 million has been spent by DOD during the period covered by the report on 52,000—you referenced this, Mr. Chairman—different training activities. Of that amount, only $100 million spent for the IMET program has come under the direct review of this subcommittee. Although DOD has indicated that the vast majority of the remaining $700 million is funded through FMS or commercial means and that the majority of training deployments do not affect OP TEMPO, it is impossible to distinguish from the information contained in the report.

The real issue for us today is whether Congress is adequately informed of DOD's decisions to deploy U.S. forces in training situa-

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tions with clear foreign policy impacts. The reports submitted to Congress about those training activities are all structured as after-the-fact reporting of training deployments that have already taken place. In addition, the requirements imposed by the Defense Authorization Bill, as far as I know—correct me if this is not correct—only require internal DOD and State approval in JCET deployments.

I intend, today, to discuss with you the appropriate role Congress should play in deciding on the scope and purpose of these deployments in cases where there are clear foreign policy implications. With all due respect to our colleagues on the Armed Services Committee, and I am glad to see our colleague, Mr. Lewis, from the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, I believe Congress should be given enough information about these deployments before they take place so the rationale and judgments about their foreign policy implications can be made.

There are obvious and clear benefits that our Special Forces derive from these deployments. Their job is to be ready to respond to the full spectrum of crises that face them in an uncertain future. However, when those training activities overlap with foreign policy, Congress, and this subcommittee specifically, has a right to be fully informed and consulted. I intend to pursue these issues in my questions and to use specific country examples to illustrate the dilemma which I have outlined. I look forward and, again, welcome our distinguished witnesses today.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. CALLAHAN. Thank you. Chairman Lewis is a member of our subcommittee, but he is also chairman of the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee. As a result, Jerry, since most of the areas that we are talking about today include more of your monies than ours here on Foreign Operations, we welcome you to give an opening statement before we hear from the Secretaries.

Mr. LEWIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do not have an opening statement. I just might mention, however, that it has been a while since I have really focused upon these issues in-depth. But something like 90 percent of the actual expenditures for such training is associated with foreign military sales, and that is a very, very significant item. Within the remaining 10 percent, a significant piece of the remainder falls in my bill.

But as we move forward to questions, I will be pleased to be able to participate.

Mr. CALLAHAN. Thank you.

Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Chairman, if I may?

Mr. CALLAHAN. Yes?

Ms. PELOSI. Was there some constraint on time for our witnesses?

Mr. CALLAHAN. I understand they have 9 meetings they have to go to——

Mr. NEWSOM. Not me, but——

Ms. PELOSI. I just wanted our colleagues to know that.

Mr. CALLAHAN. Mr. Slocombe.

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Prepared Statement of
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Walter B. Slocombe
Before the
Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs
House of Representatives Committee on Appropriations

Hearing on Foreign Military Training
March 23, 1999

Mr. Chairman, Representative Pelosi, members of the subcommittee, it is, as always, an honor to represent the Department of Defense before this subcommittee. I and my colleagues are here today to discuss foreign military training and the report submitted pursuant to section 581 of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs Appropriations Act for fiscal year 1999. As you know, the Departments of State and Defense briefed the contents of the report and discussed it with your staff as part of its delivery on Friday, March 5, 1999. The subcommittee addressed the report with State and DoD representatives during the 11 March hearing on fiscal year 2000 security assistance programs. I welcome the additional opportunity to address your questions in further detail today. I also wish to express my regret that due to a scheduling conflict I was not able to attend the annual security assistance hearing on March 11, but I know DoD was well-represented by my Principal Deputy, Jim Bodner.

Training Foreign Militaries: A Key Element of National Security Policy

Mr. Chairman, some members of Congress and some in the press have raised concerns about certain types of military training activities. Questions past and present desérve answers, and I am committed to providing all relevant information in that regard to you and your colleagues. However, before turning to specific concerns, it is right to focus why successive administrations and our nation's military leaders have put such a high priority on military-to-military contacts around the world, including training.

Mr. Chairman, this report is titled "Foreign Military Training," but it might just as well be described as "Measures Critical for U.S. Foreign and Security Interests." We train foreign militaries, not from the vague ulterior motive sometimes attributed to us or out of any sense of international altruism, but because it serves our national security interests. The great bulk of the total (over 75%) is training for NATO allies, other traditional allies like Japan and Israel, and our Gulf coalition and Middle East Peace Process partners. This training, of course, directly supports our military goals of increased military capability of our allies and partners and greater interoperability with US forces.

In addition, the transformation of the world over the past decade has opened new opportunities. The disintegration of the USSR left the former communist militaries without Soviet "supervision." Not only in the former Communist world, but also in many other places, militaries now work for democratically elected, civilian governments for the first time in memory. And in non-democratic societies, the military forces remain major factors on the scene. They have an opportunity to

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professionalize and perform strictly military tasks, as opposed to abusing their power, either domestically or internationally.

Almost everywhere, foreign militaries are looking to the United States and its military services for leadership, for support, and for advice. It is self-evident that, when the armed services of an emerging democracy want to learn from the US military, it is in U.S. interests to be responsive. It may be less obvious, but it is no less important, that when military forces in a non-democratic society make the same request, it is usually also in U.S. interests to be responsive – albeit with very careful oversight.

Around the world, countries consistently request training on the basic elements of military organization: defense resource management, financial controls, headquarters and medical unit organization and other support, equipment maintenance, and the like. Both by Administration policy and by Congressional directive, we seek to ensure that these countries also receive instruction in professionalization of militaries, civilian oversight and human rights. We believe that contact with U.S. military personnel involved in training of foreign militaries is itself an important, if intangible , part of the process. A key component of most training, especially IMET, is exposure to – indeed, immersion in – U.S. culture; securing this helpful benefit for us requires that we bring foreign students to our country. The cultural exposure is such an important adjunct to the IMET "classroom" experience that a waiver is generally required for use of IMET funds in the field.

Training, engagement and related activities are only conducted pursuant to appropriate legal authorities, with funds properly appropriated by Congress. The training falls under a range of specific accounts and within the jurisdiction of various committees, but it is always carried out for purposes of furthering U.S. foreign policy and national defense objectives. In that regard, the training activities are conducted in coordination with, and often at the request of, U.S. Ambassadors and country teams. These activities represent a tool of extraordinary value, one that warrants the continued support of the Congress. In that regard, I would thank the subcommittee again for its continued strong support of IMET and other security assistance programs that support training and engagement.

Engaging foreign military establishments through a variety of training programs, through and exchanges, and diplomatic and other contacts strongly supports U.S. national security and foreign policy interests. The three elements of our broad strategy are to "shape" the international security environment, to "respond" to the range of contingencies we might face, and to "prepare" for an uncertain future. Training foreign militaries helps all three elements.

- We help "shape" the current environment by military contacts with foreign militaries and inculcating values of professionalization, respect for civilian authority, and norms of conduct.

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- We help "respond" to crises – which usually require coalition efforts by building in foreign nations both the military capabilities and the political inclination to associate with us when crises arise.

- We help "prepare" for the future by a long-term investment in people, attitudes, doctrine, approaches to problems, relationships to civilian authority, and legal standards that match our own.

Indeed, I can think of no more cost-effective means than training foreign military forces, of furthering our interests in peacetime – and more to the point, neither can the regional CINCs who have the broad responsibility for our military contacts in their regions. Similarly, our ambassadors are strong advocates for U.S. military training programs under established standards.

In light of the justified concern about readiness, OP TEMPO and overall demands on our forces, it is significant that the vast majority of US training and engagement activities, including the activities contained in the section 581 report, require no additional separation of U.S. military personnel from their families; they put no U.S. service members at increased risk to life or limb, and they required no additional purchases of tanks, ships or aircraft.

There is another aspect of our training and engagement programs of which the Congress should be aware: U.S. troops like participating in them. They take pride in the fact that it is their military, their way of doing things, their doctrine, tactics, professionalization, and training that are the model for foreign forces.

So as we address answer your specific questions and concerns, I ask that you not lose sight of the overall policy purpose behind our activities.

The Section 581 Report

The section 581 report, as requested by the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act, represents a snapshot of data available on FY98 and planned FY99 foreign military training conducted by the Departments of State and Defense as of December 1998. It is massive in scale, amounting to over 2,000 pages of data. The unclassified portion of the report contains information on 51,854 training and DoD engagement activities; the classified annex includes information on 555 additional activities. I am pleased to advise the subcommittee that we are now able to provide information on FY98 JCET activities – which was originally classified – in unclassified form in response to your request.

Authorities. As to the authorities for our training activities, the overwhelming part -- fully 97% of the total -- of the activities covered in the report constitutes activities authorized under security assistance legislation, comprising (1) training provided on a grant basis under IMET, FMF, State Department International Narcotics and Law Enforcement authority, or under drawdown authority, and (2) training paid for by the recipient's country through the Foreign Military Sales program. The balance of activities covered in the report is authorized under various provisions of Department of Defense – related legislation. The appropriate committees of the Congress are kept fully

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informed of these Defense-funded activities. I want to reiterate that any training or engagement activity conducted in a foreign country, under any authority, is undertaken with the full knowledge of the U.S. embassy country team.

Resources. The total of activities included in this report, combining payments by the U.S. and by foreign governments, exceeds $800 million for fiscal years 1998 and 1999. (I should note that there are no cost figures for some items and in any case the final total will not be determinable for some time because some activities planned for FY99 will not occur, or may include more personnel or fewer personnel than originally projected when the data call for the report closed in December 1998.)

I want to make three basic points relating to resources.

First, approximately ninety percent of the dollar value of this training flowed through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) system, either through an FMF grant, an FMF loan, under drawdown authorities, through the State Department International Law Enforcement budget, or through foreign country purchases using their own national funds. The current data reporting and management system does not distinguish payments from foreign countries using their own resources from payments using appropriated U.S. funds (e.g., IMET or FMF) so we cannot nail down that figure mechanically. We are exploring ways to capture this information in the future.

Second, the reason the dollar total of IMET-funded training included in the report (about $48 million) is significantly below the total appropriated for IMET (approximately $100 million for FY 98 and 99 combined) is straightforward: The difference results from the fact that transportation and living expenses provided for IMET participants are not included in the report, only the value of the training or education they receive -- in effect, the tuition costs as distinct from living and transportation costs.

Third, the resources for non-security assistance activities covered in this report – about three percent of the total – are appropriated through the 050 federal budget function under the cognizance of your Defense Appropriations Subcommittee colleagues. Although defense funds may not generally be used for foreign military training, Congress has provided a number of specific authorities to DoD to use defense funds for certain specialized training activities that are therefore contained in this report. All training, including JCETS conducted by DoD under specific authorities use, some form of the O&M accounts as the budgetary source of funds, except in the case of humanitarian demining ,which is funded out of the Overseas Humanitarian Disaster and Civic Assistance (OHDACA) account.

Compiling the Report. Let me turn to the process through which the Departments of State and Defense compiled the section 581 report. During the FY1999 legislative cycle, separate reporting requirements on military training were included in foreign operations legislation. The conference report consolidated three earlier reporting requirements into section 581. As enacted, section 581 requires that the Secretaries of State and Defense report by January 31, 1999 -

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"on all military training provided to foreign military personnel under programs administered by the Department of Defense and the Department of State during fiscal years 1998 and 1999, including those proposed for fiscal year 1999. This report shall include, for each such military training activity, the foreign policy justification and purpose for the training activity, the cost of the training activity, the number of foreign students trained and their units of operation, and the location of the training. In addition, this report shall also include, with respect to United States personnel, the operational benefits to United States forces derived from each such training activity and the United States military units involved in such training activity.

I regret that we were not able to meet the January 31, 1999 due date for the report. The late enactment of the FY 99 Omnibus Appropriations legislation left only 15 weeks until the stated time for submitting the section 581 report. This was one of the over 550 congressional reporting requirements which Congress has directed the Department of Defense to satisfy in fiscal year 1999. We take these requirements seriously, but we must balance the timely completion of reports against the need to execute our mission -- and the need to take the time necessary to produce a responsive and meaningful report. In many cases, and it was certainly the case with section 581, an adequate final product may take more time than the statutory requirement permits. Given the scope of section 581, and the fact that much of the material had to be gathered from the field and was not readily retrievable through the record-keeping system, I believe we produced a quality product in a reasonable time.

Scope of the Report. Section 581 did not define "military training," or "foreign military personnel." We sought to read these terms broadly and consistently with their intended meanings as we understood them, and with reasonable practicality. To that end, we decided not to rely on formal DoD definitions for these terms in our data call. Doing so would mistakenly have limited input from the field on activities which we understood to be within the subcommittee's range of concerns. Rather, State and DoD developed a broad request for information sent to virtually all DoD components and State Department bureaus.

Specifically, we requested data for the report on all activities conducted by, or on behalf of, the Department of Defense or the Department of State, "where a significant objective is the transfer of knowledge or skills related to the performance of tasks of a military nature, to units or individuals of the uniformed armed services or civilian Ministry of Defense members of other nations." Again, this data call functioned as a means of gathering information for purposes of compiling the report, not as a formal definition of "training."

Thus, the people working on the project cast a broad net to produce an inclusive product. For example, the military services generally distinguish between "training" and "education." If we had restricted the data call to "training" as traditionally defined in the military, a range of classroom educational activities open to foreign military personnel through DoD regional security centers would have been eliminated from the report. We also included certain DoD engagement and education activities even though their primary purposes do not meet the established military definition of training foreign military personnel. In particular, we included information on Joint Combined

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Exchange Training (JCET) even though the primary purpose of this program is to train U.S., not foreign, military personnel because of obvious congressional interest in the program.

Military training can indeed be one element of engagement, but not all engagement activities are military training. We did not seek data on, and correspondingly did not include in the report, a number of classes of activities involving interaction with foreign militaries, notably combined exercises and traditional CINC engagement activities. Some examples of exercises include the regular Bright Star exercise, in which thousands of U.S., Egyptian, and other troops participate, or similar events like Cobra Gold with Thailand and Partnership for Peace exercise activities in Europe and the New Independent States. It would have been technically impossible to compile realistic financial data on exercises, and in any case the purpose of exercises is not training of foreign forces but improving the capacity of US and foreign forces to operate together and become more familiar with each other.

Similarly, we did not include traditional military contact and engagement programs. A particular engagement program that was treated in this matter is the EUCOM Joint Contact Team Program (JCTP). All of the regional CINCs maintain active programs of contacts with the militaries in their areas of responsibility. Because of the dramatic events over the last decade in Europe, EUCOM has developed its engagement program under the umbrella of JCTP. JCTP is a familiarization and orientation program established and operated by the US European Command to take advantage of the opportunity afforded by many former communist militaries seeking a closer association with the West. JCTP is closely coordinated with our embassies in Central and Eastern Europe and in the New Independent States. JCTP seeks to show foreign militaries how our military services operate; it does not train them in the activities demonstrated. United States personnel provide demonstrations or lectures under JCTP relating to a range of military activities.

The key difference between the demonstration, familiarization, and orientation activities of JCTP and a training program is that the JCTP does not attempt to increase capabilities of foreign personnel. Indeed, when, as sometimes happens, JCTP teams are asked by their audiences for instruction in the activities that have been demonstrated, the response from the US side is an offer to introduce the appropriate foreign point-of-contact to a US security assistance officer, who describes opportunities for training under FMS, IMET or otherwise. Then, foreign militaries may use the FMS system to obtain actual training in the types of activities they witness through the JCTP program.

JCTP does not circumvent Congressional oversight of foreign military training. JCTP is conducted under DoD authorities and with funds appropriated to DOD as it is a traditional defense function for CINCs to engage counterpart militaries in their respective regions. In this connection, I refer the subcommittee to the February 10, 1999 posture statement of the U.S. European Commander-in-Chief, General Wesley Clark, USA, recently submitted to your House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee colleagues, describing JCTP and calling it one of his "key elements of peacetime engagement" (pp. 29 – 30).

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That the US European Command has taken the initiative to develop a formal program for such engagement results from history's placement of many new democracies within that CINC's area of responsibility. We are proud of JCTP – the program is doing excellent work in a region that is among the highest US foreign policy and national security priorities.

Some Specific Questions.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to briefly address several questions have arisen since delivery of the report on March 5th.

Classification. DoD was asked why information on the JCET program was initially provided in classified form. The answer is that the information was provided to OSD by the Special Operations Commands in classified form, as is typical for their activities. There was not time to request a declassification review and still deliver the report in a reasonably timely fashion. As you know the annual report to Congress on JCET activities provided under 10 U.S.C. §2011 does provide this information in unclassified form. As I noted earlier, I am pleased that we are now able to present all of the FY98 JCET information in unclassified form.

Impracticality of tracking "alumni". We were also asked why we do not formally "track" foreign personnel after completing their U.S. training. The answer is found in the scale of this activity, as reflected in the size of the section 581 report, which includes a total of at least 67,142 foreign students over the two-year period covered. Formal tracking of "alumni" would be logistically very complex and costly – and perhaps impossible. It is doubtful that the information necessary for career-long tracking could be obtained from foreign citizens who have no continuing formal association with the U.S. government, and in any case we do not believe it would be worth the huge administrative burden that would be required to attempt to collect it. This burden would fall most heavily on embassy staffs which are already stretched very thin.

Of course, we do have some information about "alumni," because in many individual cases we find that the informal relationships established between U.S. personnel and their foreign training counterparts serve an important "tracking" function. Usually, the "graduates" do well, and often rise to high positions – and frequently credit their U.S. training as a key element in their career development. As is to be expected, there are sometimes reports of a foreign officer, charged with gross violations of human rights or other misconduct, who attended a U.S. training program at some point in his career. We correctly condemn those individuals, but their misconduct must not cast doubt on all recipients of similar U.S. training.

Compliance with legislation on human rights monitoring. With respect to human rights monitoring, I can report that we have implemented both section 8130 of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act for fiscal year 1999, the "Leahy Amendment," which relates to adverse human rights information and military training, and section 1062 of the Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 1999, which requires that all JCET activities be approved, in advance, by the Secretary of Defense. We integrate these two requirements by guidance providing that

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the information submitted to the Secretary of Defense in connection with seeking approval pursuant to section 1062 must include either any adverse information as described in section 8130, or a certification by a non-DoD member from the relevant country team that State has no such information. For other types of training we have issued guidance to insure that the information that section 8130 requires be considered is obtained, if any such information is known to the relevant embassy.

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Mr. Chairman, I recognize that there has been a good deal of media and some congressional attention to various military training programs in the last year or so. I want to conclude my remarks by categorically rejecting charges that have been leveled regarding foreign military training programs, claiming that we are intentionally ignoring the letter or spirit of the law, evading congressional oversight, or acting in a manner inconsistent with national policy. Let me respond with the following, specific points:

- Our foreign military training programs serve national policy and are closely coordinated with the State Department and relevant U.S. embassies.

- In all of its activities, the Department of Defense complies with requirements contained in statutes and we do our best to follow guidance on congressional intent that may be contained in legislative history and other sources.

- If an activity occurs that is contrary to law, the Department will identify the problem and fix it.

- There has been no attempt, deliberate or, to my knowledge, inadvertent or unauthorized, to evade the law with respect to training of foreign military forces. If the committee believes there are such cases and can identify them, I will investigate them and report back.

- There has been no attempt, deliberate or, to my knowledge, inadvertent, to omit responsive information from the section 581 report. On the contrary, we have included activities far broader than a standard military definition of "training" might otherwise require.

- Along with the Department of State, we will report our activities to Congress and explain the policy rationale for how our programs serve national interests and how they operate. We will provide additional information as requested to increase confidence in the transparency of our activities and objectives, and consistent with security for our forces, we will provide that information in unclassified form wherever possible.

The details of reporting aside, the underlying training and engagement programs are of key importance to our foreign policy and national security interests. The dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Soviet empire in Central and Eastern Europe, democratic reforms in Central and South America, as well as in southern Africa, have

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offered opportunities for which we waited decades. In these and other regions, we want the military establishments to be forces for stability at home, and potential coalition partners with us abroad. The activities described in the section 581 report represent a major investment toward those objectives. It is an investment that I hope to continue refining, with your support, in the future.

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Mr. CALLAHAN. Your statement will be submitted and accepted for the record.

Mr. Newsom.

Mr. NEWSOM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mrs. Pelosi, Mr. Lewis, Mr. Jackson. It is a pleasure to be here before this subcommittee. I will make a few brief remarks——

Mr. CALLAHAN. Mrs. Kilpatrick.

Ms. KILPATRICK. Kilpatrick.

Mr. NEWSOM. Oh, sorry. Mrs. Kilpatrick.

MR. NEWSOM'S OPENING STATEMENT

I would like to submit my full statement for the record.

I am pleased to join Under Secretary Slocombe today to discuss this joint report to Congress on foreign military training.

The Department of State provides the overall policy direction for a wide variety of Government activities, such as military training, which directly and indirectly support our foreign policy goals. We take this responsibility very seriously as we work with our colleagues in the Department of Defense on the conduct of foreign military training.

We welcome the opportunity to discuss any questions or concerns you may have regarding military training and share your interest in maintaining a close relationship between us in guiding these programs.

We view the thousands of training activities listed in this report as important tools of U.S. foreign policy. The activities funded through the foreign operations appropriation are explicitly intended to advance the foreign policy objectives of the United States. Fundamentally, this includes encouraging democracy, improving human rights and promoting regional stability.

These activities are a useful venue for strengthening bilateral ties, promoting greater understanding of American values and doctrine and demonstrating the United States is a worthy and valuable ally. It is through strong military-to-military interaction in peacetime that coalition members and allies are made in wartime.

On the other hand, the activities conducted by the Department of Defense, with its own appropriations, are largely intended to provide U.S. military units with training they need to fulfill their wartime and peacetime tasks. But even as they meet these needs, these DOD programs also contribute to our bilateral and regional policy objectives. Thus, regardless of the funding source, both State and Defense are fully cognizant of the degree to which these activities make important long-lasting contributions to U.S. national objectives.

Let me just briefly outline to you how the State Department participates in the policy review process to ensure that there is policy oversight over all of the activities, including those of the Defense Department.

Both the Department of Defense and the Department of State has a process at a variety of levels to review military training conducted for international personnel. This process ensures that training activities are in support and consistent with overall U.S. policy.

The theater commanders in chief, or the CINCs, and their staff start the approval process by formulating annual plans for their

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areas of responsibility. The CINCs and their staffs are in frequent contact with the U.S. embassy to clarify issues that impact foreign policy and training activities. The CINCs also benefit from having political advisers from the State Department, experienced senior foreign service officers, on their staffs.

The CINCs present their annual training and exercise plans to the respective U.S. embassies, where it is reviewed by the ambassador and the country team. If there are questionable cases, our embassies refer the issue to the Department of State and DOD for further guidance.

As training events draw closer and details are finalized, the unified command, again, clears the activity with the embassy to ensure that there are no new circumstances which could make the activity inconsistent with our bilateral and regional policy objectives.

While this procedure has generally been satisfactory, we are continuing to try to improve it, especially in countries where military training is sensitive. And greater scrutiny has resulted in cases where training exercises have been canceled or revised.

However, we are finding it is not always easy to determine which units or individuals were involved in abuses, especially in countries with weak judiciaries and poor record accountability. Our embassies are redoubling their efforts to record abuses to ensure that inappropriate personnel are not involved in our training programs and that training for qualified units is not delayed.

The great majority of training activities overseas do not raise human rights-related concerns and do not require vetting beyond that provided by the embassy country team. We are keenly aware, however, that troubled human rights records of security forces in some countries require especially close scrutiny, both locally by the embassy and back at the department level here in Washington. For example, allegations of human rights abuses in Indonesia resulted in cancellation of the JCET program there in May of 1998. Currently, U.S. military training with Indonesia military is limited to a small program of humanitarian, engineering and medical activities. In addition, a mobile team will provide training and human rights awareness in civil military relations.

In the case of Colombia, all individuals or units selected to receive training are carefully vetted by the embassy for criminal, human rights or narcotics violations. Through a 1997 End-Use Monitoring agreement with the Government of Colombia, we review indigenous sources of information; that is, criminal records, and then double-check them against U.S. Government records before training is approved.

In Turkey, the different elements of the U.S. mission in Ankara coordinate to ensure that no U.S. Government security assistance, which in this case is primarily IMET and counter-narcotics assistance, goes to security forces involved in human rights violations. We have seen something of an improvement in human rights performance of the armed forces in recent years, and we think that is, at least in some part, due to mandatory human rights training for both officers and noncommissioned officers of the Turkish armed forces.

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However, human rights problems continue in parts of the Turkish police, in particular, which led us last year to restrict Ex-Im funding of a U.S. sale of armored vehicles to the Turkish police.

In closing, I want to reiterate that foreign policy and military training are mutually reinforcing. Foreign training activities are investments that we believe reap significant dividends in the long run. We are constantly trying to improve our review process at multiple levels, both in the field and in Washington, to ensure that we are getting the most from our training activities.

Overall, the benefits derived from training activities have generated good will, promoted regional stability and improved interoperability with non-U.S. military forces, and we will work to continue to ensure that this type of training contributes to our diplomatic goals and is consistent with our overall foreign policy objectives, including advancement of human rights.

I thank the members of the committee for the opportunity to address you on this report and will be glad to try to answer any of your questions.

[The information follows:]

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STATEMENT BY
ASSISTANT SECRETARY ERIC D. NEWSOM

BEFORE THE
HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE ON FOREIGN OPERATIONS, EXPORT FINANCING AND RELATED PROGRAMS

Tuesday, March 23, 1999

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: I am pleased to join Under Secretary Slocombe today to discuss the Joint Report to Congress on Foreign Military Training. The Department of State, as an Executive Branch agency, is of course responsible for developing and implementing U.S. foreign policy. We provide the overall policy direction for a wide variety of U.S. government activities which directly or indirectly support our foreign policy goals. The Department of State takes this responsibility for providing direction and oversight very seriously, including our work with the Department of Defense on the conduct of foreign military training. We welcome the opportunity to discuss any questions or concerns you may have regarding military training, and share your interest in maintaining a close relationship in guiding these programs.

MILITARY TRAINING IS A TOOL OF FOREIGN POLICY

In the area of military training, we view the thousands of training activities listed in this report as important tools of U.S. foreign policy. On one hand, the activities funded through the Foreign Operations Appropriation are explicitly intended to advance the foreign policy objectives of the United States. International Military Education and Training (IMET), Foreign Military Financing (FMF), and Foreign Military Sales (FMS) are the best known examples of programs focused on foreign security forces.

On the other hand, the activities conducted by the Department of Defense with its own appropriations are in most cases intended primarily to provide U.S. military units with the training they need to fulfill their wartime and peacetime tasks. The Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) program is a good example of a program focused on U.S. forces. But these DoD programs also contribute to foreign policy objectives. They support regional stability and provide face-to-face demonstrations of how U.S. Armed Forces function in and support a democracy. So regardless of the funding source, both State and Defense are fully cognizant of the degree to which these activities make important and often long-lasting contributions in support of U.S. national objectives such as encouraging democracy, improving human rights and aiding regional stability.

Training foreign military personnel has long been recognized by both the Congress as well as the Executive Branch as a valuable tool for furthering U.S. foreign

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policy and national security interests. For example, the IMET program is a valuable program giving promising young officers from other countries an in-depth appreciation of how the world's most effective military – ours – can be a top-notch fighting machine while supporting and fostering the key values of respect for democracy, human rights, and civilian control of the military. I believe the Committee is well informed on how we ensure that these programs in the 150 Account are implemented in accordance with the law and the values of the U.S.

REVIEW OF TRAINING AT A VARIETY OF LEVELS

Both the Department of Defense and the Department of State have a process at a variety of levels to review military training conducted for international personnel. All of these training activities, whether funded through Foreign Operations Appropriations specifically for foreign policy reason, or funded through Defense Appropriations primarily to maintain our own military capabilities, are coordinated with the relevant regional Unified Command and the appropriate U.S. Embassy. This process ensures that training activities are in support of, and consistent with, U.S. policy.

The theater Commanders-in-Chief (CINC) and their staffs start the approval process by formulating annual plans for their areas of responsibility. We work closely with them on our foreign policy objectives for their regions and U.S. policy towards specific countries, and they shape their plans accordingly. These commanders also benefit from having Political Advisors, or POLADs, on their staffs. These experienced, Senior Foreign Service Officers are there to provide current foreign policy perspective and to be an effective liaison with the Department, thus playing a valuable role in satisfying both U.S. foreign policy goals and U.S. military training requirements. Where there are any doubts, the CINCs and their staffs are in frequent contact with the U.S. Embassy to clarify issues that impact training activities.

The process of reviewing foreign military training continues with the CINCs' presentations of their annual training and exercise plans to the respective U.S. Embassies for their consideration. As you know, the Ambassador is aided by a multi-functional country team which reviews proposed activities to ensure they are appropriate for the host country and consistent with bilateral and regional policy objectives. Finally, as individual training events draw closer and details are finalized, the Unified Command again clears the activity with the Embassy. Our embassies, per our instructions, refer questionable cases to the Department and the DoD for further guidance.

We continue to improve our review procedures. For example, there are a number of cases where training exercises have been cancelled or revised as a result of our enhanced review. Our embassies have long had the responsibility to report on human rights abuses by government security forces. But, we have found that it is not always easy to determine which units or individuals were involved in abuses, especially in

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countries with weak judiciaries and a poor record of accountability. By doubling our efforts to record abuses we will ensure that inappropriate personnel are not involved in our training programs, and that training for qualified units is not delayed.

MOST TRAINING IS NON-CONTROVERSIAL

The great majority of military training activities overseas do not raise human rights-related concerns and require no vetting beyond that provide by the Embassy operating with policy guidance from Washington. However, there are cases where a heightened awareness and further scrutiny are needed. These cases occur most often in connection with specific information developed by the Embassy and reported to Washington. Examples include the troubled human rights record of security forces in Indonesia, Columbia, and Turkey. In such cases, our assistance to the police and military is carefully vetted with the appropriate bureaus in the State Department to ensure that no training or materiel is provided to units where there is credible evidence they have been involved in the commission of gross violations of human rights.

On a few occasions, evidence of gross human rights violations has required a complete reappraisal of U.S. training activities in a specific country. In Indonesia, for example, DoD cancelled the JCET program in May 1998 and has not resumed the program. Currently, U.S. military training with the Indonesian military is limited to a small program of humanitarian, engineering, and medical activities. In addition, a mobile team will provide training in human rights awareness and civil-military relations. There is no training by the U.S military for the Indonesian military in lethal military skills, nor is any contemplated.

In the case of Colombia, approval for training activities involves a two-phased screening process by our Embassy's country team. All individuals or units selected to receive training are carefully vetted by the Embassy for criminal, human rights, or narcotics violations. This applies whether the planned training is in-country or in the U.S. Additionally, through a 1997 End-Use Monitoring agreement with the Government of Colombia, indigenous sources of information (e.g., criminal records) are reviewed and then double-checked against U.S. Government records before training is approved. In fact several training activities have recently been cancelled or delayed due to the rigorous screening process at our Embassy.

In Turkey, the different elements of the U.S. Mission in Ankara coordinate to ensure that no USG security assistance - primarily IMET and counter-narcotics assistance - goes to security forces involved in human rights violations. The State Department and human rights NGOs have noted a marked improvement in the human rights performance of the armed forces in recent years, as Turkey has instituted mandatory human rights training for both officers and non-commissioned officers upon entry and after each promotion. Human rights problems continue within parts of the Turkish police, which

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led us last year to restrict Ex-Im financing for a U.S. sale of armored vehicles to the police. There have been no specific reports of human rights abuses by the counter-narcotics police.

CLOSING REMARKS

In closing, we view military training with foreign personnel as an important foreign policy tool. But to ensure that foreign policy and military training are mutually reinforcing, we review the program repeatedly and at multiple levels in a revitalized process, both in the field and in Washington. Overall, we believe training activities have generated goodwill, promoted regional stability and improved interoperability with non-U.S. military forces. We will continue to ensure military training contributes to our diplomatic goals and that America's security and vital geopolitical interests are protected.

Mr. Chairman, I wish to thank the members of the Committee for the opportunity to address you on the Report on Foreign Military Training, and would be pleased now to answer any questions you may have.

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Intelligence Review

Evaluation Report on Training of Foreign Military Personnel - Phase III

Report Number OIR 98-610

July 28, 1998

Office of the Inspector General
Department of Defense

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Acronyms

ASD(C^3I)	Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence)
DIA (b)(3) 10 USC 424	[redacted]
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
FMS	Foreign Military Sales
GITC	General Intelligence Training Council
IAAFA	Inter-American Air Force Academy
IMET	International Military Education and Training
JMITC	Joint Military Intelligence Training Center
JSAT	Joint Security Assistance Training
MTT	Mobile Training Team
NCS	National Cryptologic School
NMITC	Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence Training Center
NSA	National Security Agency
SAO	Security Assistance Organization
SATP	Security Assistance Training Program
SOA	School of the Americas
TRADOC	U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
USAIC&FH	U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca

INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
400 ARMY NAVY DRIVE
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202

July 28, 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS, AND INTELLIGENCE)
COMMANDER, AIR EDUCATION AND TRAINING COMMAND
DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY

SUBJECT: Evaluation Report on Training of Foreign Military Personnel - Phase III (Report Number OIR 98-610)

We are providing this report for information and use. We conducted the evaluation in response to a Deputy Secretary of Defense request to assess various aspects of DoD intelligence and counterintelligence training to foreign military personnel. This report is the third of three evaluation reports. We considered management comments on a draft of this report in preparing the final report.

Comments on the draft of this report conformed to the requirements of DoD Directive 7650.3 and left no unresolved issues. Therefore, no additional comments are required.

We appreciate the courtesies extended to the evaluation staff. Questions on the evaluation should be directed to DOWOIG (b)(6), Program Director, at DOWOIG (b)(6) (DSN DOWOIG (b)(6)) or DOWOIG (b)(6), Project Manager, at DOWOIG (b)(6) (DSN DOWOIG (b)(6)). See Appendix C for the report distribution. The team members are listed inside the back cover.

David M. Crane
Director
Office of Intelligence Review

Office of the Inspector General, DoD

Report No. OIR 98-610 **July 28, 1998**
(Project No. 7OI-9009.02)

Training of Foreign Military Personnel - Phase III

Executive Summary

Introduction. This is the final report in a series of three produced in response to a request by the Deputy Secretary of Defense for an evaluation of the training of foreign military personnel.

Objective. Our objective was to evaluate intelligence and counterintelligence training provided to foreign military personnel throughout the DoD since 1992. Our evaluation focused on assessing whether current policies and procedures are adequate to ensure that training is appropriate and on how instructional materials are reviewed and approved for doctrinal consistency and currency.

Evaluation Results. With the following few exceptions, the DoD Components provide effective and appropriate intelligence and counterintelligence training to foreign military personnel.

- NSA (b)(3) 50 USC 3605 [redacted]

- While DoD Components have properly disclosed and released intelligence training materials to foreign military personnel, the Components have not complied with the August 1992 policy memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence) requiring certification of programs of instruction by the Defense Intelligence Agency.

- The August 1992, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence) policy memorandum does not address intelligence training provided through correspondence courses provided overseas.

- In only 3 of 110 cases that we reviewed, the DoD Components received Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence) approval for intelligence training conducted overseas.

- The U.S. Air Force Inter-American Air Force Academy, Lackland Air Force Base, Texas, was unaware of the requirement to have English master copies of their Air Intelligence course Spanish lesson plans and training materials. The U.S. Air Force Inter-American Air Force Academy has no procedure for maintaining English master copies for all other course lesson plans and associated training materials.

Summary of Recommendations. We recommend the following.

- The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence):

  - Establish periodic reviews of intelligence training for foreign military personnel through the General Intelligence Training Council and include the National Security Agency as an official member of the council.

  - Define the responsibilities and procedures for releasing intelligence training material to foreign military personnel, and establish procedures for reviewing disclosure decisions for currency.

  - Include in the new directive related to intelligence and counterintelligence training for non-United States persons the responsibilities for intelligence mobile training team assistance and correspondence courses provided overseas.

- The Commander, Air Education and Training Command:

  - Certify that the Inter-American Air Force Academy has all lesson plans and training materials for the Air Intelligence course available in English. The certification should be completed within 180 days from the issuance of this report.

  - Direct the Inter-American Air Force Academy to establish procedures for maintaining English master copies of all other course lesson plans and associated training materials.

Management Comments. We received comments on a draft of this report from the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence); the Air Education and Training Command; the Defense Intelligence Agency; the National Security Agency; and the Department of the Army. All organizations concurred with our report or had no comments. The Air Education and Training Command and the Defense Intelligence Agency offered suggestions to clarify the report. See Part VII for the complete text of those comments.

Evaluation Response. Management comments were responsive. Where appropriate, we modified the report as suggested by the Air Education and Training Command and the Defense Intelligence Agency.

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Part I - Introduction

Background

In March 1991, the U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) requested approval for a Mobile Training Team (MTT) to conduct counterintelligence training for Colombian military personnel in Bogota, Colombia. The Joint Staff did not endorse the proposal and requested clarification on the details of the course of instruction. Upon review of the proposed instructional materials, the Joint Staff and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) discovered that several passages contained inappropriate material that were inconsistent with U.S. laws and DoD policies. The materials, as Spanish language manuals, were being used in the USSOUTHCOM area of responsibility and at the School of the Americas (SOA) in Fort Benning, Georgia. Immediate corrective action was initiated and the training was never conducted.

In August 1991, the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) directed the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Intelligence Oversight) (ATSD[IO]), now the Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Policy, to conduct a full investigation of the matter. The report, "Improper Material in Spanish-Language Intelligence Training Manuals," March 10, 1992, recommended that the:

- Joint Staff establishes a policy to ensure that intelligence and counterintelligence training for foreign personnel is consistent with U.S. and DoD policy;

- DoD intelligence agencies and military service schools conducting intelligence training for foreign personnel ensure that training materials have been approved for consistency with U.S. and DoD policy;

- Army conduct a damage assessment of the classified information disclosed through the use of the manuals; and

- General Counsel, DoD, retain one copy of the manuals, and that all other copies of the manuals and associated materials be destroyed.

The SECDEF approved the report and directed the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence) (ASD[C^3I]) to issue instructions to implement the corrective actions. An August 27, 1992, memorandum, "DoD Policy on Intelligence and Counterintelligence Training to Non-United States Persons," issued policy to implement the recommendations approved by the SECDEF (see Appendix B).

The issue was addressed again during a 1995-1996 Government-wide review of U.S. activities in Guatemala and was discussed in the June 1996 report by the President's Intelligence Oversight Board.

In September 1996, the Deputy Secretary of Defense asked the Inspector General, DoD, to review the 1992 ATSD(IO) report and supporting material to

determine whether they were adequate in assessing individual responsibility and in determining whether corrective actions had been satisfactorily implemented.

Our report No. PO 97-007, "Evaluation Report on Training of Foreign Military Personnel-Phase I," February 21, 1997, satisfied the initial tasking. The tasking was subsequently expanded to examine how SOA training is reviewed and approved for doctrinal consistency and currency by appropriate DoD and Army functional proponents and to review intelligence training for foreign personnel throughout the DoD. Our report No. PO 98-601, "Evaluation Report on Training of Foreign Military Personnel-Phase II: School of the Americas," November 14, 1997, addressed the training at the SOA.

Objective

Our objective was to evaluate intelligence and counterintelligence training provided to foreign military personnel throughout the DoD, and to determine whether the current policies and procedures are adequate to ensure that the training is appropriate, and to determine how instructional materials are reviewed and approved for doctrinal consistency and currency. Appendix A contains a summary of prior reports and reviews related to this evaluation.

Scope and Methodology

The breadth of this task required that we issue reports in three phases.

- Phase I: Our February 21, 1997, report, (PO 97-007), which addressed the March 1992 ATSD (IO) report and supporting materials, and the August 27, 1992, ASD(C^3I) policy memorandum.

- Phase II: Our November 14, 1997, report, (PO 98-601), which evaluated the present policies and procedures for review and approval of training at the SOA.

- This report comprises Phase III and examines intelligence training for foreign personnel throughout the DoD. Because Phase I, and to a larger extent, Phase II, dealt with the training at the SOA, this report does not include statistics, interviews, or documentation reviews of the SOA.

To achieve our objective, we reviewed the ASD(C^3I) policy memorandum, "DoD Policy on Intelligence and Counterintelligence Training of Non-United States Persons," August 27, 1992; the Defense Intelligence Agency Regulation 24-12, "Training of Foreign Students," February 10, 1995; and the Department of the Army policy memorandum, "DA Policy on Intelligence and Counterintelligence Training of Non-U.S. Persons," March 24, 1997. Additionally, we reviewed more than 30 laws, regulations, and policies

governing intelligence and counterintelligence training for foreign personnel, including the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961; the Arms Export and Control Act of 1976; and the Joint Security Assistance Training (JSAT) Regulation, March 27, 1990.

We interviewed more than 90 U.S. Government civilian and military personnel from the DoD Components, which include the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Military Departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff, the unified commands, the Defense agencies, and the DoD Field Activities. Specifically, we interviewed:

- representatives from the ASD(C^3I) and the ATSD (IO);

- representatives at DoD organizations and training institutions who deal with issues related to intelligence training of foreign personnel;

- representatives from the Joint Staff, the Military Departments, and the five combatant commands and the U.S. Special Operations Command;

- course managers and instructors at Army, Navy, and Air Force Service Schools; and

- international military student officers at the National Security Agency's National Cryptologic School (NCS) at Fort Meade, Maryland; the Joint Military Intelligence Training Center (JMITC) at Bolling Air Force Base, Washington D.C.; the Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence Training Center (NMITC) at Dam Neck, Virginia; the Fleet Intelligence Training Center Pacific (FITCPAC) at San Diego, California; the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca (USAIC&FH) at Fort Huachuca, Arizona; the Inter-American Air Force Academy (IAAFA) at Lackland Air Force Base, Texas; and the 17th Training Wing at Goodfellow Air Force Base, Texas.

We reviewed more than 20 Internet home pages for the DoD Component schools and colleges that offer foreign military personnel training. Those home pages provide organization training missions, course descriptions and schedules, foreign personnel policies, and foreign student rosters.

We identified training of foreign military personnel in the four intelligence disciplines: Human Intelligence (HUMINT), Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT), and Imagery Intelligence (IMINT). Using the SOA Military Intelligence Officer Course description as a model, we identified specific intelligence courses used to provide intelligence training to foreign personnel since publication of the ASD(C^3I) August 1992 policy memorandum. We reviewed the course descriptions, objectives, student criteria, and classification of 119 DoD formal intelligence courses and identified intelligence training given to foreign military personnel overseas.

Finally, using the data collected from our sources of information, the interviews, the course descriptions, and the lesson plans, we:

- determined the DoD Component compliance with existing policy and guidance;

- determined the training methods used to train foreign military personnel; and

- assessed the currency, doctrinal correctness, and suitability of intelligence training materials used for foreign military personnel.

Structure of the Report

The details of our report are presented in four parts. Part II outlines the policies and procedures related to training foreign military personnel. Part III addresses the training methods for foreign military personnel. Part IV examines the intelligence training materials used for foreign military personnel. Finally, Part V gives our conclusions and recommendations.

Part II - Training Policies and Procedures

Training Policies

Legislative Requirements. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (22 U.S.C. Section 2151 et seq.), and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended (22 U.S.C. Section 2751) authorize the United States to provide security assistance to those countries requiring aid. The Security Assistance Training Program (SATP) provides training assistance through the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program or through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program.

DoD Policies. In support of this legislation, the DoD established policy and assigned responsibilities for intelligence training for foreign military personnel through DoD Directive 3305.2, "DoD General Intelligence Training," July 20, 1984. The Directive assigns the ASD (C^3I) with responsibilities to provide guidance and to review and comment on intelligence training conducted by all DoD Components. Also, the Directive establishes the General Intelligence Training Council (GITC), which addresses policy matters, training issues, and other intelligence topics.

The DoD promulgated additional guidance related to the training of foreign military personnel in the following.

- DoD Directive 5230.11 "Disclosure of Classified Military Information to Foreign Governments and International Organizations," June 16, 1992, provides guidelines and specific procedures governing the release of classified or sensitive information to foreign entities.

- DoD Manual 5105.38M, "Security Assistance Management Manual," change 8, dated April 1, 1998, provides guidance and procedures for the administration of U.S. military assistance and the FMS programs.

The Services addressed foreign assistance training in the JSAT Regulation, March 27, 1990. This Regulation merges Army Regulation 12-15, Air Force Regulation 50-29, and Secretary of the Navy Instruction 4950.4. The JSAT Regulation prescribes policies, responsibilities, procedures, and administration for the education and training of foreign military personnel and deals specifically with training under the IMET and FMS programs.

Following the 1991 discovery that improper training materials in the Spanish language were being used at the SOA and elsewhere in the U.S. Southern Command area of responsibility, the ASD (C^3I) issued the policy memorandum "DoD Policy on Intelligence and Counterintelligence Training of Non-United States Persons," August 27, 1992. The purpose of the policy memorandum is to ensure that greater attention is paid to intelligence and counterintelligence training given to foreign military personnel. Using the memorandum as guidance, the DIA issued its regulation DIAR 24-12, "Training of Foreign Students," February 10, 1995. The Regulation applies to all DIA elements and activities and prescribes policy, procedures, and responsibilities for the management and operation of the intelligence-related training program for

foreign military personnel. In support of the ASD (C^3I) policy memorandum, the Army published a memorandum, "DA Policy on Intelligence and Counterintelligence Training of Non-United States Persons," November 18, 1992, and revised on March 14, 1997. Finally, the uniqueness of the National Security Agency (NSA) mission warranted that it issue policies and procedures regarding the training of foreign military personnel. The NSA policies involve reviewing each foreign training request on a case-by-case basis.

Procedures Related to Intelligence Training

We identified five procedures that are related to intelligence training for foreign military personnel:

- identifying intelligence training requirements,
- funding of intelligence training,
- screening of foreign personnel,
- disclosing of U.S. military information, and
- instructor selection and training.

While each DoD Component uses its own regulations to administer those procedures, we found that the Components follow the guidance established in current laws, executive orders, and directives. We discuss each procedure.

Intelligence Training Requirements

DIA (b)(3) 10 USC 424 & (b)(3) 50 USC 3024(h)

DIA (b)(3) 10 USC 424 & (b)(3) 50 USC 3024(h) the affected DoD Component assesses its ability to meet the request. Training support is determined by each DoD Component without DoD-level oversight. However, we found occasions when DoD exercised oversight of intelligence courses taught to foreign military personnel. According to DIA documents, the GITC directed the DIA DIA (b)(3) 10 USC 424 to perform a curriculum review of "selected topical areas taught at the General Intelligence Training System schools" in October 1990. Later, in November 1993, the GITC directed the General Intelligence Training Advisory Committee to report on the Service schools' international officer intelligence training. The GITC is composed of a chairman, appointed by the Director, DIA, and a representative from DIA and each Military Department. The curriculum review in 1990 focused on five foreign officer intelligence training courses taught at the Service schools and the JMITC to determine whether intelligence courses were redundant.[1] The review did not consider NCS training. The curriculum review results concluded that each of the Service schools and the JMITC provided intelligence courses ". . . sufficiently different that there was no benefit from consolidation." The General Intelligence Training Advisory Committee report in January 1994, focused on the same five foreign officer intelligence training courses as the 1990 review, and added the Navy's Joint Intelligence Center Course. The report did not consider NCS training. The report concluded that the schools are performing international training in accordance with established guidelines.

Funding of Intelligence Training

When a foreign country has been approved for U.S. training assistance and a quota has been granted for foreign military personnel to attend DoD intelligence training, whether in residence or overseas, the course must be paid for by FMS or IMET programs.

Foreign Military Sales. The U.S. Government support under FMS requires that the United States recoup all expenses from a foreign country. Unless authorized through independent statutory or other legal authority, training expenses are considered to be under the SATP and must be fully reimbursed.

International Military Education and Training. The Department of State, in consultation with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, determines the IMET funding levels for each country. U.S. funds are made available to defray the costs of these missions in the fiscal year programs.

[1] The courses examined by the GITC were the International Officer Intelligence Basic Course (Army), the Naval Intelligence Foreign Officer Course, the Air Intelligence Officer Course at IAAFA (Air Force), the Imagery Intelligence Officer Course (Air Force), and the Combined Strategic Intelligence Training Program (JMITC).

NSA (b)(3) 50 USC 3605

[redacted]

Security Assistance Funding Process. When the SAO or DIA (b) learns of funding approval for a training requirement, he or she will initiate a Letter of Offer and Acceptance. An international binding agreement, the letter is used by the U.S. Government to offer to sell defense articles and defense services to a foreign government or international organization. The Department of State, DIA, and the Defense Security Assistance Agency review the letter. Once the letter is approved, the SAO or DIA (b) initiates Invitational Travel Orders for each foreign military person attending training in the United States. If the training is given by an MTT in a foreign country, the DoD Component tasked to provide the security assistance training can initiate travel orders for the DoD personnel upon receipt of funds.

On occasion, countries are prohibited from receiving U.S. security assistance. Sometimes, the prohibition is of short duration, such as a period immediately following a coup. In other instances, the prohibition may be long-term, such as when there are concerns about the lack of progress in human rights abuse cases or defaults on U.S. Government loans.

Our review of more than 500 records of foreign military personnel attending DoD-sponsored intelligence courses held from 1992 through 1997 indicated that every person was authorized training under IMET funding. Two Colombian officers attended intelligence courses in the United States when Colombia was under sanction due to lack of cooperation on counternarcotics operations. However, the officers had started their training several months before the restrictions became effective. Section 617 of the FAA provides for the "orderly termination of programs" which "may include the obligation and expenditure of funds to complete the training of studies outside their countries of origin of students whose course of study or training program began before assistance was terminated." The Colombian officers were allowed to complete their training. Once prohibition began, no other students from Colombia were allowed to begin training. The sanction on Colombia continued until February 1998.

Screening of Foreign Personnel

Since 1992, more than 900 foreign military personnel, representing 59 countries, have attended intelligence training at DoD schools and colleges as resident students. Each potential assignment of a foreign military person to a DoD training institution is first considered by the U.S. embassy in the country in which that person is a citizen. The embassy screening process is designed to ensure that all factors associated with an assignment to a DoD school or college are fully coordinated and that the resultant decision is consistent with U.S. policy. The same screening process is performed for foreign personnel attending U.S.-sponsored training provided by MTTs.

The screening process begins once a foreign country requests personnel quotas and provides the names and other identifying data of those they wish to nominate to the U.S. embassy. Since 1994, U.S. embassies have screened prospective foreign military personnel under guidance from a Department of State cable, "Screening the Human Rights Records of Nominees for U.S.-Sponsored Training," Date Time Group 111930Z JAN 94:

> ...that all candidates for U.S. training or travel grants - military and civilian - should be carefully checked for any record of criminal activity, human rights abuses or corruption that would make them ineligible or inappropriate for U.S. programs. This applies to nominees for, inter alia, International Military Education and training (IMET), DoD educational institutions, police training, counter-terrorism and counter-narcotics training and USIS [U.S. Information Service] international visitor programs. Screening the records of prospective nominees for human rights abuses, corruption and criminal actions is in keeping with the administration's emphasis on human rights, and greater congressional and public scrutiny of recipients of U.S. training and travel grants.

In November 1997, a Department of State cable further emphasized the screening of prospective foreign military personnel. "Screening Nominees for U.S.-Sponsored Training Programs," Date Time Group 192156Z NOV 97, stated:

> Effective screening of all candidates, military and civilian, selected to participate in grant-funded U.S. training programs, in country or in the U.S., is a matter of continuing concern and interest both in the Department [of State] and the congress. Future congressional support will depend ... on firm evidence that training programs are not only meeting their goals and objectives, but that only personnel of unquestionable character are selected to participate in them.

A December 1997 joint Department of State and DoD cable, "Guidance for Screening Candidates - U.S.-Sponsored Training Programs," Date Time Group 231411Z DEC 97, detailed supplemental guidelines to facilitate the foreign military personnel screening and selection process. The guidelines direct that the foreign country must certify in writing that local record and background checks on potential students have been performed and are satisfactory, relevant members of the U.S. embassy Country Team have screened potential students, the SAO or DIA (b) has interviewed potential students for suitability, and records of potential students will be maintained for 10 years.

The SAO or DIA (b) administers the English Comprehension Level test to potential foreign students. With the exception of the School of the Americas and the IAAFA at Lackland Air Force Base, Texas, which conduct all instruction in Spanish, all intelligence training conducted in DoD schools and by MTTs is in English. Foreign military personnel enrolled in DoD training

courses must understand, speak, read, and write in English to attain required skills and professional competence. Each course has an established minimum English Comprehension Level score for enrollment of foreign personnel. The minimum scores for the intelligence training courses vary depending on the extent of comprehension needed. Once prospective foreign military personnel have successfully completed the screening process, the SAO or DIA (b) (2), 10 will brief them on policies and regulations, legal status, the training program, standards of conduct and personal appearance, travel status, military records, and purchasing U.S. items.

Upon arrival at the DoD training institution, foreign military personnel fall under the administrative supervision of the international military student managers. The international military student managers are DoD personnel, military or civilian, who are responsible for the management of foreign military personnel while they are assigned to the training activity. The student manager briefs foreign military personnel on DoD Component regulations and local policies. Additionally, the student manager re-administers the English Comprehension Level test. We interviewed the international military student managers at the NCS, JMITC, NMITC, FITCPAC, the USAIC&FH, the IAAFA, and the 17th Training Wing. None reported having any foreign personnel returned to his or her country for failing the English Comprehension Level test.

Disclosure of U.S. Military Information

Although foreign military personnel attending U.S.-sponsored intelligence training receive a security screening before leaving their countries, the granting of a U.S.-equivalent security clearance does not permit the disclosure of classified U.S. information. DoD Directive 5230.11 requires that only officials with delegated authority can specifically authorize such disclosure. The disclosure of DoD information refers to the release of classified information to foreign governments. Because intelligence training material may involve information derived from classified or unclassified sources, DoD training institutions must also determine what unclassified intelligence training information may be released as part of the overall disclosure process.

Unclassified material. Commanders of training institutions may authorize the release of unclassified publications used in their courses. We learned that the commanders make this decision after careful consideration of the material and its relevance to the intended country. When unclassified training materials, training aids, and training devices are requested by a foreign country, release authority may be granted by the foreign disclosure office of the DoD Component.

Classified material. DoD Directive 5230.11 makes the DoD Component originating the classified information responsible for determining its release for presentation to foreign governments or foreign military personnel. Disclosure of classified intelligence information provided as training must meet all of the following criteria.

- Disclosure is consistent with U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives concerning the proposed recipient foreign government.

- Disclosure is consistent with U.S. military and security objectives.

- The foreign recipient of the information will afford it substantially the same degree of security protection given to it by the United States.

- Disclosures will result in benefits to the United States at least equivalent to the value of the information disclosed.

- The disclosure is limited to information necessary to the purpose for which disclosure is made.

Of the 119 intelligence courses taught by DoD training institutions since 1992, 62 (52 percent) were unclassified. The 57 classified courses were approved by authorized disclosure officials and attended by students who held the appropriate security clearance. International intelligence course managers requested disclosure approval each time information in a classified course changed or when a new country gained approval for attendance. One course manager mentioned that a course update caused a country, previously eligible to attend the training, to be dropped from attending the course. Additionally, the classified Joint Intelligence Course at the NMITC has two separate versions, one for Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom, and one for Japan.

We found no adverse effects from existing policy regarding oversight of the disclosure process. In the 1992 policy memorandum, the ASD(C^3I) assigned DIA the oversight responsibility for the release of intelligence training material. The policy states that, "DIA will be responsible for certifying that the information has been cleared for release to the foreign government specified before endorsing the POI [program of instruction]." While DoD Components (including DIA) properly disclosed and released the intelligence courses they offered, we found no documentation that the programs of instruction had been certified by DIA. DoD Components are not aware of this requirement.

Instructor Selection and Training

The DoD instructors, at resident schools and overseas, are the primary contact for foreign military personnel at U.S.-sponsored training. The DoD process of selecting and training instructors seeks to ensure that foreign military personnel receive quality training.

Instructor Selection. Instructors for DoD include both military and civilian personnel. On occasion, the DoD will use U.S. Government contractors to provide training to foreign personnel. The contractors teach specific intelligence systems or skills. U.S. Government contractors do not teach intelligence doctrine or policy. The criteria for selecting instructors depend on

the subject-matter expertise required. DoD training institutions identify instructor requirements and justifications as part of their manning documentation. The SOA and IAAFA instructor requirements include a foreign language capability.

Instructor Training. The NSA, DIA, and the Military Departments require instructor training for both military and civilian personnel assigned to instructor positions. At the NCS, instructors participate in a training program designed to recognize the professional status of instructors. The instructors must complete a 1-week course, "Training Methods for Cryptologic Instructors," and must be certified in the subject matter they teach.

Instructors at DIA must complete the instructor training course at NSA or an equivalent professional instructor training course. The instructors are observed and critiqued by team chiefs.

The Military Services schools have similar programs for training and technical certification of their instructors. Although the programs are administered by the Service school commandants, the policies and procedures for training qualified instructors are guided by the Military Departments through their training commands: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, U.S. Air Force Air Education and Training Command, and U.S. Navy Chief of Naval Education and Training. Instructors must complete instructor qualification training and demonstrate competency in the courses they teach. Supervisors evaluate instructors and provide periodic certification approval.

Security Assistance Orientation Training. Security assistance training is provided to military or civilian personnel who interact with foreign military personnel. During security assistance training, personnel are provided information on the role of security assistance in U.S. foreign policy, the status of foreign military personnel, and the administrative security issues related to foreign personnel enrolled in U.S.-sponsored training. At all DoD training institutions we visited, instructors, course managers, and international military student managers were familiar with their security assistance responsibilities.

Selection of Instructors for Security Assistance Teams. Security assistance teams provide training to foreign military personnel overseas in the form of technical assistance or MTTs. The MTT performs a specific training mission over a short period of time (less than 179 days). An MTT member can be military, DoD civilian, or U.S. Government contractor. Selection of personnel to perform security assistance training overseas is based on subject-matter expertise, availability, and the duration of the duty. Selected instructors attend country orientation courses or briefings. A human rights orientation is included in briefings provided to prospective instructors. The Army provides a 3-day course through the Security Assistance Training Management Organization, at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. The Air Force requires attendance at the U.S. Air Force Special Operations School, Hurlburt Air Force Base, Florida. The Navy and Marine Corps control team deployments through the Naval Education and Training Security Assistance Field Activity, Pensacola, Florida, or the Marine Corps Combat Development Command at Quantico, Virginia.

Conclusion

Throughout the DoD, the five procedures related to intelligence training for foreign military personnel are functioning well with appropriate levels of oversight. We concluded that the intelligence training conducted since 1992 conformed to established laws, regulations, and policies with two exceptions. First, although we found no adverse effects, the ASD(C^3I) should use the GITC as the forum to address intelligence training issues as they affect foreign military personnel. Furthermore, including NSA as an official member of the GITC will enhance the council's effectiveness. Second, because of the ineffective enforcement of the ASD(C^3I) 1992 policy memorandum, DoD Components are unaware of the provision that requires DIA certification of programs of instruction for release to foreign governments. The ASD(C^3I) must determine the responsibilities and procedures for release of intelligence training materials, and establish periodic reviews of disclosure decisions.

Part III - Training Methods

Training Methods

The DoD provides intelligence and counterintelligence training to foreign military personnel through three training methods: resident, correspondence, and MTT assistance. Resident training involves on-site instruction at DoD-sponsored training facilities. Training by correspondence offers courses to foreigners by mail. MTTs, composed of DoD civilian and military personnel on temporary duty, are invited to train foreign personnel in their own country. Since August 1992, we found that 119 intelligence courses were taught in residence, 281 through correspondence, and 110 through MTT assistance. These figures do not include courses taught at the SOA, because SOA training was previously covered in our Phase I and II reports.

Resident Courses. Of those 119 courses taught to foreign personnel representing 59 countries, 105 provided technical instruction or assistance on installation, operation, and maintenance of U.S. intelligence systems or computer operating systems and programs fielded to foreign governments. None of the 105 technical intelligence courses contained material covering doctrine or policy. The remaining 14 intelligence courses involved in-depth instruction in one or more of the intelligence disciplines and included material covering doctrine and policy. The 119 courses are categorized by activity as follows.

Defense Agencies	Courses	Countries
National Security Agency (National Cryptologic School)	[redacted]	[redacted]
Defense Intelligence Agency (Joint Military Intelligence Training Center)	[redacted]	59
Army	**Courses**	**Countries**
U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca	[redacted]	57
Navy	**Courses**	**Countries**
Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence Training Center	[redacted]	4
Fleet Intelligence Training Center Pacific	[redacted]	28

Air Force	Courses	Countries
Inter-American Air Forces Academy	[redacted]	9
17th Training Wing	[redacted]	38

Marine Corps	Courses	Countries
Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence Training Center	[redacted]	1

We reviewed the content and the security classification of all 119 courses and examined the disclosure process of each DoD Component for classifying and releasing information to foreigners, and found no problems. We also ascertained whether the course material was presented in English. With one exception, all courses were taught in English with the requirement that each foreign student meet an acceptable English comprehension level prior to attendance. The IAAFA Air Intelligence course is the only intelligence course taught in Spanish. Legislative history accompanying Public Law 101-510, recognizes that the IAAFA conducts all training in Spanish. All courses were unclassified or sanitized to the appropriate level of classification.

Correspondence Courses. NSA (b)(3) 50 USC 3605 [redacted]

NSA (b)(3) 50 USC 3605 [redacted]

Mobile Training Team Assistance. The basic function of the MTT is to train and assist foreign personnel in areas such as combat operations and intelligence. The teams are not intended to perform SAO functions or to augment U.S. forces in a foreign country. Instead, the teams seek to achieve specific training objectives in connection with the development of a country's defense capability. An SAO should not request overseas training assistance unless the training meets all the MTT requirements delineated in the JSAT Regulation. When

Training Methods

MTT assistance is requested, Military Department resources will be used unless the SECDEF determines that providing assistance will have an adverse effect on the combat readiness of that Military Department. In those cases, the use of DoD civilian or contractor personnel may be considered.

From 1992 through 1997, the DoD deployed 110 MTTs in support of 19 countries and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. All teams conducted training in English and covered areas such as indications and warnings, tactical air intelligence, cryptographic analysis, digital communications, fiber optics, and overhead collection management. The 110 deployments are categorized as follows.

Defense Agency	MTT	Countries
National Security Agency (National Cryptologic School)	[redacted]	[redacted]
Defense Intelligence Agency (Joint Military Intelligence Training Center)	[redacted]	2 + NATO
Army	**MTT**	**Countries**
U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca	[redacted]	1
Training and Doctrine Command (Security Assistance Training Management Office)	[redacted]	2
Marine Corps	**MTT**	**Countries**
Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence Training Center	[redacted]	2
Unified Commands	**MTT**	**Countries**
Atlantic	[redacted]	8 + NATO
European	[redacted]	13
Pacific	[redacted]	3

The DoD Components conducted MTT assistance in accordance with the JSAT Regulation. Specifically, MTT assistance was properly requested and programmed through FMS or IMET channels as required, requisite programs of instruction were assembled, and the disclosure of classified information was properly approved. However, only 3 of the 110 deployments complied with the provision of the ASD(C^3I) policy memorandum by obtaining approval for training conducted overseas. The Pacific Command's MTT in support of exercise VIGILANT BLADE during 1995 through 1997 received ASD(C^3I) approval as well as the approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as required.

Further, the MTT assistance courses conducted by DIA and NSA were available at a resident school. The JSAT Regulation states: "MTTs will be requested only when no other training is available to accommodate a particular training requirement." Even though DIA and NSA do not technically come under the purview of the JSAT Regulation, we believe that ASD(C^3I) coordination and approval of DIA and NSA MTT assistance would ensure compliance with applicable policies and procedures.

Conclusion

The DoD Components provide training to foreign military personnel through three methods: resident, correspondence, and MTT assistance. We found no problems with resident training. We did note that the IAAFA Air Intelligence course is the only intelligence course taught in Spanish. NSA (b)(3) 50 USC 3605 [redacted]. Even though the 1992 ASD(C^3I) policy memorandum does not specifically address correspondence training, we believe that this area needs definition in the new directive under development. Further, although the DoD Components conducted MTT assistance in accordance with the JSAT Regulation, only 3 of 110 MTT deployments complied with the provision of the ASD(C^3I) policy memorandum related to obtaining approval for training conducted overseas.

Although DoD policy on intelligence and counterintelligence training of foreigners currently exists as a memorandum, the DoD Components are not following the policy and the ASD(C^3I) is not enforcing the policy. In our Phase I report, dated February 21, 1997, we recommended that the ASD(C^3I) reissue the August 1992 policy memorandum as a DoD directive to ensure that DoD Components fulfill their continuing responsibilities and that oversight organizations scrutinize intelligence training provided to foreign students. To date, the ASD(C^3I) has not reissued the policy in a DoD directive.

Part IV - Training Materials

Training Materials

Our examination of the intelligence training offered to foreign military personnel from 1992 through 1997 included a review of the training materials. The August 1992 ASD(C^3I) policy memorandum states that "training material used or provided must have been approved by the appropriate DoD doctrinal authority to ensure it is consistent with U.S. and DoD policy and must have been cleared for foreign release." The intelligence courses taught by the DoD received proper disclosure and release authority. This section discusses the content of the intelligence courses provided to foreign personnel.

National Cryptologic School, Fort Meade, Maryland. NSA (b)(3) 50 USC 3605 [redacted]

The curricula presented by the NCS relate directly to cryptologic professions or disciplines. They are of two types of which the first type is cryptology. The curricula include courses necessary to develop professional skill in a cryptologic discipline. The second type includes courses taken from disciplines outside but important to cryptology (for example mathematics and computer science). Some of the courses are identical to courses taught outside the cryptologic community. In some cases, they are modified to meet the needs of cryptology. The NCS curricula taught to foreign personnel contains no intelligence doctrine or policy courses.

Of the NCS courses currently offered, 79 percent has been revised and approved since 1991. Course versions that are older than 1991 involve mathematics, language, linguistics, and basic computer science skills. As the DoD proponent on cryptology, the NCS determines the requirement to update its technical courses through individual course managers.

The NCS courses follow a standard format. The NCS Training Manual requires that each program of instruction sets the terminal learning objectives for measuring student performance, develops detailed training materials, and serves as the primary document for reviewing the course content. Course documents provide the course objectives, student qualifications and prerequisites, terminal learning objectives, testing and homework guidelines, and requirements for successful course completion.

The Joint Military Intelligence Training Center, Bolling Air Force Base, Washington D.C. The JMITC has taught foreign military personnel in 11 intelligence courses since 1992. The majority of foreign personnel have attended the Combined Strategic Intelligence Training Program, which is opened to foreign military personnel only. The course objective is to provide foreign military personnel an understanding of the major functions of joint and combined intelligence activities, worldwide challenges posed to U.S. national

security, and the role of the intelligence analyst. The program provides seminars on current intelligence subjects of high interest and contains an initial 5-day orientation followed sequentially by 2 courses: the 2-week National Intelligence Course and the 3-week Intelligence Analyst Course. The National Intelligence Course lesson plans cover doctrinally approved information concerning intelligence at strategic, operational, and tactical levels. The course includes a 2-hour lesson entitled, "Ethics and Moral Leadership for the Intelligence Professional," which includes emphasis on recent executive and legislative policy on ethical conduct of intelligence personnel. The Intelligence Analyst Course lesson plans include analytical theory involving critical thinking and analytical writing. The JMITC faculty performs annual updates of the Combined Strategic Intelligence Training Program.

Matriculation in the other ten courses has been limited to Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom due to security classifications of the courses. The National Senior Intelligence Course provides senior officers (Lieutenant Colonel and Colonel) an understanding of the national and defense intelligence communities. The Defense Intelligence Production Analysis Course addresses intelligence analysis of foreign defense industrial activities and facilities. The remaining eight courses focus on training military intelligence analysts in the fundamentals of indicator-based methods and analytical systems. The courses are the Indications and Warnings Course, Intelligence Information Operations Course, Modernized Integrated Data Base Manager's Overview, Modernized Integrated Data Base Fundamentals and Applications, Modernized Integrated Data Base Fundamentals and Applications Train-the-Trainer, Modernized Integrated Database Production in Units, Modernized Integrated Data Base User Transition Course, and Modernized Integrated Data Base Train-the-Trainer. Like courses at the NCS, these courses specialize in the technical training of intelligence analysts.

Department of the Army. The USAIC&FH in Arizona manages four courses given to foreign personnel: the International Intelligence Officer Basic and Advance Courses, the Intelligence in Combating Terrorism Course, and the Ground Surveillance Systems Operator Course. The USAIC&FH provides foreign military personnel with a working knowledge of the responsibilities and duties of tactical intelligence staff personnel.

Both the International Officer Intelligence Basic and Advance Courses are for foreign officers only. The Basic Course lasts 10 weeks and is designed for entry-level intelligence officers. The Advance Course takes 15 weeks and emphasizes preparing officers for unit command and intelligence duties at all echelons. Both courses were reviewed and approved by the USAIC&FH in 1994.

The 2-week Intelligence in Combating Terrorism Course provides a working knowledge of intelligence in combating terrorism. Foreign military personnel are taught specific techniques and methodologies used in analyzing terrorists and terrorist groups and how to develop a terrorist threat assessment for military installations and deploying units. The course has been limited to Canadian and Australian military personnel only. The USAIC&FH reviewed and approved this course in 1994.

The 4-week Ground Surveillance Systems Operator Course trains enlisted personnel in the operations and maintenance of ground surveillance systems. While intended to train U.S. personnel only, the course had six appropriately cleared Australian military personnel attend portions of instruction while in foreign liaison positions at Fort Huachuca from 1993 through 1996. The USAIC&FH reviewed and approved the course in 1995.

We reviewed the programs of instruction, course summaries, and lesson plans for each of the four courses. The courses cover doctrinally approved intelligence information and included instruction in human rights and legal issues. While the Combating Terrorism Course contains terrorist case studies, the studies are viewed from an historical perspective to give students practical examples of indications and warnings.

The USAIC&FH lesson plans follow a standard format. The lesson plans are prepared in accordance with TRADOC Regulation 350-70, "Training Development Management, Processes, and Products," September 24, 1995, which requires terminal learning objectives for measuring student performance, development of detailed training materials, and reviews of the course content. The lesson plans provide the course objectives, student qualifications and prerequisites, terminal learning objectives, testing and homework guidelines, and requirements for successful course completion.

Department of the Navy. The Navy provides intelligence training to foreign military personnel at two locations, the NMITC, Dam Neck, Virginia, and the FITCPAC, San Diego, California. The NMITC teaches the Joint Intelligence Center course to Australian, Canadian, United Kingdom, and Japanese personnel at the classified level. The Marine Corps provided a one-time intelligence training course for intelligence officers of the Royal Saudi Navy in December 1996. That course was taught at NMITC using unclassified lesson plans on Terrorism Analysis. FITCPAC provides unclassified intelligence training to foreign officers representing 28 countries in the Naval Intelligence Foreign Officer Practical Application Course.

The Joint Intelligence Center course is designed to provide students assigned to joint intelligence positions with the skills required to conduct all-source intelligence analysis. The 4-week course provides students fundamental information to function in a joint warfare environment and focuses on joint intelligence collection, tasking, and information management. Training methods involve classroom lectures, practical exercises, and guest speakers. We reviewed the Joint Intelligence Center training course control documents, master schedule summary sheets, curriculum outlines of instruction, and student study guides. From the curriculum outlines and study guides, we reviewed the training material covering HUMINT, terrorism analysis, noncombatant evacuation operations, SIGINT, special operations, and counternarcotics. The material presented approved doctrinal information and follows the course learning objectives. The Chief of Naval Education and Training reviewed and validated the Joint Intelligence Center material 1994, and the course materials are under revision for 1998.

The Naval Intelligence Foreign Officer Practical Application Course offers foreign military personnel general intelligence training in naval analytical techniques and procedures. In addition to classroom instruction, students receive an understanding of U.S. society, institutions, and goals. The 5-week course is offered once a year. Of the total training hours, the course uses 11 percent of that time briefing the students on U.S. intelligence. The briefings cover the history of U.S. intelligence, U.S. security policy, current intelligence issues, intelligence support for battle group operations, SIGINT, and intelligence support to special operations. The remainder of the students' time involves briefings on naval operations and U.S. society and institutions. Foreign military personnel receive training on civil rights issues from city of San Diego government representatives. The Commander, Naval Training Center, FITCPAC, reviews and approves the course content annually.

Department of the Air Force. Foreign military personnel receive Air Force intelligence training in three courses under the Air Education and Training Command. The 17th Training Group at Goodfellow Air Force Base, Texas, instructs the Defense Sensor Interpretation and Application Training Program and the International Intelligence Applications Officer course. The IAAFA, Lackland Air Force Base, Texas, teaches the Air Intelligence course in the Spanish language.

The Defense Sensor Interpretation and Application Training Program lasts 15 weeks. The course is designed to train U.S. personnel intermediate and advanced level imagery analyst skills. However, since 1992, five foreign officers (Canadian, Australian, and British) have attended this classified course. We examined the training plan, course chart, and individual lesson descriptions. The 17th Training Wing commander reviewed and approved the course in 1996.

The International Intelligence Applications Officer course trains foreign officers (Captain to Lieutenant Colonel) from 40 countries during a 14-week period. The course is designed to educate foreign officers in the knowledge and skills needed to perform basic intelligence applications and imagery interpretation functions. We reviewed the training plan, plan of instruction, course chart, and individual lesson plan descriptions. From the individual lesson plans, we examined classes on targeting, international terrorism, and mission planning. Foreign personnel receive training on Rules of Engagement, Law of Armed Conflict, and the Geneva Convention. The current course was updated in 1994 and was reviewed and approved by the 17th Training Group Commander in 1997. The course is being updated for 1998.

The 10-week IAAFA Air Intelligence course provides unclassified intelligence training to foreign military personnel. Course content includes principles of intelligence; intelligence skills; mapping, charting, and geodesy; order of battle; and combat intelligence operations. We reviewed the training plan, plan of instruction, course chart, and individual lesson plan descriptions. Since the course is taught in Spanish, we selected several classes for IAAFA instructors to provide an English version of their classroom instruction. The instructors translated their classroom materials for human rights, survival, evasion, resistance, and escape, and search and rescue, Rules of Engagement, Law of

Armed Conflict, and the Geneva Convention classes. The IAAFA commandant reviewed and approved the classes in 1996 and 1997.

The IAAFA maintains English versions of the plans of instruction for its Air Intelligence Course. We examined those materials and found them consistent with DoD policy. However, we found that the lesson plans and briefing slides for the course were in Spanish. The 1992 ASD(C^3I) policy memorandum requires that a "master copy of all lesson plans and instructional material must be available in the English language." The academy's instructors write their draft lesson plans and training material in English that are then translated into Spanish. During our visit, the faculty could not produce copies of lesson plans or briefing slides in English. Given the lack of English translations, we could not fully verify all of the course contents. The academy had not received the 1992 DoD policy memorandum, and was unaware of the requirement.

In addition to the Air Intelligence course, we learned that the IAAFA provides training in 72 other courses, all of which are taught in Spanish. Even though the IAAFA maintains English versions of the plans of instruction for all those courses, the lesson plans and the associated training material exist only in Spanish. While this evaluation focused primarily on intelligence training for foreign personnel, the availability of English versions of lesson plans and associated training materials for all IAAFA courses is essential to facilitate effective external oversight of course content. Presently, only qualified IAAFA faculty and staff conduct course content evaluations.

Mobile Training Team and Correspondence Training Material. Of the 110 MTTs and 281 correspondence courses used overseas since 1992, we were able to assess the content of all the training. All but seven MTTs and all the correspondence courses originated from the resident courses and training materials described above. Considering the dates of the training and the reviews and approval dates of the materials, we concluded that the training presented since 1992 was consistent with U.S. and DoD policy.

The seven MTTs involved two intelligence training programs. Four teams provided U.S. Government contract training support for the Linked Operations Intelligence Centers Europe through the U.S. European Command. The Linked Operations Intelligence Centers Europe is an intelligence gateway computer system providing coalition connectivity between the United States, NATO, and allied military services. The other three team deployments supported the U.S. Pacific Command combined exercise VIGILANT BLADE. We determined that the materials used by the seven mobile training teams were consistent with U.S. and DoD policy.

Conclusion

The DoD Components have established periodic review and approval procedures of training materials to ensure that information is current and appropriate for foreign military personnel. The DoD school commandants or their representatives are the approval authorities for all programs of instruction,

and the training materials used since 1992 conform to DoD regulations and policies. The only exception is the lack of master copies of English lesson plans at the IAAFA, making external examination difficult. The academy was not aware of the DoD policy. The staff and faculty at the academy are currently producing master lesson plans in English for the Air Intelligence course.

Part V - Summary

Conclusions

We evaluated intelligence and counterintelligence training provided to foreign military personnel throughout the DoD. We determined that current policies and procedures are adequate to ensure that the training is appropriate, and the instructional materials are properly reviewed and approved for doctrinal consistency and currency.

Several weaknesses in training exist, however. First, while DoD oversight in evaluating intelligence training requirements for foreign personnel was performed in 1991 and 1994, NSA (b)(3) 50 USC 3605 [redacted]. Second, while the DoD Components have properly controlled disclosure and release of intelligence training information under other existing directives and policies, they are not complying with the 1992 ASD(C^3I) policy memorandum requiring DIA certification of programs of instruction. Third, the ASD(C^3I) policy memorandum does not address intelligence training provided through correspondence courses overseas. Fourth, only 3 of 110 overseas MTTs received prior ASD(C^3I) approval. Lastly, because the IAAFA did not receive the 1992 policy memorandum, the academy did not know the ASD(C^3I) requirement to have master copies of the Spanish lesson plans in English for their Air Intelligence course. The IAAFA has no procedures for maintaining English master copies for all other course lesson plans and associated training materials. The presence of English master copies facilitates external review of all training provided to foreign personnel.

Recommendations:

A. We recommend that the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence):

1. Establish periodic reviews of intelligence training requirements for foreign personnel by the General Intelligence Training Council.

2. Include the National Security Agency as an official member of the General Intelligence Training Council.

3. Define and enforce the responsibilities and procedures for releasing DoD intelligence training material to foreign personnel.

4. Establish the responsibilities and procedures for periodic reviews of disclosure decisions.

5. Include in its new directive on intelligence and counterintelligence training of non-United States persons the DoD Component responsibilities for the approval of mobile training team assistance, and address the approval of courses offered through correspondence.

B. We recommend that the Commander, Air Education and Training Command:

1. Certify that the Inter-American Air Force Academy has complied with the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence) 1992 policy by having all lesson plans and instructional material for the Air Intelligence course available in English. The certification should be completed within 180 days from the publication of this report.

2. Direct the Inter-American Air Force Academy to establish procedures for maintaining English master copies of all other course lesson plans and associated training materials.

Appendix A. Summary of Prior Reports and Reviews

During the last 5 years, the General Accounting Office; the Inspector General, DoD; the General Counsel and Inspector General, DoD; the SOA Board of Visitors; the U.S. Army Infantry Center Task Force; and the Professional Software Engineering, Inc., issued reports discussing SOA issues.

General Accounting Office

Report No. NSIAD-96-178 (OSD Case No. 1171), "School of the Americas - U.S. Military Training for Latin American Countries, " August 22, 1996, states that the SOA training is intended to provide a long-term investment in a positive relationship with Latin America. Training at the SOA makes up a small percentage of the entire training the Army provides to foreign students. The courses offered at the SOA are based on U.S. military doctrine and are similar to courses at other Army training locations. The SOA courses emphasize the protection of human rights. The report did not address problems or weaknesses at the SOA and offered no recommendation for corrective action.

Inspector General, DoD

Report No. PO 97-007, February 21, 1997, "Evaluation Report on Training of Foreign Military Personnel - Phase I." The report provides the results of a review of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Intelligence Oversight) report of March 1992 on the use of Spanish language intelligence training manuals in the U.S. Southern Command area of responsibility and at the SOA. The evaluation was undertaken at the request of the Deputy Secretary of Defense to determine whether the 1992 report was adequate to assess individual responsibility and to determine whether corrective actions recommended in the report were satisfactorily implemented. The Inspector General, DoD, evaluation determined that the 1992 report was adequate for concluding that no deliberate or orchestrated attempt was made to violate DoD or Army policies and that no further investigation was required. In August 1992, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence) issued a policy memorandum on intelligence and counterintelligence training of non-U.S. persons. The memorandum directed that the appropriate authority must approve the training materials to ensure consistency with policy and that the material must be cleared for foreign release. The Inspector General, DoD, evaluation concluded that the memorandum had little impact and that only the Army and the Defense Intelligence Agency published implementing instructions. The evaluation report recommended that the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence) reissue the memorandum as a DoD directive.

Part VI - Additional Information

Report No. PO 98-601, November 14, 1997, "Evaluation Report on Training of Foreign Military Personnel - Phase II: School of the Americas." The report evaluated whether the current policies and procedures concerning instruction at the SOA are adequate to prevent the use of improper training materials and whether the school's lesson plans and instructional material are reviewed and approved for doctrinal consistency and currency. The report was the second of three issued in response to the request of the Deputy Secretary of Defense to evaluate the training of foreign military personnel. The Inspector General, DoD, evaluation determined that the SOA had initiated several commendable measures designed to focus attention on human rights. The measures included the creation of a Board of Visitors as well as an enhanced human rights training program for students and instructors. The Inspector General, DoD, evaluation made several recommendations, including:

- the TRADOC revise the 1990 Special Relationship Memorandum of Agreement to specify the oversight role of the U.S. Army Infantry Center;
- the SOA adopt the TRADOC standard lesson plan format;
- the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, revise the 1992 Army policy on intelligence and counterintelligence training of no-U.S. persons;
- the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs), in conjunction with the Department of the Army, seek DoD coordination whenever consideration is given to assigning foreign military personnel to the SOA from countries under sanction.

General Counsel and Inspector General, DoD

The DoD Guatemala Review Panel, chaired by the DoD General Counsel and Inspector General, issued Report Serial Number SI-433514-95, "Guatemala Review-Report to the President's Intelligence Oversight Board," October 31, 1995. The report, which focused on a Government-wide review of allegations surrounding the death, disappearance, and kidnapping of U.S. citizens and others in Guatemala, described the use of inappropriate training materials in the U.S. Southern Command area of responsibility from 1982 through 1991. The report states that Guatemala was among the nations that received intelligence training from U.S. Southern Command MTTs using inappropriate manuals and that Guatemalan military personnel were students at the SOA when the manuals were in use.

Board of Visitors

The "Initial Report of the Board of Visitors," July 8, 1996, states that the SOA mission is being pursued in an exemplary manner by the Commandant, SOA.

The report indicates that the SOA fulfills a need in providing doctrinal training as well as instruction on civilian control, democratic values, and human rights. The report made several recommendations, including that:

- the current mission of the SOA remain unchanged;
- the SOA become more relevant to Latin American country needs by modifying its doctrine, curriculum, and course materials;
- the SOA remain under the Training and Doctrine Command;
- Spanish remain the principal language for SOA courses; and
- the SOA curriculum be monitored to ensure that current inclusion of human rights instruction is maintained and strengthen.

U.S. Army Infantry Center Task Force

At the direction of the Commander, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, a task force was created in 1994 to review all aspects of the operations of the SOA in response to a request received from the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs for a full report on SOA. The U.S. Army Infantry Center Task Force, "Report on the School of the Americas," March 15, 1994, states that the SOA has been and remains a valuable strategic instrument. The SOA accomplishes its assigned mission and complies with applicable regulations. The nomination and selection process of the SOA cadre and students is sound. The SOA courses are comprehensive, doctrinally sound, and cost-effective. Less than 1 percent of all SOA graduates are alleged to have committed crimes or human rights violations. There is no evidence that indicates that the SOA courses influenced alleged criminal behavior. The report concludes that the SOA program for human rights training is the most comprehensive and well developed program in the U.S. Army. The report recommends that the SOA be provided adequate resources to continue to execute it mission and that an active duty lawyer be assigned to the SOA faculty to enhance its human rights awareness training.

Professional Software Engineering, Inc.

The Professional Software Engineering, Inc., a private sector company, was contracted by the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command to conduct a study of the SOA. In its "White Paper on U.S. Army School of the Americas," August 4, 1995, the company points out that the SOA is strategically important to the U.S. and that the SOA mission supports U.S. foreign policy. The report states that the publicity received by the SOA has given the U.S. Army an opportunity to examine the SOA operations closely and resulted in added emphasis on human rights in the course materials. The white paper stresses that human rights violations by Latin American military personnel cannot be linked to SOA instruction or training.

The white paper recommended that:

- the Army reaffirm Spanish as the language of instruction at the SOA;
- the SOA be subordinate to USSOUTHCOM;
- the TRADOC seek a clear statement of policy regarding the SOA;
- the TRADOC ask the DoD to review the interpretation of the Expanded IMET criteria; and
- the TRADOC investigate the affiliation between the SOA and the Inter-American Defense College.

Procedural Guidance for Intelligence and Counterintelligence Training of non-U.S. Personnel

Existing Military Department, DIA, NSA, and JCS procedural guidance for training with CONUS remain in effect.

Existing responsibilities for technical review of training proposals remains in effect.

In the case of intelligence and counterintelligence training provided overseas, formal programs of instruction (POI) must be developed prior to the initiation of training. These POI must contain lesson plans and copies of all instructional materials, including handouts, to be used in the training.

Lesson plans and materials will be standardized to the maximum extent practicable and will be generated by the appropriate Military Department major command responsible for training doctrine. In cases where appropriate lesson plans have not been prepared by the Service major command and cannot be prepared in time to meet objectives critical to the combatant commanders, draft lesson plans and material may be proposed by the U&S command involved, but must be endorsed as doctrinally correct by the appropriate Service major command. Services will assure that adequate English language translations exist of all material.

All POIs shall be reviewed doctrinally by the Services which is proponent for the subjects being taught, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the National Security Agency (for SIGINT subjects), and the Joint Staff. DIA will be responsible for certifying that the information has been cleared for release to the foreign government specified before endorsing the POI. Prior to any deployment of training personnel, the training proposal shall be reviewed by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence) (ASD(C3I)). The ASD(C3I) will accomplish staffing within OSD and with the intelligence community as necessary. Requests for ASD(C3I) review should not be forwarded until the concurrence of the appropriate Military Services, DIA, and all appropriate Joint Staff offices has been obtained. These concurrences and any pertinent comments should be shown in the request for ASD(C3I) review.

Appendix C. Report Distribution

Office of the Secretary of Defense

Deputy Secretary of Defense
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)
  Deputy Chief Financial Officer
  Deputy Comptroller (Program/Budget)
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence)
Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)
General Counsel of the Department of Defense
Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Policy
Director, Defense Logistics Studies Information Exchange

Joint Staff

Director, Joint Staff
Inspector General, Joint Staff

Department of the Army

Secretary of the Army
Under Secretary of the Army
Deputy Under Secretary of the Army for International Affairs
Commander, Training and Doctrine Command
Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Inspector General, Department of the Army
Auditor General, Department of the Army
Commandant, United States Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca
  Inspector General, United States Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca

Department of the Navy

Secretary of the Navy
Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Financial Management and Comptroller)
Inspector General, Department of the Navy
Inspector General, United States Marine Corps
Chief of Naval Education and Training
  Inspector General, Naval Education and Training
Commandant, Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence Training Center
Commandant, Fleet Intelligence Training Center, Pacific

Department of the Air Force

Secretary of the Air Force
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Financial Management and Comptroller)
Inspector General, Department of the Air Force
Commander, Air Education and Training Command
Commandant, Inter-American Air Forces Academy
Commander, 17th Training Wing

Unified Commands

Commander in Chief, U.S. European Command
  Inspector General, U.S. European Command
Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command
  Inspector General, U.S. Pacific Command
Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command
  Inspector General, U.S. Atlantic Command
Commander in Chief, U.S. Southern Command
  Inspector General, U.S. Southern Command
Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command
  Inspector General, U.S. Central Command
Commander in Chief, U.S. Special Operations Command
  Inspector General, U.S. Special Operations Command

Defense Organizations

Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
  Inspector General, Defense Intelligence Agency
Director, Defense Logistics Agency
Director, National Imagery and Mapping Agency
  Inspector General, National Imagery and Mapping Agency
Director, National Security Agency
  Inspector General, National Security Agency
Director, Defense Security Assistance Agency

Non-Defense Federal Organizations and Individuals

Office of Management and Budget
Technical Information Center, National Security and International Affairs Division, General Accounting Office

Chairman and ranking minority member of each of the following congressional committees and subcommittees

  Senate Committee on Appropriations
  Senate Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations
  Senate Committee on Armed Services
  Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
  Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs
  House Committee on Appropriations
  House Subcommittee on National Security, Committee on Appropriations
  House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight
  House Subcommittee on Government Management, Information, and Technology, Committee on Government Reform and Oversight
  House Subcommittee on National Security, International Affairs, and Criminal Justice, Committee on Government Reform and Oversight
  House Committee on National Security
  House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence

Part VII - Management Comments

Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence) Comments

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
6000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-6000

COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS, AND INTELLIGENCE

June 3, 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Evaluation Report on Training of Foreign Military Personnel – Phase III
Project No. 7OI-9009.02

We have reviewed the draft evaluation report and agree that steps must continue to be taken to strengthen and revitalize our role regarding intelligence training. As a result of the Phase I Report recommendation to reissue the August 1992 ASD(C3I) policy memorandum as a DoD Directive, a draft directive on intelligence and counterintelligence training for non-U.S. persons was drafted, but has not yet been formally coordinated throughout the Department.

Our response to the Phase II Report included a statement that the approximate completion date for the DoD Directive would be April-May 1998. That date will be extended to allow time to incorporate the recommendations in the Phase III Report into the draft Directive, and staff it throughout the Department for review and coordination. This process is anticipated to take several weeks.

For further assistance, please contact DOWOIG (b)(6) at DOWOIG (b) or DOWOIG (b)(6) at DOWOIG (b)

Cheryl J. Roby
Acting
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Intelligence & Security)

Proposed Changes to DoD IG Training of Foreign Military Personnel
Phase III
6 May 1998 (Draft Evaluation Report)

AETC requests the following changes to the draft report:

Executive Summary, last bullet statement corrected to read: "The USAF Inter American Air Forces Academy (IAAFA), Lackland AFB, Texas, was unaware of the requirement to have an English language master copy of their Air Intelligence course." — Revised Exec Sum

Page ii, Summary of Recommendations, second bullet, changed to read: "The Commander, Air Education and Training Command, certify that IAAFA has the Air Intelligence course lesson plans and training material available in English." — Revised Exec Sum

Page 28, Conclusion, 3rd sentence, amended to read: "External evaluation of Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence courses by personnel not Spanish language qualified is difficult due to IAAFA's lack of English lesson plans." — Revised page 28

Page 30, Conclusions, last two sentences changed to read: "Lastly, because the IAAFA did not receive the 1992 policy memorandum, the Academy did not know the ASD (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence) requirement to have master copies of the Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence applicable courses lesson plans in English. The English copies allow external review by personnel not Spanish language qualified." — Revised page 30

Page 31, para B., amended to read: "We recommend that the Commander, AETC, certify the IAAFA has complied with the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence) 1992 policy letter by having the Air Intelligence course (MASL D172023) lesson plans and audiovisual slides available for review in English." — Revised page 31

Atch

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Defense Intelligence Agency Comments

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20340-

DIA (b)(3)

JUL 02 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Training of Foreign Military Personnel - Phase III (Project No. 7OI-9009.02)

Reference: DoD IG Memorandum, May 6, 1998, subject as above.

1. The reference document was reviewed, and the following comments are provided:

a. Suggested corrections to content:

(1) Page 3, Scope and Methodology, last paragraph: The date for the Defense Intelligence Agency Regulation 24-12, "Training of Foreign Students," should read February 10, 1995 vice 1990.

Revised page 3

(2) Page 8, Training Policies, DoD Policies, second bullet in second paragraph: DoD Manual 5105.38M, "Security Assistance Management Manual," has been updated to change 8, dated 1 April 1998.

Revised page 8

(3) Page 24 and 25, Training Materials, The Joint Military Intelligence Training Center, Bolling Air Force Base, Washington, D.C., paragraph one: The number of courses taught at the JMITC that have been attended by foreign military personnel should be 13 vice 6. In paragraph two, the seven courses additional courses are:

Revised pages 4, 1 18, 19, 24 25

- National Seniors Intelligence Course
- Defense Industrial Production Analysis Course
- Modernized Integrated Data Base Manger Overview
- Modernized Integrated Data Base Production (Installations)
- Modernized Integrated Data Base User Transition
- Modernized Integrated Data Base Train-the-Trainer Fundamentals and Applications
- Modernized Integrated Data Base Train-the-Trainer Production Course

Additionally, the listed Modernized Integrated Database Train-the-Trainer course should be changed to Modernized Integrated Data Base Train-the-Trainer Transition.

(4) It should be noted that international training issues have been addressed by the General Intelligence Training Council (GITC) subsequent to 1991. A General Intelligence Training Advisory Committee (GITAC) on Intelligence Training for International Personnel was convened on 27 January 1994 as required by the November 1993 GITC. The GITAC's stated purpose was to provide a forum to discuss intelligence training for international personnel among the intelligence community training professionals and to lay the groundwork for a standardized policy. During the meeting, the attendees provided the currently available international training courses, discussed the process of providing other training, and addressed the concerns of the community regarding this issue. There was representation from all Services, the Service schools, DIA, and DSAA. More importantly, NSA representatives were invited and attended this GITAC on international training.

Revised pages 10, 16, 30, Exec Sum

b. Comments on Recommendations for the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence): p 30.

(1) Recommendation A1: Concur.

(2) Recommendation A2: The National Security Agency chairs the Cryptologic Training Council (CTC), a body similar in scope and function to the General Intelligence Training Council. Both councils invite representatives from the other council as observers, not members, to their respective meetings. As such, recommend that for international training issues, NSA (CTC) coordinate with the GITC and that the GITC be responsible for the consolidation and coordination necessary to provide the oversight required by the ASD(C3I). In addition, the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) provides international training and should be included as a member in any international training forum to ensure complete DoD coverage. NIMA training of international students was not addressed in the subject report, and it is recommended that the GITC also consolidate any issues from the Community Imagery Training Council (CITC).

(3) Recommendation A3: Concur with the general premise; however, the unspecified details on definition, responsibilities, and procedures for the release of DoD intelligence training material could have an impact on DIA resources. Recommend thorough coordination with DIA on this issue to ensure sufficient resources are available to satisfy the requirements as dictated in the new directive. Disclosure decisions for training material are made by the Service/ organization developing the training, and DIA Foreign Disclosure will review only that material derived from DIA sources.

(4) Recommendation A4: Concur.

(5) Recommendation A5: In addition to the DoD component responsibilities for approval listed in this recommendation, approval of technology-based training (TBT) and military training missions (MTMs) that provide intelligence training should be addressed. More and more intelligence training is becoming available via TBT, and currently little guidance for the provision of this training to an international audience exists (other than standard disclosure issues). Additionally, approval guidance for intelligence training provided by MTMs was not reported by this study but should be included in the new directive.

(6) Recommendation B: Concur.

2. My point of contact for this report is DIA (b)(3) 10 USC 424 & (b)(6) [redacted]

Barbara A. Duckworth

BARBARA A. DUCKWORTH
Chief of Staff

National Security Agency Comments

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000

Serial: COMP-030-98
17 June 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
INSPECTOR GENERAL, DOD

SUBJECT: Training of Foreign Military Personnel - Phase III

NSA has reviewed the report, "Training of Foreign Military Personnel - Phase III," dated 6 May 1998. NSA has no comments, critiques or corrections to make regarding the report. Thank you for the opportunity to review the report.

Please contact NSA (b)(3) 50 USC 3605 Audit Liaison NSA (b)(3) 50 USC 3605 if you have any questions or need additional information.

ROBERT J. LIBERATORE
Comptroller

Department of the Army Comments

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, DC 20310-1001

REPLY TO ATTENTION OF

DAMI-ZR (36-2b) 3 Jun 98

MEMORANDUM FOR INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE REVIEW (MR. BOB VIGNOLA), 400 ARMY NAVY DRIVE, ARLINGTON, VA 22202-2884

SUBJECT: Training of Foreign Military Personnel – Phase III (Project No. 7OI-9009.02)

The Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (ODCSINT) has reviewed the subject report and concurs with the report as written.

DoW OIG (b)(6)

Intelligence Internal Review

Team Members

This report was prepared by the Office of Intelligence Review, Office of the Inspector General, DoD.

DOWOIG (b)(6)